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Pertence ao Processo de Afastamento nº 186/87,
do Prof. Dr. Kanavillil Rajagopalan do Departa
mento de Linguística do Instituto de Estudos da
Linguagem.

ASSUNTO: Relatório de Afastamento referente ao
período de 20/11/93 à 19/01/94

RELATÓRIO

Docente responsável : Prof. Dr. Kanavillil Rajagopalan
Unidade : DL / IEL
Assunto : Atividades desenvolvidas no exterior
Ocasião : Estágio de Pós-doutoramento
Universidade hóspede no exterior : Universidade da Califórnia, Berkeley, EUA
Unidade : Departamento de Filosofia
Período : 1 ano; de 20-01-93 a 19-01-94
Autorização para o afastamento : Portaria do Reitor, de 22-06-92 (D.O.E., Sec. II, São Paulo, 102 (117) terça-feira, 23 de jun. 1992), com base em Parecer CADI 500-92
Data da entrega deste documento : Janeiro de 1994

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PROCESSO - Nº 186/87

K. Rajagopalan

RELATORIO

Kanavillil Rajagopalan

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APRESENTAÇÃO

Este relatório documenta um resumo das principais atividades desenvolvidas ao longo do ano de 1993, período no qual estive nos E.U.A., na qualidade de "Visiting Scholar and Research Associate" junto ao Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade da Califórnia, Campus de Berkeley.

Após um apanhado geral sobre a pesquisa que foi desenvolvida nesse período, dos contatos com pesquisadores locais e visitantes dos mais diversos países do mundo inteiro, das palestras e conferências assistidas ou proferidas, dos cursos e "graduate seminars" que foram acompanhados na qualidade de "auditor", segue-se uma reflexão geral e pessoal a respeito do "state of the art" que verifiquei no campo do meu interesse acadêmico mais imediato, a saber, a Filosofia da Linguagem. Por fim, acham-se anexados a este relatório cerca de 120 páginas de documentação comprobatória, composta basicamente por 6 trabalhos escritos durante o período da minha estadia no exterior.

PESQUISA DESENVOLVIDA NO PERÍODO

O projeto de pesquisa que se pretendia realizar durante o

estágio de pós-doutoramento fixava como meta principal aprofundar numa linha de pensamento que vinha perseguindo desde 1988 (graças a uma bolsa de pesquisa concedida pelo CNPq - Processo nº 306151/88-0) e, de forma geral, desde o ano de 1978 quando iniciei a pesquisa que serviu de base para a minha tese de doutorado. Ademais, propunha-se a tentar divulgar a um público maior a pesquisa já realizada por mim durante todo esse período, com o intuito de recolher o 'feedback' imprescindível tanto para averiguação da qualidade do trabalho como para fixar metas futuras.

E com grande satisfação que posso registrar que obtive sucesso além do esperado em todos os dois sentidos. Quanto à primeira meta, isto é, a de aprofundar na linha de pesquisa que venho perseguindo já há mais de uma década, foi possível sanear as lacunas de ordem bibliográfica que sempre inibiam avanços em alguns momentos cruciais.

Nos dois semestres acadêmicos que passei em Berkeley, foi possível acompanhar, na qualidade de "auditor", os seguintes cursos:

PHILOSOPHY 3: The Nature of Mind (John R. Searle)

PHILOSOPHY 133: Philosophy of Language (John R. Searle)

PHILOSOPHY 183: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Hans Sluga)

PHILOSOPHY 185: The American Pragmatists (Elizabeth Lloyd)

PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec. 4: Heidegger and Foucault (Hubert Dreyfus)

PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec. 7: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Language (Stephen Neale)

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PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec.1: Realism & Reason in Science
(Martin Jones).

PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec. 2: Objectivity: The Holy Grail in
Science, Epistemology, and the Philosophy of Mind
(Elizabeth Llyod)

PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec. 3 Realism and Social Construction
(John R. Searle)

LINGUISTICS 290 D Sec.2: Cognitive Science and Social
Inquiry (George Lakoff)

PHILOSOPHY 290 Sec. 7: Subjectivism and the Reality of
Colour (Barry Stroud)

Em alguns como 'Philosophy 3', 'Philosophy 183', 'Philosophy
290/7', 'Philosophy 290/3' e 'Linguistics 290', a minha partici-
pação foi muito mais do que de um mero observador, tendo sido
convidado tanto para participar nos debates como iniciar a
discussão de pontos polêmicos (moot points) que pudessem então ser
usados como pontos de partida para debate aberto.

Os diferentes departamentos que compõem a UC Berkeley têm
uma programação bastante intensa de colóquios, palestras, e
conferências. Segue-se, em baixo, uma lista parcial de alguns dos
eventos que pude acompanhar de perto (a lista foi confeccionada a
partir das anotações e/ou os cartazes que foram recebidos via a
'mailing list' e não cobre a totalidade).

David Zubin 12/02/93 "Semantic fragmentation: how
disorganized can a category get ?" Cognitive Science

John McDowell 18/02/93 "Truth and externalism" Philo-
sophy

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- Paul Kiparsky 24/02/93 "Anaphora" Linguistics.
- Peter Godfrey-Smith 26/02/93 "Phenotype plasticity and cognition" Cognitive Science.
- Alexander Garcia-Dittman 04/03/93 "AIDS - a philosophical perspective". Philosophy.
- Paul van Geert 12/03/93 "Dynamics of development" Cognitive Science.
- Ivan Sag 28/04/93 "Minimalism" Linguistics.
- George Lakoff 03/05/93 "Conceptual analysis" Anthropology
- Fernando Flores 06/05/93 "Philosophy and business" Philosophy.
- Hans D. Sluga 06/05/93 "The architectonics of knowledge" Berkeley Art Gallery.
- Katherine Nelson 07/05/93 "Constraints and non-constraints on children's word-learning" Psychology.
- James D. McCawley 27/08/93 "Discontinuities and other non-standard kinds of constituent structure" Cognitive Science.
- Dominic W. Massaro 10/09/93 "Perceiving talking faces" Education.
- Paul Vincent Spade 09/09/93 "How to start and stop: Walter Burley on the Instant of Transition". Philosophy
- John R. Searle 24/09/93 "The rediscovery of the mind". Cognitive Science.

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John Ohala 13/09/93 "Speech perception and lexical representation: the role of vowel nasalization in Hindi and English" Linguistics.

John Dupré 07/10/93 "The solution to the problem of the freedom of the will". Philosophy

Vilayanur Ramachandran 08/10/93 "Neural plasticity in the adult human brain: phantom limbs, blind spots, and strabismus". Cognitive Science

John Haugeland 28/10/93 "Mind embodied and embedded". Cognitive Science.

Lokendra Shastri 12/10/93 "From simple associations to systematic reasoning: a neurally motivated model of rapid inference". Cognitive Science.

Linda Waugh 03/11/93 "Iconicity in the lexicon and its relevance for morphology and semantics" Linguistics.

Além dessas conferências e palestras, tive o grande prazer de assistir aos "Sather Classical Lectures" do ano - uma série de conferências em homenagem a um dos mais ilustres ex-reitores da universidade - que no ano de 1993 contou com a presença de Alexander Nehamas da Universidade de Princeton que proferiu 6 conferências sobre o tema "Socratic reflections: Echoes and images from Plato and Xenophon to Nietzsche and Foucault", nas seguintes datas: 10, 17, e 24 de fevereiro, e 3, 10, e 17 de março, de 1993.

Um outro evento de grande importância no qual também tive o prazer de participar foi um congresso de 3 dias sobre o tema

"Context and Interpretation" que houve nos dias 18, 19 e 20 de março de 1993 e que contou com a presença de especialistas de diversos países do mundo.

O ano de 1993 foi profícuo também no que tange a produção e divulgação acadêmicas. Em anexo, acham-se 6 trabalhos redigidos durante o período (sendo 5 em inglês e 1 em português) redigidos durante o período da minha estadia no exterior. Desses, 2 (Anexos 2 e 3) são versões escritas de conferências proferidas, respectivamente, no Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, e no Townsend Center for the Humanities. Outros 2 artigos (Anexos 1 e 5) já foram aceitos para publicação, e estão previstos para saírem na Revista D.E.L.T.A. O quinto (Anexo 4) foi objeto de discussão num seminário no Departamento de Retórica, UC Berkeley. O sexto deverá ser apresentado dentro em breve num congresso de literatura no Brasil.

O ano de 1993 foi extremamente valioso para mim no que diz respeito aos contatos pessoais que obtive com acadêmicos das mais diversas áreas que me interessam, áreas estas que, nos últimos anos, me deram subsídios para o meu próprio trabalho enquanto pesquisador.

Além dos docentes do Departamento de Filosofia com o qual estive oficialmente ligado, foi possível conhecer professores e pesquisadores de outras áreas como a Linguística, a Teoria Literária, Letras Clássicas, Anthropologia, História, Ciência Política, e Português.

A FILOSOFIA DA LINGUAGEM: UMA REFLEXÃO ACERCA DO SEU

'STATE OF THE ART'

Kanavillil Rajagopalan

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Indubitavelmente, a Filosofia da Linguagem permanece, ainda hoje - na ante-véspera da virada do século XX - a sub-área que conta com o maior prestígio no campo da Filosofia, ameaçando, cada vez mais, as demais sub-áreas historicamente tidas como centrais à investigação filosófica. Nas universidades principais nos Estados Unidos, assim como nos demais centros de excelência no mundo inteiro, o enfoque principal das pesquisas no campo da Filosofia continua sendo - como facilmente demonstra uma consulta às listas que contêm dados sobre as teses e dissertações defendidas a cada ano - sobre a questão da linguagem. Trata-se de uma tendência que vem se consolidando desde que a linguagem passou ao lugar central da investigação filosófica, naquilo que vem a se caracterizar como a principal inovação no campo no século e o inconfundível traço distintivo seu em relação aos séculos anteriores. Comprova-se, em outras palavras, o caráter definitivo e, ao que parece, irreversível, da tendência que se iniciou no apagar das luzes do século XIX com Gottlob Frege - a tendência que Richard Rorty, aproveitando uma dica fornecida pelo filósofo francês Henri Bergson, batizou de "a virada lingüística" ("linguistic turn").

Uma prova muito clara dessa tendência atual é a proposta que

está em pauta no momento em algumas universidades de vanguarda como a UC Berkeley, de fundir os departamentos da Filosofia e da Lingüística, já que, no entender de muitos, as linhas de demarcação tornaram-se demasiado tenues. É interessante registrar a esse respeito que a maior resistência a tal proposta se constitui em uma questão puramente institucional, que é a de o que fazer com as sub-áreas como a Filosofia de ciência, de um lado o, a Fonética, de outro lado, que não teriam como justificar seu vínculo com a nova disciplina que surgiria da proposta união.

Engana-se porém, a meu ver, quem pensa que seja a Filosofia um campo de estudos coeso e consolidado, onde as grandes preocupações, algumas das quais oriundas desde os primórdios na Grécia Antiga, estejam a caminho de serem solucionadas definitivamente. Muito pelo contrário, a sensação mais forte que tive ao longo do ano que passei no Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade da California - Berkeley, na qualidade de Visiting Scholar e Research Associate, foi a de que o campo está à espera daquele momento fatídico que deverá despertar mudanças decisivas, inclusive uma possível implosão e, quem sabe, até uma redefinição. De onde a importância da observação feita casualmente por John R. Searle, recém eleito membro do poderoso National Endowment for the Humanities, e, por sinal, o "sponsor" da minha estadia nos E.U.A., de que um quarto de século após ter entrado no campo como um "jovem turco" já se sente a sensação não tão confortável de fazer parte do Establishment, sobretudo diante das dificuldades em aceitar algumas das idéias novas que estão no ar.

Na verdade, não resta mais nenhuma dúvida de que a assim chamada 'Filosofia Analítica' - herdeira da tradição Austro-Anglo-Americana e pensar filosófico - já não conta com tamanho entusiasmo, nem mesmo nos países em que, até há pouco, sua hegemonia absoluta parecia questão pacífica. Por outro lado, ainda não há nada no horizonte que prometa ser capaz de ocupar o vazio que um eventual desmoronamento da 'mainstream philosophy' fatalmente ocasionará no mundo anglofônico.

A assim-chamada 'Filosofia Continental' - rótulo que na verdade se constitui num grande desrespeito à multiplicidade de tendências e interesses que os países do continente europeu, menos a Grã-Bretanha, historicamente vêm cultivando - sempre foi vista com desconfiança pelos filósofos dos países anglofônicos. Nada me parece evidenciar qualquer mudança a caminho a curto prazo. No entanto, nos discursos dos filósofos analíticos, a frequência com que se ouve críticas crescentes a Derrida, Deleuze, Bataille, Lyotard, Baudrillard e outros da França, e Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer - para não falar de Hegel - e outros da tradição teutônica, faz pensar que, de alguma forma, esses nomes continuam sendo pedras no sapato deles.

O mais curioso, porém, é que já há algum tempo, verifica-se uma certa receptividade quanto a nomes como o de Michel Foucault (que, segundo fui informado nos bastidores, aceitara, pouco antes do seu adoecer, um convite para integrar o corpo docente da UC Berkeley na qualidade de Professor Visitante, dividindo seu

tempo, de dois em dois anos, entre Paris e Califórnia. Um detalhe interessante (contado por H. Dreyfus, um dos mais destacados intérpretes de Foucault nos E.U.A.) e que, na ocasião da sua primeira visita a UC Berkeley, o Departamento de Francês (e não, note-se, o da Filosofia) que o convidara, mal conseguiu juntar um número razoável de pessoas para compor uma plateia a altura.

A crescente receptividade aos nomes como o de Foucault não significa necessariamente que nos bastidores da Filosofia Analítica esteja em curso uma mudança no sentido de abrir canais de diálogo com a filosofia europeia, em particular, a de origem latina; parece-me mais correto dizer que o pensamento de alguns desses filósofos já se acha suficientemente "peneirado" e "pasteurizado" a ponto de estar em condições de ser assimilado à tradição analítica, ao menos no que diz respeito à parte que mais serve a tal propósito (É evidente que devemos ter todo o cuidado para não generalizar demais essa alegação, pois trabalhos como o de Dreyfus e Rabinovitch constituem nobres exceções à regra).

Por outro lado, parece-me que uma grande parcela dos filósofos anglo-americanos vêm na Escola de Frankfort pensadores que raciocinam de forma, se não paralela ou complementar, ao menos não conflitante, em relação às grandes preocupações que sempre nortearam a empresa analítica. É o que se verifica nos casos de nomes como Jürgen Habermas, Karl Otto Apel, Hans Georg Gadamer, e outros. É preciso que se diga, entretanto, que não são os filósofos de carteira que vêm demonstrando interesse explícito no

pensamento desses filósofos alemães, mas sim pesquisadores em outras áreas como a Ciência Política, a Sociologia, etc. A propósito, uma das coisas mais surpreendentes que descobri durante o estágio na UC Berkeley foi a de que alguns dos filósofos se encontram, não no Departamento de Filosofia, mas em departamentos onde menos se espera encontrar filósofos, como os da Teoria Literária e da Retórica.

No contexto da Filofia Norte-Americana, verifica-se certos desenvolvimentos que cada vez mais atraem atenção e entusiasmo. Ainda se processando à margem ou até mesmo à revelia da "main - stream philosophy", eles estão se tornando cada vez mais polêmicos e ameaçando os arraiais do Establishment. Com destaque entre essas tendências contemporâneas está o incrível ressurgimento do Pragmatismo, ou o assim-chamado "Neo-Pragmatismo". Esse Movimento se aglutina acerca do nome de Richard Rorty - analítico de carteira assinada de outrora (teve passagem inclusive por Princeton) - que prega abertamente a necessidade de uma filosofia não só pós-metafísica mas pós-analítica.

O Neo-Pragmatismo não se sente constrangido em declarar suas raízes no pensamento europeu não-britânico. Vê paralelos entre o pensamento dos pragmatistas clássicos como James e Dewey (Rorty exclui Peirce dessa lista, por razões que fogem a esta discussão) e as idéias polêmicas veiculadas pelos chamados pensadores pós-modernos franceses. Essa nova linha de pensamento vem conseguindo novas adesões até mesmo nas universidades vistas como as mais conservadoras (como a de Stanford), além de já contar com

simpatizantes de peso como Stanley Cavell da Universidade de Harvard - intelectuais que, embora não se declarem pragmatistas de carteira assinada, vêem naquele movimento muitas possibilidades quanto aos anseios contemporâneos.

Nem o neo-pragmatismo, nem o pós-modernismo já não se constituem em movimentos uniformes. O maior desafio a ambos vem da escola acadêmica que tem se auto-denominado "teoria crítica" e, de forma mais intensa, do outro lado do Oceano Atlântico, a Grã-bretanha. Terry Eagleton, Christopher Norris e outros do Reino Unido, assim como Frederick Jameson da Universidade de Duke, E.U.A., se encontram entre aqueles que, a partir de uma postura que chamam de "neo-marxismo", vêem no discurso de Rorty e dos outros neo-pragmatistas um viés 'perigoso' de complacência em relação ao status-quo, que, no seu entender, ainda pede muita cautela e vigília.

Assim como na polêmica franco-alemã, o que desperta discussão mais acalorada no eixo anglo-americano é, em outras palavras, a questão da ética. A pergunta que se procura responder é: Dentro de uma tradição filosófica que testemunhou a metafísica cedendo seu lugar para a episteologia, que por sua vez entregou seu lugar para semântica, abrindo dessa forma o caminho para que a linguagem viesse ocupar o centro de toda atenção filosófica, como fica a questão da ética? Isto é, com o desmoronamento da verdade alética enquanto o principal sustentáculo das teorias de linguagem, como deverão ser encaradas as dimensões políticas e morais dos nossos atos e pensamentos que, na época anterior, eram


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tidas como ligadas umbilicalmente a uma razão transcendental ?

Se essas últimas perguntas eventualmente redundarão no deslocamento da linguagem do seu atual lugar de destaque no centro da atenção filosófica, só o futuro dirá. Quanto aos indícios disponíveis por ora, eles apontam para o recrudescimento da questão ética, no interior da filosofia da linguagem e não, como até pouco atrás, à margem dela.

12 de Dezembro de 1993

Berkeley, CA,



Kanavillil Rajagopalan

ANEXO 1

QUEM TEM MEDO DO HOLISMO ?

Trabalho aceito para publicação na Revista D.E.L.T.A.

DEBATE

QUEM TEM MEDO DO HOLISMO?

Kanavillil RAJAGOPALAN (Universidade Estadual de Campinas e
Visiting Scholar, Universidade da Califórnia, Berkeley)

*ABSTRACT: As a metaphysical stance, holism has more often than not been simply taken for granted. Philosophers as diverse as Frege (at least, on one interpretation, due mainly to Quine), Wittgenstein, Austin, Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Dennett, Block, Devitt, Putnam, Rorty and Sellars, as well as those working in the areas of A.I. and Cognitive Psychology, Structuralist Linguists and the French literary theorists are generally regarded as having, in one way or another, subscribed to holistic forms of thought. Given the awe-inspiring hegemony of holism in today's academic world - especially after the disintegration of the Vienna Circle and logical positivism, the recent appearance on the market of a book by J. Fodor and E. LePore, with the modest title *Holism: A Shopper's Guide*, deserves to be seen as most timely and welcome - if only for the reason that it promises to stir up some fresh controversy. The present review article is an attempt to survey the scenario, estimate what the stakes are and hazard some guesses as to what we may expect to see by way of possible reactions to the challenge posed by the book.*

De tempos em tempos, um certo campo de saber se vê repentinamente em meio a um verdadeiro abalo de proporções sísmicas. E quase sempre isso ocorre em razão da reativação de uma idéia bem simples (do tipo "O Rei está nu") que ficou esquecida e esmagada debaixo de uma tradição respeitável e sólida. Sem pensar em Copérnico ou Einstein, foi certamente o que aconteceu - é claro, em escala menor - em 1931 no mundo da matemática quando Gödel publicou - despretensiosamente e numa revista austríaca de pouca repercussão - a sua famosa prova de incompletude. Sem sombra de dúvida, podemos dizer que em 1959 havia chegado a vez da lingüística com a publicação da resenha de *Verbal Behavior* de B.F. Skinner, por Noam Chomsky.

É novamente a vez da filosofia, cuja história geofísica já

registrou inúmeros outros abalos. Trata-se do livro *Holism* de Jerry Fodor e Ernest LePore (1992), que traz como sub-título despretensioso e jocoso '*A shopper's guide! Um guia para o comprador*'. Trata-se nada mais, nada menos que de um questionamento cerrado e detido e de um rigor impressionante do próprio conceito de holismo e as razões que têm sido mobilizadas para que ele viesse ocupar o lugar outrora ocupado pelo atomismo.

Para se ter uma idéia das exatas dimensões da ameaça que representa o livro de Fodor e LePore, basta notar que, como lembram os autores (p.7), filósofos tão variados como Frege, Wittgenstein, Austin, Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Dennett, Block, Devitt, Putnam, Rorty e Sellars, quase todos que atuam nos campos da Inteligência Artificial e Psicologia Cognitiva e lingüistas de cunho estruturalista (entenda-se, grosso modo, de orientação pré-chomskiana) e todos, sem exceção, que trabalham na crítica literária de inspiração francesa estão na mira. "Deve haver algum furo sério naquele raciocínio" é o que exclama John Searle (comunicação pessoal) que confessa ainda não ter tido o tempo suficiente para amadurecer sua opinião a respeito. Tal comentário, porém, acena para o franco reconhecimento de que um eventual êxito da proposta lançada por Fodor e LePore implicaria, entre outras coisas, no sepultamento definitivo de todas as propostas semânticas de ordem internalista - a sua própria inclusa - que já se encontram em crise, desde que foi lançada - no início da década de 70 - a alternativa externalista por um grupo de filósofos, entre eles Kripke e Donnellan, e em cujas fileiras cada vez mais crescentes se encontram nomes como Putnam (da fase do argumento sobre "terra-gêmea"), Burge, Kaplan, Perry e outros (em sua maioria, associados à UCLA).

Afinal, o que é que este livro traz que tanto incomoda os arraiais consagrados da Establishment Philosophy? Em termos gerais, podemos afirmar que o holismo já não é mais algo que aqueles que nele repousam fé incondicional, se vêem na necessidade de defender. Quando Frege nos diz (em 'Sentido e referência') que "Só no contexto de uma sentença é que uma determinada palavra tem seu sentido", ou quando diz Wittgenstein (em *Investigações*

Filosóficas) que "Compreender uma sentença é compreender toda a linguagem", ou quando Davidson se inspira nos dois últimos para decretar que "Só no contexto de uma língua é que uma sentença (e portanto uma palavra) tem seu significado) (Davidson, 1984:122) - todos eles estão entregando-se à tese holista (p.ix). A eles se juntam J.L.Austin que em seu 'The meaning of a word' descarta a propriedade de se perguntar "Qual o significado de uma palavra?", recomendando como a pergunta certa "Qual o significado da palavra x ?", e acrescentando logo em seguida que, no fim das contas, a pergunta deverá se remeter ao enunciado todo em que se encontra a palavra em questão. Também está nesse mesmo campo John Searle, para quem, de acordo com sua atual posição, a compreensão de um enunciado só se dá no contexto de uma rede (network) de crenças etc. e também um pano de fundo (background) de capacidades e disposições que em si nada têm a ver com significação. Da mesma forma, boa parte da nossa prática rotineira de apelar para o famigerado "contexto" para resolver questões de ambigüidade e vagueza também esconde a aceitação tácita do holismo. É o caso quando se diz, por exemplo, que a palavra 'manga' quer dizer algo no contexto "A da minha camisa rasgou" que não tem nada a ver com o que ela significa no contexto "A que comprei na feira era deliciosa", ou quando Bertrand Russel conclui que o artigo definido em inglês 'The' por si só não quer dizer nada, só contribui para que "The F is G" seja uma sentença bem definida, ou ainda, quando alguém diz que [Empedikli:s li:pt] significa que fulano saltou em inglês, mas em alemão quer dizer siclano amou - e assim por diante.

Um questionamento sério das nossas bases da aceitação incondicional do holismo implica, como outros autores do livro sob exame bem sabem, provocar ondas de temor e inquietude em áreas como a filosofia, a lingüística etc., onde há algum tempo reina relativa estabilidade nesse sentido, fazendo com que surja a necessidade de se reverem praticamente todas as perguntas fundamentais - entre elas, as que dizem respeito à composicionalidade do sentido, ao papel dos princípios normativos, à racionalidade e suas ligações com significação, à possibilidade de

um argumento a priori contra ceticismo, à relação linguagem/mundo etc. etc.

A estratégia de Fodor e LePore, por sinal muito bem pensada e trabalhada, é definir o holismo, não em oposição direta ao atomismo, mas como um caso particular (e exarcebado) de 'anatomismo' (ao que parece, um neologismo que se justifica pela oposição fono-morfológica ao 'atomismo' quando analisado em an + atomismo e que contudo pode despistar desnecessariamente o leitor desavisado). 'Ser anatômico' (assim como 'ser atômico') é uma propriedade de ordem mais elevada, ou seja, é um predicado que atua sobre outros predicados. Uma propriedade é anatômica quando estiver sujeita à condição de que se algum objeto possuir tal propriedade, ao menos um outro objeto também terá que possuir a mesma propriedade. Exemplo: 'ser vizinho'. Se eu for um vizinho, necessariamente há alguém em relação a quem eu sou o vizinho, e esse alguém terá que ser um vizinho também, ao menos em relação a mim. Ou seja, ninguém pode ser vizinho de si próprio. Vale frisar que a necessidade aqui referida não é de ordem puramente semântica ou lingüística mas, sim, de ordem metafísica. Agora, predicados como 'descobriu o único' ou 'comeu o último.....' seriam 'atômicos' por não permitirem que outros objetos possuam a mesma propriedade. O mesmo será o caso de 'ser uma pedra'- a verdade de " 'x' é pedra" não depende de, nem acarreta " 'y' (também) é pedra" (Lembre-se que a consideração chave não é se mais de um objeto pode satisfazer o predicado, mas se haveria ou não uma necessidade metafísica que exige que pelo menos mais um objeto tenha a mesma propriedade).

Tendo definido 'anatômico' e 'atômico' em termos mutuamente excludentes, a tática de Fodor e LePore consiste em chamar de 'holística' qualquer propriedade que seja "muito anatômica" (p.2). Isto é, uma propriedade é holística quando atende à condição de que, se qualquer objeto possuir tal propriedade, muitos outros objetos também devem possuí-la ao mesmo tempo (Os autores consideram, en passant, a possibilidade de se definir melhor o quantificador 'muitos', porém não perseguem a questão por acharem que os argumentos que vão arrolar no resto do livro

em nada dependem de tal resolução - uma decisão metodológica que certamente despertará maior discussão).

Isso posto, a questão central do empreendimento de Fodor e LePore torna-se : "Será que 'ser um signo', 'ser um signo pertencente a uma língua L', 'ter um objeto intencional', 'ter um conteúdo intencional', 'ter um referente', 'ser capaz de ser avaliado em termos semânticos' etc. etc. são propriedades atômicas ou anatômicas?" (p.2). Como já vimos, trata-se de uma pergunta que afeta diretamente praticamente tudo o que se faz em nome de filosofia da linguagem, lingüística, ciência cognitiva etc. etc. Como já vimos também, a opinion recue a respeito é a de que são, todas elas, anatômicas (isto é, para Fodor e LePore, mínima e potencialmente holísticas já que, por definição, anatomismo é holismo de menor possível grau - se bem que os próprios autores relutam em colocar a questão nesses termos). A contra-proposta de Fodor e LePore é de que nenhum argumento até hoje arregimentado a favor do holismo sobreviverá a exame minucioso - tese esta que eles fazem questão de frisar que é modesta e que não constitui, nem de longe, em uma defesa do atomismo e, muito menos, uma prova definitiva a favor deste. Da mesma forma, avisam os autores, nada do que se diz no seu livro tem a pretensão de ser uma prova derradeira contra o holismo. Eles até admitem a possibilidade de que "de fato haja bons argumentos a favor do holismo semântico, só que nenhum deles foi identificado até hoje"(p.35). E acrescentam "we are non-committal; you choose"/"somos descompromissados; vocês é que vão escolher"(ibid). Onde, o sub-título do livro, bem a gosto das leis que regem a publicidade e o marketing aqui na terra do Tio Sam, cujo lema se lê: "Não enganarás ninguém com falsa propaganda".

De qualquer forma, o sub-título do livro ressalta bem o que pretendem os dois autores. Depois de um capítulo introdutório chamado 'Uma geografia das questões' /A geography of the issues', onde se mapeiam os contornos da terra a ser vistoriada e sondada, eles prosseguem para passar em revista algumas das mais destacadas e visadas propostas semânticas dos últimos tempos que, de uma forma ou de outra, apóiam-se na tese do holismo. São 6

capítulos seguidos (que constituem o restante do livro) onde são encarados, um por um, pesos pesados como Quine, Davidson e David Lewis e estrelas em ascensão como D.C. Dennett, Ned Block e Paul Churchland. Ou seja, nada mais precisa ser dito sobre o potencial devastador do desafio lançado neste livro - a não ser a situação irônica engendrada por *'um guia para o comprador'* que explicitamente pretende desestimular o comprador em potencial.

No entanto, vale repetir de novo, nada há neste livro que derradeiramente comprove a inviabilidade de qualquer uma das teses semânticas em sua mira, e muito menos, acabe de vez com os bons tempos do holismo enquanto a única metafísica viável diante do desgaste do atomismo, apressado pelo desmoronamento do Círculo de Viena e, subseqüentemente, do Positivismo Lógico que tanto lhe prestigiaram. O trabalho dos autores é muito mais cauteloso e se dirige no sentido de desfazer as bases de uma série de "certezas" que, segundo eles, têm ofuscado a apreciação das questões em sua verdadeira dimensão.

Entre tais supostas "certezas" está a idéia de que um questionamento da distinção kantiana entre enunciados analíticos e sintéticos, tal qual Quine o faz em seu "Two dogmas of empiricism" implica, sem mais nem menos, o holismo semântico. Para Fodor e LePore, não só não procede tal raciocínio, como também não tem a menor força a alegação largamente aceita de que o holismo semântico seja o destino certo de quem se convenceu da tese do holismo de confirmação. Só para lembrar, o holismo de confirmação é aquele que diz que os chamados 'enunciados observacionais' nunca são verificados por fatos isolados e discretos no mundo externo, mas sim pelo mundo como um todo tal qual ele se apresenta aos nossos sentidos. Vale frisar que Fodor e LePore não se opõem à possibilidade de se inferir o holismo de confirmação a partir da premissa de que não há nenhuma justificativa para a distinção analítico/sintético; eles apenas questionam a atual tendência de concluir que daí para se chegar ao holismo semântico falta um só passo.

Tudo isso é, no entanto, apenas uma amostra. O livro está recheado de argumentos interessantes do gênero que se destacam

pela agudez de raciocínio e clareza de exposição. O que não significa, é claro, que ele seja à prova de crítica. Muito pelo contrário, parece-me que faz parte do propósito dos autores deste livro provocar e tirar o sossego dos pesquisadores contemporâneos que, salvo pouquíssimas exceções, habituaram-se com determinadas teses amplamente aceitas hoje em dia e, talvez por este único motivo, tratam-nas não mais como posições a serem constantemente revistas, mas como se elas fossem verdades absolutas. A julgar pela primeira reação ao livro entre os estudiosos, aqui nos Estados Unidos, os autores não perdem por esperar para comemorar, pois contestação e questionamento certamente virão nos próximos meses. Em Rajagopalan (em preparação) procuro, ainda que tangencialmente, dar um primeiro passo nessa direção, refletindo sobre pelo menos um holista confesso, J.L. Austin, cuja obra filosófica venho estudando já há algum tempo, procurando mostrar como ele consegue evitar algumas das conseqüências indesejáveis do holismo de referência apontadas por Fodor e LePore.).

E é nesse contexto mais amplo que gostaria de acrescentar mais algumas considerações rápidas sobre o livro que, no meu entender, certamente vão figurar nas futuras discussões sobre o assunto. Cabe, em primeiro lugar, uma pergunta: se é verdade que os próprios autores não reivindicam para seu livro nenhuma finalidade drástica a não ser a de simplesmente reabrir tópicos tidos como encerrados, não teria sido um exagero descabido compará-lo, como eu fiz no início deste trabalho, aos grandes momentos cataclísmicos do mundo do saber acadêmico como o teorema de Gödel e a resenha de Chomsky? Quanto ao teorema de Gödel, não resta dúvida de que se trata de uma obra de mestre que selou de forma definitiva o destino de um projeto, sonhado por, entre outros, Frege e deixado como herança notadamente para o matemático inglês David Hilbert. Este último teve de acordar um belo dia para descobrir que não havia mais nenhuma razão para continuar o projeto de pesquisa que perseguira durante os últimos trinta anos. Não foi isso que aconteceu com a resenha que Chomsky fez do livro *Verbal Behavior* de Skinner, a segunda obra

à qual procurei comparar o livro de Fodor e LePore. A grande diferença é que, se por um lado a crítica chomskiana, por não se constituir em uma prova contra o behaviorismo no sentido preciso e rigoroso deste termo, não conseguiu pôr fim a um projeto de pesquisa (se bem que Fodor e LePore falam dessa obra como se ela tivesse tido exatamente uma tal função. Ver p.78), ela certamente fez com que muitas áreas sentissem uma sacudida violenta. Isso porque até a publicação da crítica chomskiana, o behaviorismo gozou de uma soberania igualada pelo prestígio do holismo nos dias de hoje. O que não significa que o behaviorismo deixou de ser uma força depois da crítica de Chomsky, assim como, não é por causa da crítica de Fodor e LePore que o holismo não vai continuar a ser uma postura metafísica respeitada. Só que, daqui em diante não haverá mais como continuar a trabalhar no interior desses paradigmas, sem ao menos tomar conhecimento dessas vozes de alerta. Donde a certeza de que o livro estará em nossas agendas por muitos anos.

Um outro aspecto da importância deste livro que não posso deixar de registrar é que ele já conseguiu tumultuar o equilíbrio sempre precário das "alianças" caleidoscópicas que se verificam no mundo da filosofia analítica e nas áreas conexas como a lingüística e a psicologia que sempre mantiveram uma relação estreita com ela. Ou seja, o livro de Fodor e LePore conseguiu a proeza incrível de colocar contra a parede um grupo heterogêneo de guerreiros que nunca se entendiam entre si e impôs-lhes uma bandeira comum para defender. Assim, para se livrar da acusação de que estavam, o tempo todo, trabalhando sobre premissas pouco seguras e mal sustentadas, um austiniano que não se entende com um searleano que não se entende com um davidsoniano que não se entende com um dummettiano que não se entende com um putnamiano----- vai ter que esquecer suas diferenças e juntar esforços com todos os adversários de outrora para enfrentar a dupla de novos adversários para que, no caso de um eventual êxito, todos eles possam continuar a medir forças entre si para ver quem tem a razão. E como se não bastasse a necessidade de se fazer tal trégua na disputa interna no campo da filosofia analítica, será preciso, em algum

momento, travar uma batalha, quem diria, do mesmo lado em que também se encontram os estruturalistas de todos os naipes, inclusive os mais incômodos pós-estruturalistas do 'Continente' que também estão na mira de Fodor e LePore. Uma das conseqüências da proposta desses autores é de trazer à tona - se bem que de forma indireta - a força do desafio externalista em semântica, não só em relação às teses internalistas dentro do campo da filosofia analítica, mas também em relação à filosofia 'Continental' que certamente precisará re-examinar seus pontos de atrito a partir deste livro. (Assunto que merece maior discussão que, porém, deixo para uma outra oportunidade, devido à falta de espaço).

Há, contudo, uma profunda ironia nisso tudo. Pois, por mais paradoxal que pareça, o sucesso deste livro (a meu ver, já garantido) medido em termos da intensidade de seu impacto e da extensão da repercussão que ela deverá ter, vai, ao mesmo tempo, denunciar um certo fracasso de suas próprias metas! Ao colocar numa mesma panela teorias das mais variadas e de orientações heterogêneas sob a alegação de que todas elas compartilham da tese não comprovada de holismo, não estará o próprio livro, afinal de contas, fornecendo-nos uma prova contundente de que pelo menos a propriedade de ser holístico é ela mesma holística?

(Recebido em 24/05/1993)

NOTAS

Muitas das idéias aqui desenvolvidas foram surgindo ao longo de discussões que mantive com colegas do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade da Califórnia, Berkeley e, em especial, os participantes do grupo de Graduate Seminar em filosofia da linguagem. Pela absoluta impossibilidade de se saber a quem devo o quê, desisto da idéia de agradecer-lhes nominalmente. Não posso porém deixar de agradecer a CAPES que me propiciou essa oportunidade através de uma bolsa de pós-doutoramento (Processo No. 2715-92-7).

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ANEXO 2

REMARKS ON J. L. AUSTIN'S
METAPHYSICS

Versão escrita de uma palestra que proferi no
Departamento de Filosofia, UC Berkeley

1993-94 Philosophy Colloquia Series

- September 9 Paul Vincent Spade
Indiana University
"How to Start and Stop: Walter Burley on the Instant of Transition"
- September 23 Kanavillil Rajagopalan, Campinas, Brazil
"Remarks on J.L. Austin's Metaphysics"
- October 7 John Dupré, Stanford University
"The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will"
- October 28 John Haugeland, University of Pittsburgh
Title to be announced
- November 18 George Myro Lecture
Richard Grandy, Rice University
Title to be announced
- January 27, 1994 Thomas Scanlon, Harvard University
Title to be announced
- February 10 Michael Jubien, University of California, Davis
"The Fallacy of Reference"
- March 3 Mary Louise Gill, University of Pittsburgh
Title to be announced
- To be announced Geoffrey Hellman, University of Minnesota
Title to be announced
- To be announced Susan Hurley, St. Edmund Hall, Oxford University
Title to be announced

All talks except the Myro Lecture will be held at 4:10 p.m. in the Howison Library, 305 Moses Hall, at U.C. Berkeley. Refreshments will follow each talk.

For more information, please call (510) 642-2270. Kim Kempton and Michael Idinopulos are the colloquia coordinators.

REMARKS ON J. L. AUSTIN'S
METAPHYSICS

Kanavillil Rajagopalan

State University at Campinas, Brazil

It has often been claimed that the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin produced no coherent philosophy of his own.⁽¹⁾ A classic statement to this effect is the following observation by J.O. Urmson: "It is not possible to give a systematic account of Austin's philosophy, for he had none."⁽²⁾ This lack of coherence or systematic character is typically attributed to two factors. First, the fundamentally negative thrust of his philosophical enterprise and, secondly, the ease with which he is deemed to have revised his views on different issues from time to time. Both are highly debatable claims and call for further comments.

The idea that Austin's is largely a negative philosophy is closely linked to the belief that his temperament was that of a radical reformer - an opinion, it seems, originally voiced by Stuart Hampshire⁽³⁾ and subsequently fully endorsed by G.J. Warnock.⁽⁴⁾ Now, radical reformers and obsessed iconoclasts are of the same ilk, or so it would seem. In fact, Warnock himself has more recently referred to the "almost throughout undeviatingly negative critical, even polemically critical"⁽⁵⁾ character of Austin's Sense and Sensibilia⁽⁶⁾ (whose very last phrase 'dismantling the whole doctrine before it gets off the ground' would alone suffice to justify the comment). As for the other major work of

the English philosopher, viz., How to Do Things with Words, we have Austin's own confession that he was all along primarily concerned to "play Old Harry" with the twin time-honoured dichotomies 'true vs. false' and 'fact vs. value'. Given this fundamentally negative approach to distinct philosophical issues, so the reasoning proceeds, no positive philosophy could possibly be forthcoming. To quote Warnock again, "..... he [Austin] in fact held no .. general theory of philosophy at all - unless a certain purely negative view could be accounted a theory." (8)

The second alleged reason for the absence of any systematicity in Austin's philosophy is the claim that he frequently changed his views, often drastically. John Searle for one has warned us of the "misleading appearance of unity of Austin's views", adding that "in fact they developed and changed a good deal over the years." (9) Mats Furberg, whose work Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin's Philosophy, (10) Searle reviewed and found guilty on precisely that score has nevertheless insisted on maintaining his original stance, (11) arguing that there are certain fundamental assumptions and views that remain by and large unchanged through the entire span of Austin's career as a philosopher. Warnock strikes a middle course on the question when he says, "Austin said himself that the views expounded in the [William James] lectures 'were formed in 1939'", hastening to add, "He must have meant, of course, 'began to be formed', since it would obviously be wrong to suppose that his thinking about these topics was completely static and unchanging over the

(12)

following twenty years."

Now it is not my aim here to adjudicate among these competing views. But I do want to contend that neither of these claims viz., the negative thrust of many of his views and the lack of unity to his thoughts along the temporal dimension - is sufficient to warrant the thesis that Austin's philosophical work is a bundle of disconnected and incoherent idle musings. Rather, as I shall seek to show, there is an amazing degree of coherence in Austin's philosophical views on such varied themes as truth, sense-data, facts, scepticism and the like that he examined in his different papers and, furthermore, that this coherence becomes all the more evident as soon as one sets out to identify the kind of metaphysics that underlies his philosophical thinking. And, indeed, as it will turn out, Austin's is a metaphysics in important respects at odds with that of most of his interlocutors. This explains in part why the tone of his philosophical discourse often strikes one as out and out negative - explicitly so when he is examining the views of others as in Sense and Sensibilia and, even more exasperatingly, implicitly so when he consciously engages himself in what appears to be a tireless debunking of his own theory-building drive as in How to Do Things Words (justifying Max Black's celebrated suggestion that an appropriate sub-title for the work would be 'In pursuit of a vanishing distinction').

(14)

An important insight into the sort of metaphysics that Austin was striving to come to grips with can be had from a care-

ful re-reading of his earliest published paper 'Are there a priori concepts?', originally presented at a symposium at the annual meeting of the Aristotelian Society. Now, surprisingly, the received opinion among Austin scholars has tended to downplay the real significance of this paper and its relevance to the rest of his philosophical enterprise. Warnock, for instance, brushes it aside with one brusque remark: "That paper - except for its unusually determined insistence on distinguishing one question from another, and its marked scepticism as to the merits of most philosophical answers - is not particularly characteristic of Austin's work".

It seems, however, fairly safe to say that the paper has more often than not been grossly mis-read as to the real intent of some of its claims. To begin with, it has seldom been noted that Austin was alone among the three symposiasts who addressed the moot point, in refusing to take the question at its face-value. Whereas both Mackinnon and Maclagan - the two fellow-symposiasts who spoke before Austin - interpreted the qualifier a priori partitively, Austin chose to view it as having a sweeping, defining role. In other words, the other two speakers concentrated on the validity or otherwise of holding a sub-class of concepts to be a priori (that is to say, leaving beyond their ken the larger issue of there being any concepts whatsoever - a question which they in effect treated as somehow given in order to address the narrower one). Austin, on the other hand, directed his critical attention at the larger issue and by undermining the very grounds

for postulating concepts of whatever kind - all of them, tout court, called in question, a fortiori, the possibility of there being any a priori concepts.

Now, it would not do to treat the whole episode as an early example of what was to later on become a signal characteristic of the Austinian manoeuvre viz., that of answering a question by responding to a sub-part thereof, as in his essay 'Other minds', where (17) instead of addressing himself to the question "How could one possibly come to know what is going on in someone else's mind?", he prefers to tackle the apparently simpler but more general question as to how one ever knows, full stop. The real point Austin is anxious to make in his "Are there a priori concepts?" is that the only serious candidates with a claim to being concepts in the required sense are such entities as are claimed to be universals. Having established this, Austin's next contention is that since he does not know what universals are, he is simply not going to swallow hook, line and sinker the idea of a concept either.

That Austin remained faithful throughout his life to his early rejection of concepts is evident from his 1959 (a year before his death) Gothenburg talk 'What I do as a philosopher' where he reiterated his long-nurtured conviction in the following words: "I do not really believe there are any concepts". (18)

And, to be sure, there is also plenty of supporting evidence for the claim of Austin's unrelenting distrust of all talk of universals. A case in point is the central idea of 'The meaning of a word', a paper written a year after his 'Are there a priori concepts?'. Austin argues that the question "What is the mean- (19)

ing of a word?" is simply a non-sensical generalization from the legitimate question "What is the meaning of the word 'x'?" (20)

It has been pointed out by, among others, Mats Furberg, that Austin's dissatisfaction with concepts carries over to propositions, conceived of as universal bearers of trans-linguistic meanings. The claim that Austin resisted the idea of propositions in this sense gains some further strength from the comments of D. R. Cousin, the third symposiast at the 1950 session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association that sparked off the celebrated debate between Austin and P.F. Strawson on the question of truth, or more specifically, what sort of entities could be properly regarded as truth-bearers. In arguing against Austin's position while at the same time wanting - against Strawson's - to retain the essentials of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, one of the principal advantages that Cousin claims for his solution is that of reinstating 'propositions' which had been left out of the picture altogether. (21) It is also noteworthy here to recall that in his early paper voicing his dissatisfaction with Austin's notion of 'locutionary acts', Searle too makes a point of underscoring that by re-introducing into the Austinian framework the conspicuously absent notion of propositions, the whole enterprise of speech act semantics can be brought back to be in line with the long and respectable tradition running through Frege, Russell, Meinong and others. (22)

Anyhow, the categorical rejection of the idea of concepts would alone suffice to make Austin deserve the title of a radical

reformer or even a determined iconoclast, albeit in the making, for what is at stake is the entire tradition of western philosophy, right since Plato. It is interesting to mention at this juncture that barely a year after Austin's death Margaret Masterman, participating in a symposium sponsored by the Aristotelian Society - the very same Forum that Austin used - was to lay down what she thought were some of the basic attributes of a philosophical model of translation (the topic of the symposium); "It must deal in concepts, not only in words or terms" followed, hot on the heels, by the rather amusing explanatory comment: "All philosophers believe in concepts, though they sometimes pretend not to." ⁽²³⁾ Clearly, Masterman's point is that, to the extent contemporary philosophy has elected conceptual analysis as its central task, any philosopher who says in dead earnest that she does not recognize concepts as viable entities, is either out of his mind, or taking the first step towards some major, ground-breaking reform of the very field.

What are the consequences of Austin's tireless questioning of the idea of concepts and propositions for the rest of his thinking? The answer, as we shall see, is that his entire metaphysics turns on this single issue. I shall argue my case by examining at some length Austin's controversial theses on the two time-honoured topics of western philosophy, viz., truth and knowledge.

Once again I shall have to go against the opinion reçue on these matters and insist on a high degree of coherence in Austin's

views that many Austin scholars have been reluctant to recognize. Typical of the standard reading of Austin's position is the following observation by Warnock:" ... it is noteworthy that in his views on truth Austin very clearly and definitely does not make the sort of mistake, as I have taken it to be, into which he temporarily deviated in writing about knowledge." (24)

Warnock's point is that on the issue of knowledge or in trying to answer the question what it is to know that 'p', Austin led himself astray by instead trying to answer the altogether different question as to under what circumstances one is entitled to say 'I know that 'p''. Now, argues Warnock, while it is indeed true that 'I know that 'p'' entails 'p', precious little is to be gained in our understanding of what it is to know by looking more closely at instances one's truly saying 'I know that p' (except of course for the uncontestable truism that genuine knowledge must somehow incorporate truth and hence must be defined in terms thereof). I shall postpone further discussion of Warnock criticisms of Austin's position on knowledge until after I have looked at Austin's views on truth.

The theory of truth that Austin showed himself keen to uphold has left both friends and foes flabbergasted. Indeed, on the face of it, it looks like a bundle of disconnected claims assembled with a view to simply shocking his audiences rather than trying to persuade them to accept a novel point of view.

To begin with, contrary to the approach he himself seemed to be recommending in 'Other minds' in regard to the verb 'know', Austin puts a spoke in the wheel of any attempt to interpret

the formula 'It is true that ...' performatively, suggesting very strongly that it is every inch a descriptive phrase. What then does it describe or depict? Austin's answer that what a true sentence corresponds to is a fact drew a volley of criticism from his fellow symposiast P.F. Strawson. For Strawson a fact is what a statement, when true, states and what a statement states, it cannot simultaneously correspond to. Furthermore, Strawson goes on to contend that Austin's 'facts' turn out, on closer inspection, to be 'pseudo-entities' because, appearances to the contrary, they are not part of the world, i.e., they do not constitute part of the reality "out" there. Consequently, statements cannot be said to be about facts, nor can they be said to refer to any facts. And what a statement cannot refer to, it cannot correspond to either -- argues Strawson triumphantly, further propping up a conclusion already reached independently.

Now, it is a widely held opinion among scholars that in this head-on confrontation, Strawson got the better of Austin. D.R. Cousin, who spoke immediately after Strawson had made his objections to Austin's paper during the 1950 symposium, declared at the very outset of his paper: "Mr. Strawson, I feel sure, is right: there is an important difference between the problem about our use of 'true' and the problem of elucidating the fact-stating type of discourse." (25) Austin's reiteration of his position in 'Unfair to facts' and, more specifically, his insistence (26) that facts are, contrary to Strawson's claims, very much "in the world" are considered by Warnock as mostly "irrelevant" to his

theory of truth, the very idea of facts being or not being "in the world" being itself hopelessly "obscure". Warnock's argument is that a clearer appreciation of Austin's view of truth can be had by looking at what comes very close to being a definition of truth that Austin himself comes up with further on in his earlier essay 'Truth'. Interestingly enough, there the word 'fact' simply does not occur as part of the analysis. In his 1962 paper 'Truth and correspondence', Warnock notes that, precisely for this reason Strawson's quarrel over the use of the word 'fact' has little impact on Austin's original proposal. Strawson in fact concedes the point and revises his case against Austin in his essay 'Truth: a reconsideration of Austin's views'. In a paper entitled 'Truth: Austin, Strawson, Warnock', Honderich has suggested that the term 'circumstance' would help avoid the confusion over the already over-used 'fact'. Anyhow, here is the oft-quoted definition of truth by Austin: " A statement is said to be true - when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by descriptive conventions."

While Warnock is certainly on the right track when he asks us to deflect our attention from the controversy over 'facts' to Austin's positive suggestions as to how language 'hooks onto' the real world, he seems to miss a very important point when he thereby implicitly suggests that the two are totally independent of each other. That Warnock cannot be entirely right on this

begins to become clear as soon as one recalls that one of the key issues on which Austin and Strawson found themselves at logger-heads was what do with the Correspondence Theory of truth. Austin's rather condescending attitude to the theory - at least the spirit of it if not the letter - was, in Strawson's view and, indeed, the view of most of his contemporaries, a veritable scandal. For Strawson, the theory needed "not purification, but elimination."⁽³³⁾

It is important to bear in mind here that Strawson's initial objections to the Correspondence Theory of Truth antedate his objections to Austin's views on truth. As we have already seen, Austin's views were, on the other hand, prompted, at least in part, by what he saw as an erroneous tendency among many philosophers, among whom Strawson, to interpret: '... is true' as having a primarily performative (or, as Strawson would say, 'performatory' role). And, to be sure, in his comments immediately following Austin's paper, Strawson is first and foremost concerned to show that Austin's views, far from lending support to the Correspondence Theory of truth, actually served to undermine it. Besides, from Strawson's point of view, the sort of knock-down arguments that he, Strawson, has already come up with against the Correspondence Theory, are sufficient to show the weakness of Austin's objections, insofar as these objections crucially hinge on the theory's viability.

An important point of departure for Austin, whether in his criticisms of the Correspondence Theory of Truth or in his disagreements with Austin on the related issues, is that one

should be careful enough to distinguish referring from stating. For Strawson, the referring function is standardly performed by noun-phrases. And it is these expressions and they alone that guarantee that language is 'hooked onto' the real world and they do this by picking out appropriate things, persons, events etc. in the real world. What Austin calls 'facts' do not belong here, although he is forced to speak of them as though they in fact did. Hence Strawson's allegation that they reveal themselves to be 'pseudo-entities' in Austin's hands.

Not only did Austin, as we have already seen, object to Strawson's characterization of facts as 'pseudo-entities', even more importantly insofar as the present debate is concerned, he did not agree with Strawson that a statement establishes whatever relation it has with the world, thanks exclusively to the capacity of its noun-phrases to single out particular objects persons etc. in the world. For Austin, this is where the demonstrative conventions play their crucial role. Because it is thanks to these conventions that one can single out the historic state of affairs (and, notice, not particular objects) to which a given statement is to be seen as correlated, or, if you insist, to which it may be regarded as 'referring' (In the definition that Austin formulates - cited earlier - the word 'refer' occurs in scare quotes, giving a clear indication that it is to be taken in this slack and extended sense).

The difference between Strawson and Austin on the whole issue comes to the fore if we follow a line of reasoning indicated by Warnock. Warnock suggests that one of the most fruitful

ways of getting a clear idea of Austin's view of truth is to compare his 1950 essay with the paper 'How to talk: some simple ways', which was published some three years later. In 'How to talk' (34) Austin presents us with a simplified 'picture' of truth which serves as an excellent counterfoil to the real-life 'picture' presented in 'Truth'. We are asked to imagine a certain 'speech-situation S_0 ' and a 'world' that goes with it. This imaginary world has the peculiar characteristic that it is entirely constituted by an indefinite number of individual 'items', with the further proviso that each of these items is of one and only one type. The language to be used in 'Speech situation S_0 ' is a highly restricted one. It consists of just three sorts of expression viz., I-words, T-words, and the copula. I-words are uniquely referring terms and they refer to distinct 'items' in the imaginary world. T-words are associated, again uniquely, with item-types, and the copulas serve the purpose of linking the two kinds of expressions.

Leaving aside a number of further details, one may go straight to the heart of the matter by asking what it is for an assertion in S_0 to be true. It is noteworthy that although even in this simplified language there is a need to distinguish a sentence from an assertion made by the use of that sentence, both reference and type identification are guaranteed by definition. That is to say, given that a certain sentence s is well-formed, its use on any occasion to make an assertion automatically secures reference for its subject-term (or, as it would

be more appropriate to say the term that serves as its topic) and type-identification for its predicate term. This is so because s is necessarily of the form 'I-word - copula - T-word'. And the 'conventions of reference' and 'the conventions of sense that hold good for this language are so designed as to guarantee success under all circumstances.

Now the real point of bringing the above discussion to bear on Austin's overall view of truth is that it places in relief an important respect in which Austin sees ordinary language as being different from its imaginary and idealized counterpart. To begin with, the so-called 'conventions of reference' and the 'conventions of sense' have yielded their places to the 'demonstrative conventions' and the 'descriptive conventions' respectively. Now, beyond the shadow of a doubt, Austin wants the difference to be a lot more than merely terminological. For it turns out that neither demonstrative conventions nor the descriptive ones are guaranteed by fiat as their counterparts in the imaginary language of 'Speech-situation S₀'. Instead of an automatic guarantee of success by stipulation, we have here a permanent risk of reference failure and mis-identification.

Indeed, Austin himself makes the following highly suggestive comment on the risk involved: "Thus for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also sufficiently like to merit the same 'description', which is no longer a purely natural relation... That things are similar, or even 'exactly' similar, I may

literally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally see - in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the conventional choice of a name to be given to the colour which they are said to be." (35)

It seems reasonable to conjecture here that what Austin is really at pains to do is dissociate himself from what David Kaplan has referred to as "the metaphysics of types under the old token/type conception." For, while it is true that Austin did invoke the token/type distinction in thinking of the way the historic state of affairs pointed up by the demonstrative conventions relates to the sentence as it is interpreted by the descriptive conventions, it seems equally clear that he is somewhat uneasy with the metaphysical underpinnings of that Peircean distinction. As Kaplan puts it, "It seems to me in many ways that this is a sort of updated version of the Platonic notion of abstract forms. The eternal, the unchanging Platonic forms (shapes, perhaps) are the types, and their physical embodiments, which reflect these abstract forms, are the tokens." (37) Indeed, this should come as no surprise in view of Austin's unconcealed discomfort with the notions of 'concept' and 'proposition', which, as already discussed, are ultimately defined, like 'type', with reference to Platonic universals.

It is worth pointing out at this juncture that the real significance of Austin's appeal to 'conventions' has not been fully appreciated by critics, some of whom otherwise sympathetic to his overall thesis. A case in point is Warnock, who in his

essay 'A problem about truth' devotes a lengthy footnote in order to discuss what he characterizes as two "not ... very important slips" in Austin's paper. According to Warnock, Austin messed up his case a little when he claimed that "the relation between the statement that S and the world which the statement that the statement that S is true asserts to obtain is a purely conventional relation ..." and also when he claimed that the 'demonstrative' conventions correlate "the words (= statements) with the historic situations etc. to be found in the world." Warnock insists that in both cases Austin overstated his case, because "On his [Austin's] view all that is purely conventional is that to utter 'S' is to make the statement that S: whether or not the statement made is true is of course a matter not of convention, but fact." Similarly, says Warnock, "What 'demonstrative conventions' in part determine is not how statements are related to the world, but what statement is made by the utterance of certain words on a particular occasion." Now, it is important to notice how Warnock misconstrues Austin's fundamental claim regarding the role of conventions. To begin with, it is amply clear from Austin's argument that he appeals to conventions not only with a view to taking care of the widely-acknowledged arbitrariness that marks all symbolic relations, but also - and this is the key issue here - for the reason that, in his view, conventions enter into the very manner in which we see words are relating to the world. To recall his own words quoted earlier, in regarding two patches of colour as being the same colour,

a convention is involved "additional to the conventional choice of a name to be given to the colour they are said to have." ⁽⁴³⁾ Here is another remark by Austin that points in the same direction: " ... even when a language does 'mirror' ... features in the world very closely (and does it ever ?) the truth of statements remain still a matter ... of the words used being the ones conventionally appointed for situations of the type to which ⁽⁴⁴⁾ that referred to belongs." Or again, "There are many intermediate cases between a true statement and a faithful picture ... For example, maps: these may be called pictures, yet they are highly ⁽⁴⁵⁾ conventionalized pictures." Also, Warnock's observation that "whether or not a statement ... is true is of course a matter not of convention, but of fact" ⁽⁴⁶⁾ does not, as he thinks, bolster his own case against Austin, because in Austin's view all such entities as 'facts', 'situations', or 'states of affairs' are themselves conventional; they are, if you like, 'stylizations' of reality that have by convention been assumed to be reality itself. Finally, Austin makes his position unambiguously clear when he says , "There is something peculiar about the 'fact' ⁽⁴⁷⁾ something which may make us hesitate to call it a 'fact' at all" and, furthermore, "...we are aware that this relation is one which we could alter at will, whereas we like to restrict the word 'fact' to hard facts, facts which are natural and unalterable, or anyhow, not alterable at will. Thus, to take an analogous case, we may not like calling it a fact that the word elephant means what it does, though we can be induced to call it a (soft) fact

- and though, of course, we have no hesitation in calling it a (48)
fact that contemporary English speakers use the word as they do."

Now, it would not help to take the line that the arguments contained in the foregoing paragraph are misdirected because Warnock was after all referring to just those 'hard facts', facts "which are natural and unalterable, or anyhow not alterable at will." For, on such a view, Warnock would be giving in, contrary to his own professed aims, to Strawson's position on the matter - a point, Strawson himself was quick to notice and cash in on in (49) his 'A problem about truth - a reply to Mr. Warnock'. The upshot of all this discussion is that, for Austin, conventions play a crucial role in a theory of truth, because in his view it is thanks to them that we have representations of reality that we call facts, entities with reference to which our words may be adjudged true or false.

Austin's thesis that the relation of language with reality is permeated by conventionality has important consequences for his metaphysics. On the one hand, it serves as the cornerstone of his holism. In their recent book Holism: A Shopper's Guide, (50) J. Fodor and E. LePore treat holism as a special case of anatomism which in turn is defined in the following way: "A property is anatomic just in case if anything has it, then at least one other thing does." (51) It is easy to see how Austin's claim that the idea of 'sameness' involves a convention over and above the convention routinely involved in its nomenclature is a holistic claim about identity and category membership. Thus,

to go back to the very example he discusses, the claim that it is thanks to a convention that different patches can be said to have the same colour can only make sense if it is further granted that the identity of each of the other colours recognized as such by the members of a community also result from similar conventions.

Another important consequence of the conventionality thesis for Austin's metaphysics is that it keeps the English philosopher away from having any trucks with semantic realism (Again, a position quite in keeping with his outright rejection of universals and a whole lot of other Platonic paraphernalia).

In a recent discussion of semantic realism, however, Frederick Stoutland has made some claims on behalf of the time-honoured metaphysical position that seem to fly in the face of our analysis of Austin's metaphysics as anything but realistic (whether it thereby describable as anti-realistic in the strong sense is a question that will ^{be} looked at later on). Stoutland's thesis is worth discussing in some detail since it helps us appreciate Austin's position from a clearer perspective.

Stoutland argues that realism as a metaphysical doctrine involves the following three claims: (1) "... sentences are true or false in virtue of that in the world which they are about" (2) "... in order for sentences to be true or false in virtue of that in the world which they are about, they must in some way fit what they are about; they must agree with it, be adequate to it, conform to it" (3) "... truth is non-epistemic." (53)

Now, it is one of Stoutland's central claims that the world

of philosophy is simply not divided between realists on one side and non-realists on the other, for if it were so, all non-realists would ipso facto be anti-realists - which, he insists, is far from being the case. In other words, opposition to realism does not thereby push one into the camp of relativists, a point worth bearing in mind in the rest of our discussion.

Anyhow, let us proceed to consider Austin's metaphysics against each of the three claims Stoutland stakes out on behalf of realism in semantics. As we shall see, Austin's philosophy remains resolutely resistant to a classificatory attempt using Stoutland's claims as the relevant criteria. That is to say, all three of them simply fail to apply in the particular way they have been formulated.

In the light of our discussion of Austin's debate with Strawson on the issue of truth, it is not very difficult to see how the first of the three claims fares badly. For although the claim looks at first blush unexceptionable as far as it goes, it turns out that, in elaborating on it, Stoutland gives it a certain twist that puts the entire issue right at the centre of the Austin-Strawson debate. Stoutland appends the following illustrative comment to his first claim: " 'Zinnias grow wild' is about zinnias, and it is true (if it is) in virtue of their growing wild." ⁽⁵⁴⁾ Now, such a formulation as this as to how language 'hooks onto' the real world would be, as we have already seen, thoroughly unacceptable to Austin, because of its close resemblance to Strawson's way of characterizing the relation, which was precisely what Austin was adamantly concerned to contest. To see

what is problematic with the formulation, note that it is precisely what occurs, from Austin's point of view, in 'Speech Situation S₀'. If we gloss over such considerations as to whether or not the requirement of the guarantee of unique reference and unerring type-identification are met, it is not difficult to see that the sentence 'Zinnias grow wild' conforms to the canonical form 'I-word - copula - T-word' (i.e. under the unexceptionable paraphrase 'Zinnias are wildgrowing'). But then, as we may recall, Austin's whole point is to show that things are a lot more complex in natural languages like English, where reference-fixing and type-identification are further mediated by demonstrative and descriptive conventions respectively. For Austin, truth cannot be simply a matter of straight-forward correlation between a noun phrase like 'zinnias' and a property (a universal ?) such as 'wild growing'; if anything, it is a correlation between a historic state-of-affairs mediated by one set of conventions, and a sentence meaning, also mediated by another set of conventions. The net result of all this is that Austin can and should reject the second part of the claim while letting the first part stay the way it is.

The same problem carries over to the second claim Stoutland makes for realism. For Stoutland, it is imperative that the language-world 'fit' be totally unmediated; otherwise, the world cannot by itself make a given sentence true or false as it is expected to. In his own words, "Neither truth nor falsity is possible ... if language and the world are related purely conventionally." (55) Now, Austin would certainly have found this claim

totally unacceptable, because a logical conclusion from this by modus tollens would make his own metaphysics describable out and out anti-realistic (= relativistic), given his conviction both in the conventional character of the relation between language and world, and in the possibility of such a relation as truth (and, more importantly, in the viability of a spruced-up version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth). And, to be sure, Austin was by no means a relativist in metaphysical matters.

It is interesting to insert parenthetically into our discussion an interesting point of comparison between Frege (or, rather, Frege as read by Dummett) and Austin. Against Dummett's famous observation that "Frege, although a realist, did not believe in the Correspondence Theory of Truth," one is tempted to advance the counterbalancing claim that "Austin, the translator of the Grundlagen der Arithmetik, although by no means a realist, nevertheless found it harmless to subscribe to (a modified version of) the Correspondence Theory of Truth." (56)

In respect of his third claim on behalf of realism viz., that truth be non-epistemic, that is to say, justification-transcendent, Stoutland notes that it is outrightly "rejected by anti-realists and their cousins, the pragmatists and coherentists." (57) Now, there seems little doubt that Austin would have frowned upon the idea of truth being non-epistemic, without - it is important to stress this - thereby identifying himself with the anti-realist relativists and their "cousins", contrary to what Stoutland's claim predicts. We will explore this point in the next few paragraphs.

In order to see how in Austin's view truth turns out to be epistemically constrained, we need to take a closer look at what he has to say on perception and knowledge. Indeed, in Austin's case, the two are intimately intertwined. Warnock has very ably argued that, although Austin did have a number of highly original observations to make on the topic of perception, many of them extremely valuable in themselves, their real point of interest is the crucial bearing they soon reveal themselves to have on the question of knowledge. (58)

Critics have all too often been content to conclude rather hurriedly that the central task that Austin was anxious to address in his Sense and Sensibilia was that of knocking the so-called 'sense-data' off the high pedestal where they had remained for long securely esconced, thanks to Bishop Berkeley and others. Now, there is no doubt that Austin had little sympathy for idealism, whether in its empirical version as upheld by Berkeley or in its transcendental version as avocated by Kant. In respect of Sense and Sensibilia, however, what is seldom if ever noted is that, along with the sustained questioning of the grounds for postulating 'sense-data', Austin also called in question all the arguments that have traditionally been employed in favour of the putative 'materiality' of the so-called 'material objects' - entities that always served as a foil to sense-data. Indeed, this should come as no surprise to anyone who has paused to pay sufficient attention to Austin's own note of caution that it "is essential ... to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-

(59)
looking dichotomies."

As already mentioned earlier, the real issue between Ayer and Austin was a question, not of perception but of knowledge. In his Foundations of Empirical Knowledge,⁽⁶⁰⁾ Ayer had contended that all judgments about material objects were doomed to be at best provisional insofar as the amount of certainty that could possibly accrue to them invariably depended upon the availability of an infinitely large array of sense-experiences. To Ayer, this made such judgments totally different from those about individual sense-experiences which - in principle at least - could be effected 'incorrigibly' in virtue of the fact that to have a sense-experience is, by definition, to be 'directly' or 'immediately' aware of a sense-datum.

Austin's debunking of Ayer's thesis is both clever and marked by surprising turns. He begins by questioning the incorrigibility claim which he attacks in two ways. On the one hand Austin insists that it is not at all clear what the claim really amounts to, since at no moment does Ayer tell us what a sense-datum proposition would look like. Secondly, even if we ignore this problem, it is still difficult to see how such a proposition can be self-authenticating, since if one is to say anything informative at all with the help of such a proposition, one cannot but take the risks of misdescription, misclassification, mis-identification etc. (in virtue of the fact that we are no longer talking of, say, the imaginary language of 'Speech Situation S.', where such risks are pre-emptively

eliminated by definition).

But now, what is even more interesting and somewhat unexpected is what Austin goes on to say about Ayer's pivotal claim that judgments about 'material objects' are doomed to be irremediably inconclusive. Austin's reaction to this follows the same line of reasoning he adopted in order to call the bluff of the argument from illusion. When a church is camouflaged as a barn or a straight stick is placed in a tumbler full of water, what one is in fact looking at is neither a barn nor a bent stick; for Austin, the correct answers in these cases should be 'a church camouflaged so as to look like a barn' and 'a straight stick made to appear bent', respectively. In neither case is appearance innocent of our current epistemic access to the putative 'facts of the matter'. Similarly, Austin is fully convinced that Ayer's fundamental assumption that judgments involving material objects are subject to revision in light of future evidence just cannot be right the way it has been formulated. If an animal that we have always believed to be a cat were suddenly to start barking, what are we to conclude? To quote Warnock here, "We may say, with amazement, that it seems to be turning into a dog, or we may be left, with even more amazement, completely at a loss for words; but we need not question that for years it undoubtedly was, as we all took it to be, a cat. That was established conclusively, not indeed by an infinite number of tests, but in the experience of all of us over a
(61)
number of years." The point is very subtle. What Austin is at

pains to drive home is that the whole question gets hopelessly muddled if we substitute ' (it was) a dog that seemed for a long time to be a cat' for 'it (the cat) seems to be turning into a dog', in exactly the same way as 'a barn that turned out to be a church' will misrepresent the state of affairs we want to refer to by 'a church camouflaged as a barn'. However, on a closer look, the juxtaposition of the two arguments presents us with a problem. Because, at least on the face of it, what Austin says on judgments about material objects seems to fly in the face of what he himself says on the question of optical illusions. Isn't, one is tempted to ask, Austin guilty of assuming a double standard here ? For, if what appears as a barn but is in fact a church is to be correctly referred to as 'a church camouflaged as a barn' and not 'a barn that turned out to be a church', shouldn't we be saying, by the same token, that what appeared for a long time to be a cat but in fact seems to be turning into a dog, must be referred to as 'a dog that seemed to be a cat for a long time' rather than 'a cat that seems to be turning into a dog' ?

The answer to the above dilemma will take us back to Austin's views on ontology. An important insight into Austin's metaphysics is obtained as soon as one realizes that for Austin there simply cannot be any 'facts of the matter' over and above the descriptive conventions that govern all facts. Thus all those judgments that involve generalizations from individual sense experiences (which Ayer therefore took to be perforce inconclu-

sive) were the product of descriptive conventions. On the other hand, judgments involving individual experiences about historic situations had to pass through the sieve of demonstrative conventions. Now, it so happens that these two kinds of convention contribute differently to the formation of belief-systems. The descriptive conventions, when repeatedly applied over a period of time, impart a degree of certainty to judgments, whereas the demonstrative conventions that have to do with historic situations are applied over very short periods of time (often fleeting moments) and hence can guarantee no incorrigibility of the sort Ayer claimed or them.

In other words, it is Austin's major claim that there can be no qualitative difference between the two types of judgment, but at best, a quantitative one. That is to say, rather than an either-or sort of opposition, what we have is a gradient scale or a continuum between two polar opposites. Needless to say, a claim such as this is designed to effectively debunk a substantial portion of Ayer's whole thesis which rests on there being a qualitative, all-or-none distinction between judgments about sense-data and judgments about material objects. As for Ayer's strategy of using the theory of perception as a springboard to the theory of knowledge, Austin's response is, once again, characteristic of an arch debunker. He readily agrees with Ayer on the question of the relation between perception and knowledge. But he argues that, contrary to Ayer's further claim, precision and incorrigibility work at cross-purposes. So, in addition to the arguments already marshalled, there is the

further argument that Ayer cannot be right even in his claim that judgments about sense-data are precise and incorrigible as opposed to judgments about material objects that are claimed to be imprecise (since they supposedly range over an infinite array of experiences) and inconclusive (since future experiences can presumably prove them false). For Austin, on the contrary, precision and incorrigibility are inversely proportionate to each other. As Warnock puts it, "We 'take refuge' in vagueness when we wish to minimize the chances of error; to be extremely precise is to run the risk of getting it wrong."⁽⁶²⁾

An important question that crops up at this stage has to do with another charge of double standard that Austin seems to run the risk of having to face. How can he consistently argue, on the one hand, that there can be no qualitative difference between judgments about sense-data and those about material objects and insist, on the other hand, that those philosophers who believe there is no qualitative difference between normal waking experience and dream experience are simply mistaken in their belief? Aren't, one is tempted to ask, illusory sense experiences and dream experiences sufficiently alike to merit the same analysis? On the issue of waking vs. dreaming, Austin is categorical when he says: "If dreams were not qualitatively different from waking experiences, then every waking experience would be like a dream; the dream-like quality would be, not difficult to capture, but impossible to avoid."⁽⁶³⁾ Now, rather surprisingly, Austin points to the very existence of the expression 'dream-

like quality' as a knock-down argument in favour of his contention. Barry Stroud has observed, apropos of the claim and the supporting argument, that he finds the former "dubious" and the latter "even less persuasive".⁽⁶⁴⁾ It seems to be the case, however, that the point Austin is making here is crucial to an understanding of his metaphysics, although we cannot but agree with Stroud that Austin could have come up with a more persuasive way of pressing his case. And indeed we have here Stroud's own excellent analysis of Austin's argument to draw on. Stroud shows that Austin's clever debunking of the Cartesian thesis consists in laying bare the fundamental premiss of his whole enterprise viz., the general requirement that we must know that we are not dreaming if we are to know anything at all. By calling in question this very premiss Austin "attacks what is really the heart of Descartes' position" for, "without Descartes' condition for knowledge, philosophical scepticism about the external world would be completely disarmed."⁽⁶⁵⁾ Stroud draws attention to the pithy, epigrammatic and somewhat enigmatic observation by Austin that figures in a footnote to 'Other minds': "'You cannot fool all of the people all of the time' is 'analytic'."⁽⁶⁶⁾ Together with his equally terse remark in Sense and Sensibilia "Familiarity takes the edge of illusion",⁽⁶⁷⁾ that sentence epitomizes a fundamental tenet of Austin's epistemology and also opens a window on his ontology.

What the two aphorisms together yield is, it seems to me, the key to a proper understanding of Austin's metaphysics. For Austin, the very idea of our being endlessly out of touch with

'reality' is uninteresting and unproductive. In his view, Descartes erred when he chose radical scepticism as the pedestal on which to erect his whole epistemological enterprise. And Cartesian scepticism flounders, according to Austin, because of its question begging assumption as to the unavailability of a categorical distinction between dreaming and being awake. For Austin, quite on the contrary, it is thanks to our ability to invoke such a distinction that we are at all able to get started. And the very fact that we not only got started but have indeed come all the way along is evidence enough that we have at our disposal, at any given moment, sufficient and relatively stable means to satisfy ourselves of our wakefulness. As he says, "There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking"⁽⁶⁸⁾. What Austin is anxious to drive home is that although doubts can often be raised as to the authenticity of an individual case of wakefulness, there can be no such thing as doubting the very notion of wakefulness, or what amounts to the same thing, doubting that wakefulness is different from dreaming. This is so because the general notion of 'wakefulness', as opposed to individual cases purporting to instantiate it, bear the stamp of authentication by a whole community which has put it to test over a considerable length of time and "all of the people cannot be fooled all of the time".

We see thus that there is a clear parallel between Austin's objections to Descartes and his differences with Ayer. In both cases, the essential argument is that the more one moves towards the generalization end of the experiential continuum

(as is the case with wakefulness in the abstract or judgments concerning material objects), the lower the probability of our being in error. This means the closer we get to this end, the greater the legitimacy of regarding the 'objects' in question as categorial and the oppositions that obtain among them as qualitative.

All this leads us right back to Austin's own definition of truth, where, as claimed earlier, the most important element is the pivotal role he assigns to conventions. We may recall that for Austin conventions are operative at both the demonstrative and the descriptive ends of the continuum. And conventions are formulated and kept alive in living linguistic practice. As we have also seen truth for Austin is a matter of correlating the historically identified individual case to the general beliefs arrived at by a community over a certain period of time. These beliefs, in turn, are encapsulated in linguistic units we call sentences. This means truth is mediated by language all throughout, perhaps minimally at the demonstrative end, but in a more thorough fashion at the descriptive end.

But truth is also our ultimate guarantee that the world as we know it is the way it really is. So here we have a claim that may well turn out to be the cornerstone of Austin's metaphysics: if there is such a thing as an ultimate reality, it is downright steeped in language.

NOTES

- (1) This text is a slightly modified and expanded versions of the notes used for a colloquium at the Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, on September 23, 1993. i wish to thank CAPES for a grant (2715-92-7) that supported my year-long stay as a Visiting Scholar at Berkeley. Many of the ideas presented in this paper form part of an ongoing research project financed by CNPq (306151 88-0).
- (2) J.O. Urmson, 'Austin's philosophy' p. 26. In K.T.Fann ed. 1969. Symposium on J.L.Austin. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pp. 22 - 32.
- (3) Stuart Hampshire, 'J.L.Austin, 1911 - 1960'. In K.T.Fann ed. op cit. pp. 33 - 48.
- (4) G.J.Warnock, "John Langshaw Austin: A biographical sketch". p.21. In K.T.Fann ed. op cit. Pp. 3 - 21.
- (5) G.J.Warnock 1988. J.L.Austin. London: Routledge. p. 11.
- (6) J.L.Austin 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (7) J.L.Austin 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.
- (8) See J.L.Austin p.3
- (9) John Searle, 'Review of M. Furberg's Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin's Philosophy. p.389. Philosophical Review. 75. 1966. Pp. 389 - 391.
- (10) Goteborg, Elanders. Boktryckeri Aktiebolag. 1963.
- (11) Mats Furberg 1971. Saying and Meaning: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin's Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. 116. fn.
- (12) See J.L. Austin. p. 105.
- (13) My own personal view on the two theses is the following: That Austin's philosophy has a negative thrust to it seems to me to be unassailable. Unlike Warnock and others, I do not think, though, that it has to do with the fact that Austin was, more often than not, arguing against other philosophers. I believe his philosophy is negative in a more fundamental sense viz., it is

self-debunking - he is also, all the time, arguing against himself. As for the second thesis viz., that he changed his views all along his career, I am willing to buy it, though not at its face-value. As an arch debunker, it seems to me, it was part of his philosophical project to create and immediately thereafter proceed to undo distinctions all along the way, the most celebrated of which is of course the one between 'performatives' and 'constatives'.

(14) Max Black, 'Austin on performatives' p. 401. in K.T.Fann ed. op cit. Pp. 401 - 411.

(15) J.L.Austin, 1939. In Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1961. Pp. 1 - 9.

(16) J.L.Austin p.32.

(17) In Philosophical Papers. Pp. 44 - 84.

(18) Cited in Furberg 1971. Saying and Meaning p. 9.

(19) In Philosophical Papers. Pp. 1 - 22.

(20) See Furberg, op cit. p. 28.

(21) D.R.Cousin, 'Truth' In Aristotelian Society. Supplements Vol. XXIV 1950. Pp. 157 - 172.

(22) John R. Searle, 'Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts' 1968. In I. Berlin ed. 1973. Essays on J.L. Austin. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp.

(23) Masterman, 'Translation' p. 169. Aristotelian Society Supplement. Vol. XXXV. Pp. 169 - 216.

(24) J.L.Austin, p. 45.

(25) D.R.Cousin, p. 152. R.M. Chisholm ('Review of Philosophical Papers, Mind 1963) however considers 'Truth' "one of the least satisfactory of Austin's papers" unlike 'How to talk' which he describes as "of very first importance to philosophy."

(26) In Philosophical Papers Pp. 102 - 123.

(27) J.L.Austin p. 46.

(28) In Philosophical Papers. Pp. 85 - 102.

(29) In C.D. Rollins ed. 1962. Knowledge and Experience Pittsburgh. pp.

(30) Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 15. 1965.

(31) In Studies in Logical Theory. Monograph No. 2.

- (32) 'Truth', p. 90.
- (33) P.F.Strwson, 'Truth' p. 190. In Logico-Linguistic Papers. London:Metherun. Pp. 190 - 214.
- (34) In Philosophical Papers. Pp. 181 - 201.
- (35) 'Truth', p. 90.
- (36) David Kaplan, 1990. 'Wors'. p. 98. In Aristotelian Society: Supplement. Vol. LXIV. Pp. 93 - 119.
- (37) ibid. pp. 35 - 36.
- (38) G.J.Warnock. 'A problem about truth'. p. 67. In G. Pitcher. ed. Truth. Englewood cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1964. Pp. 54 - 67.
- (39) ibid.
- (40) ibid.
- (41) ibid.
- (42) ibid.
- (43) 'Truth', p. 90.
- (44) ibid.
- (45) ibid.
- (46) 'A problem about truth', p. 67.
- (47) 'Truth' p.
- (48) ibid.
- (49) In G. Pitcher ed. op. cit. Pp. 68 - 84.
- (50) J. Fodor and E. LePore. 1992. Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (51) ibid. p.1.
- (52) F. Stoutland, 'On not being a realist'. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Aristotelian Society 1988/89. Pp. 95 - 111.
- (53) ibid. p.96
- (54) ibid.
- (55) ibid.
- (56) Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth. 1971. p. 442.
- (57) Stoutland, op. cit. p. 96.
- (58) J.L.Austin. p. 26 ff.
- (59) J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, p. 3.

- (60) A.J.Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan. 1940.
- (61) J.L.Austin., p.25.
- (62) ibid.
- (63) Sense and Sensibilia. p. 48.
- (64) Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1984. p. 47.
- (65) ibid. p. 48.
- (66) p. 81.
- (67) Sense and Sensibilia p.
- (68) 'Other minds' p. 55.

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The U.C. Berkeley Philosophy Colloquium Committee presents:

Kanavillil Rajagopalan

Campinas, Brazil

“Remarks on J.L. Austin’s Metaphysics”

Thursday, September 23

4:10 p.m.

Howison Library

Moses Hall

Philosophy Colloquium
Moses Hall, UC Berkeley
September 23, 1993

REMARKS ON J.L. AUSTIN'S METAPHYSICS

Kanavillil Rajagopalan (Rajan)
State University at Campinas, Brazil

(1) a. lack of systematicity

J.O. Urmson: "It is not possible to give a systematic account of Austin's philosophy, for he had none."

J.R. Searle: "... misleading appearance of unity of Austin's views."

b. negative thrust

Stuart Hampshire: his temperament was that of a "radical reformer"

G.J. Warnock: "... almost throughout undeviatingly negative critical, even polemically critical"

Austin (S & S): "dismantling the whole doctrine before it gets off the ground"

How to Do: "to play Old Harry with" the twin dichotomies true/false and fact/value

Warnock: "[Austin] in fact held no general theory of philosophy at all - unless a certain purely negative view could be accounted a theory."

external and internal senses of 'negative'

Max Black: 'In pursuit of a vanishing distinction' the strategy of 'textual splicing'; intertextuality

(2) The importance of 'Are there a priori concepts?' (1939)

Warnock: "That paper -except for its unusually determined insistence on distinguishing one question from another, and its marked scepticism as to the merits of most philosophical answers - is not particularly characteristic of Austin's work."

Mackinnon and Maclagan vs. Austin on a priori

'What I do as a philosopher' (Gothenburg talk, 1959): "I do not really believe there are any concepts."

Austin on 'universals' - 'The meaning of a word'

'concepts' to 'propositions' Mats Furberg

R. Cousin; Searle

Margaret Masterman (Symposium on 'Translation', 1961): "It [a philosophical model of translation] must deal in concepts, not only in words or terms" ... "All philosophers believe in concepts, though they sometimes pretend not to."

(3) Austin's theory of truth

'true' descriptive, not just performative

Warnock: "... it is noteworthy that in his views on truth Austin very clearly and definitely does not make the sort of mistake, as I have taken it to be, into which he temporarily deviated in writing about knowledge."

Correspondence Theory of Truth

the exact theoretical status of 'facts' - 'states of affairs'; 'circumstance' (Honderich)

Strawson's "pseudo-entities" vs. Austin's things "in the world"

Austin's definition of truth:

A statement is said to be true when the historic states of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by descriptive conventions.

The importance of 'How to talk: some simple ways' (1953)
Speech Situation S₀.

I-words - copula - T-words

reference (conventions of reference) and type-identification (conventions of sense)

the switch from the imaginary language to real language: permanent risk of reference-failure (mis-identification) and misclassification.

"Thus for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also sufficiently like to merit the same 'description', which is no longer a purely natural relation ... That things are similar, or even 'exactly' similar, I may literally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally see - in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the conventional choice of a name to be given to the colour which they are said to be."

David Kaplan (1990): "the metaphysics of types under the old type/token conception" ... "It seems to me in many ways that this is a sort of updated version of the Platonic notion of abstract forms. The eternal, the unchanging Platonic forms (shapes, perhaps) are the types, and their physical embodiments, which reflect these abstract forms are the tokens."

AUSTIN: (a) "... even when a language does 'mirror' ... features in the world very closely (and does it ever?) the truth of statements remain still a matter ... of the words used being the ones conventionally appointed for situations of the type to which that referred to belongs" (b) "There are many intermediate cases between a true statement and a faithful picture ... For Example, maps: these may be called pictures, yet they are highly conventionalized pictures." (c) "There is something peculiar about the 'fact' ... something which may make us hesitate to call it a 'fact' at all" (d) "...we are aware that this relation is one which we could alter at will, whereas we like to restrict the word 'fact' to hard facts, facts which are natural and unalterable, or anyhow, not alterable at will."

Austin's holism

(4) Consequences for Austin's metaphysics

Stoutland on metaphysical realism:

(1) "... sentences are true or false in virtue of that in the world which they are about" (2) "... in order for sentences to be true or false in virtue of that in the world which they are about, they must in some way fit what they are about; they must agree with it, be adequate to it, conform to it" (3) "... truth is non-epistemic"

(1a) "'Zinnias grow wild' is about zinnias, and it is true (if it is) in virtue of their growing wild" (2a) "Neither truth nor falsity is possible ... if language and the world are related

purely conventionally" (3a) [that truth is justification-trans-
cendent] is rejected by anti-realists and their cousins, the
pragmatists and coherentists"
Dummett: "Frege, although a realist, did not believe in the
"Austin, although by no means a realist, nevertheless found it
harmless to subscribe to a spruced-up version of the correspon-
dence Theory"
Epistemic constraints on truth
In S & S, the status of 'sense-data' questioned alongside of that
of the 'material objects'
Austin: "[It] is essential ... to abandon old habits of Gleich-
schaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies."

Arguments against A.J. Ayer (Foundations of Empirical Knowledge)
(1) a church camouflaged as a barn (church, *barn)
(2) a straight stick placed in a tumbler full of water (a
straight stick, *a bent stick)
(3) an animal we have that always behaved like a cat, but sudden-
ly starts barking (a cat, * a dog)
Ayer's claim: judgments about sense-data are precise and incorri-
gible; judgments about material objects inconclusive
Austin's counter-claim: the difference between the two sorts of
judgments at quantitative, not qualitative.
Austin on dreaming and waking (arguing against Descartes): the
difference between dreaming and being awake qualitative, not
quantitative.

"If dreams were not qualitatively different from waking
experiences, then every waking experience would be like a
dream; the dream-like quality would be, not difficult to
capture, but impossible to avoid."
Barry Stroud's analysis of Austin's account: Austin "attacks what
is really the heart of Descartes' position," for "without Descar-
tes' condition for knowledge, philosophical scepticism about the
external world would be completely disarmed."
AUSTIN: "You cannot fool all of the people all of the time" is
'analytic' ". (Other minds)
"Familiarity takes the edge of illusion" (S & S)

ANEXO 3

ON LISTENING FOR NIETZSCHEAN
ECHOES IN J. L. AUSTIN'S
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

Versao escrita de uma conferencia proferida

no Townsend Center for the Humanities,

UC Berkeley

ON LISTENING FOR NIETZSCHEAN
ECHOES IN J.L. AUSTIN'S PHILO-
SOPHICAL DISCOURSE

KANAVILLIL RAJAGOPALAN

STATE UNIVERSITY AT CAMPINAS, BRAZIL

"I dreamt a line that would make a motto for a sober philosophy: Neither a be-all nor an end-all be." - J.L.Austin

"I am dreaming and have to go on dreaming." - Friedrich Nietzsche

The history of philosophy provides ample evidence for the routine use of two clearly distinguishable strategies when it comes to coping with recalcitrant voices, especially as they begin to increasingly threaten the integrity of the discipline: marginalization and domestication. The so-called 'pre-Socratics' are a constant reminder of the enormous efficacy of the first strategy. The very term 'pre-Socratic' illustrates the strategy of marginalization at work: lumping together an entire group of heterogeneous thinkers as preparatory to dismissing them as at best 'marginal' to what is to be, by implication, legitimately considered the body of the text, the first chapter of Western Philosophy. In more recent times, the strategy was brought to bear on the figure of Nietzsche - with unprecedented success for a considerable length of time - after his very presence decidedly became a source of embarrassment to the Philosophical Establishment. The modus operandi of the strategy of marginalization comprises several well-calculated stages. To begin

with, the intended victim is reduced to a caricature so as to be made the butt of public ridicule. The victim is thereafter forced into that special category from where she can be asked to serve as a foil to what mainstream philosophy considers its model practitioner. The caricaturing stage may involve, among other tactics, paying left-handed compliments, as when Nietzsche was generously praised for his literary qualities (which meant a simultaneous dismissal of his claims to being a philosopher, insofar as, within the prevailing orthodoxy, philosophy was the very negation of literature). Not infrequently, this is done in an extremely subtle fashion or, presumably, in ways even totally unintended, as seems to have been the case with the book Nietzsche as a Philosopher by Arthur Danto⁽²⁾ - an otherwise in-depth study of Nietzsche and his oeuvre - that, nevertheless, betrays the officially backed prejudice right in its very title. For, as a moment's reflection would reveal, the title presupposes that, somehow, all the other attributes of Nietzsche are common knowledge, the only aspect deserving a book-length treatment being his credentials as a philosopher, which are regarded, by implication, as none too obvious.

The strategy of domestication aims at an entirely different effect, although it too employs the very same rhetorical means to achieve the intended effect. Thus, using the very same technique of caricaturing as blowing certain features out of proportion while suppressing or erasing others, the victim's philosophical profile is subjected to a major interpretative plastic surgery so as to make him completely unrecognizable from his former self.

Note that so far the procedure is indistinguishable from ~~that~~ of marginalization. The important difference is that, in the ~~case~~ of domestication, all this is done with a view to bringing the person in question back to the fold (rather than 'easing' ~~her~~ out of it), to portraying her as a part and parcel of the long ~~tradition~~ tradition to which other respectable members of the guild are ~~claimed~~ claimed to belong. As I shall endeavour to show along what follows, the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin belongs to this second ~~category~~ category.

If I am right about the above contention, it should ~~come~~ come as no surprise that there is an amazing degree of similarity ~~between~~ between Nietzsche and Austin, a claim I wish to explore in greater ~~detail~~ detail. Meanwhile, note that the claim is not in the least affected ~~by~~ by the indisputable fact that Austin is standardly viewed as ~~belonging~~ belonging to the mainstream, Austro-Anglo-American tradition of ~~analytic~~ analytic philosophy, whereas in Nietzsche's case, doubts have ~~been~~ been raised even as to the appropriateness of calling him a philosopher. Quite on the contrary, that is the whole point. ~~What~~ What the above facts go to prove is rather that the Establishment ~~has~~ has been immensely successful in warding off the potential danger ~~posed~~ posed by each of them. As we shall see, both were thoroughly out of ~~tune~~ tune with the philosophical orthodoxy by which they found themselves surrounded. But the Establishment found it prudent to ~~adopt~~ adopt completely different tactics in their effort to bracket ~~each~~ each of them: Nietzsche was summarily bracketed out; Austin was, if you like, 'bracketed in.'

An excellent point of departure for our investigation is a certain abiding common interest which the two philosophers shared and which had far-reaching consequences for the kind of philosophical thought developed by each of them: classics and philology. Nietzsche devoted several years to the study of classics and held a chair in classical philology at Basel at the very early age of 25. Austin studied classics, first at Shrewsbury School and then at Balliol College, and nurtured a keen interest in philology till the very end of his life.

What is, however, even more interesting to note is that they made a thoroughly unconventional use of philology, each in his own idiosyncratic fashion, but in potentially convergent ways.

Nietzsche's unorthodox approach to the Ancients has been generally recognized and commented on in the literature. Silk ~~and~~ Stern have, for instance, put it on record that he "had been at odds with conventional philology and philologists even before ~~he~~⁽³⁾ took the chair at Basel." This is indeed borne out by the initial reaction of bewilderment and the subsequent chorus of lambasting criticism occasioned by the publication of his very first book The Birth of Tragedy⁽⁴⁾. The critics were outraged by what they saw as a complete travesty of history when Nietzsche claimed in that book that Schopenhauer and Wagner were engaged in ushering in a new culture, recovered from the ancient, pre-Socratic Greeks, and that only in Sophocles could one encounter the cherished ideal of a perfect harmony between the Diony-

sian and the Apollonian. However, in respect of the remark by
 (5)
 Silk and Sterne, Higgins has made a point of emphasizing that
 Nietzsche's thorough dissatisfaction with the standard approach
 to classics does not mean he fell out of love with what excited
 him most about classics. The following note captures in a nut-
 shell the secret of Nietzsche's passion for classics:

Classical scholarship as knowledge of the ancient
 world cannot, of course, last forever; its material
 is exhaustible. What cannot be exhausted is the
 new adjustment of our age to the classical
 world, of measuring ourselves against it. If we
 assign the classicist the task of understanding his
 own age better by means of the classical world, then
 the task is a permanent one - this is the antinomy of
 classical scholarship. (6)

It is important to note here that what Nietzsche identifies
 as an antinomy in classical scholarship turns out to be a source
 of puzzlement and exasperation only for those classicists who
 consider it their mission to unravel something waiting to be laid
 bare. For Nietzsche, there simply is no such thing buried in the
 past, waiting for the classicist to unearth - provided, as it is
 generally further assumed, she has the dedication and patience of
 an archeologist. Rather, as we have seen, it is Nietzsche's
 pivotal claim that, if conducted in the proper spirit, both
 philology and classical scholarship are subjects of investigation
 that can never come to an end. This is so because every new
 moment in our lives - call it the present - is going to provide
 us with a new vantage point from which to contemplate and revise
 the past. This freshly revised past will, in turn, create a new
 frame of reference in terms of which the present moment itself

(i.e. assuming, it has not, by now, already slipped into the past) will be seen in new light. And so on. The upshot is that the cyclical movement will never come to a standstill. Here is how the whole process as described in Nietzsche's own words:

Men have always, in fact, understood the ancient world exclusively in terms of the present - and shall the present now be understood in terms of the ancient world? More precisely, men have explained the classical world to themselves in terms of our own experiences, and from what they have acquired of the classical world in this way, they have assessed evaluated their own experience. Hence experience is clearly an absolute prerequisite for the classicist. Which means, the classicist must be a man in order to become creative as a classicist. (7)

Now, the idea that we constantly reinterpret our past in the light of what or how we happen to be at the present moment is by no means a novel idea in the English-speaking world, certainly not since the publication of T.S. Eliot's essay 'Tradition and the individual talent'.⁽⁸⁾ No doubt, the very idea of our past being in an eternal state of interpretive flux is already mind-boggling in itself. But for Nietzsche that was only half the story. The point that he had been, long before Eliot's essay, at pains to drive home ('with a hammer,'⁽⁹⁾ to recall his own favourite turn of phrase) was, as it turns out, even more 'outrageous'. He was concerned to knock off the supposedly secure foothold that traditional approaches to historiography implicitly claimed the present moment to provide. As Michel Foucault was to phrase it years later, "One of the most harmful habits in contemporary thought is the analysis of the present as being, precisely, in history, a present of rupture, or of high point, or of completion

(10)
 or a returning dawn." It was Nietzsche's uncompromising claim that the present too is just as much a product of interpretation, of what we construe it to be in the light of our own already interpreted past. That is why he can insist that the interpretive cycle knows no beginning, no end. There are, only interpretations and no ultimate facts of the matter to lay our hands on.

Nietzsche's tireless debunking of all claims of 'ultimate reality' and hence all the time-hallowed hopes for 'grounding' philosophical inquiry, finds interesting resonance in Austin's highly controversial and, as it strikes me, little-understood stance on the question of truth. As irony would have it, though, when Austin claimed in 1950 (11) that a modified version of the so-called Correspondence Theory would adequately explain most of what is philosophically interesting about truth, his critics, (12) among whom P.F. Strawson, found the whole idea something of a 'scandal', allegedly for the reason that Austin seemed to them to be advocating an unashamedly conservative and, judged in terms of the prevailing orthodoxy, outrageously retrogressive view. What Austin's detractors failed to notice or should we rather say, preferred not to notice, is that he was busy doing exactly the opposite of what they were accusing him of being engaged in. For, Austin was, to use a turn of phrase that he himself was to employ (13) five years later in his William James lectures at Harvard, concerned to "play Old Harry with" the very opposition between 'true' and 'false'. And, as it turns out, the subversive, destabilizing element in Austin's seemingly conservative thesis

is the idea of 'conventionality', which he claims, is what ~~makes~~ it the case that our words 'correspond' with the world, whenever, that is, we think they do so. In other words, the world with which our words are said to correspond every time we make a true statement, is not part of a language-independent reality 'out there', but something that we have, by convention, agreed that there is - or, if you like, conjured up.

Nietzsche deconstructs the traditional concept of classical scholarship by showing that both the past and the present constitute mutually dependent variables of an unending, hence indeterminate, chain of effects. Austin deconstructs the claims of Analytic Philosophy's most cherished theory of truth by insisting that the putative world of objective reality against which it pits language is itself the effect of past linguistic interventions. What both Nietzsche and Austin are saying is that the world of reality, whether as it is claimed to have existed in the past or whether as it is claimed to exist today, is the outcome of man's incessant interpretive action, and not its pre-condition or raw material. Needless to point out, what is at stake in both cases is the founding principle of mainstream philosophy, as it has been practised in the Western world from time immemorial.

Nietzsche's virulent and unyielding opposition to the Socratic/Platonic heritage has earned him the title of an iconoclast who rejoices in heralding the twilight of the idols. Austin has been portrayed as a contentious thinker, moved by the spirit of a radical reformer, but the word 'iconoclast' has not, to the

best of my knowledge, been used to characterize his status as a philosopher. What is amazing about this is that, as we have just looked at, Austin actually followed the trail opened by Nietzsche (the question as to whether he did it self-consciously or otherwise need not deter us here) and, like Nietzsche, undertook a frontal assault on some of the grounding principles of what we have come to identify as the Platonic tradition. A case in point is the notion of 'concepts'. There is no doubt whatever that Austin spurned the whole idea till the very end of his life, insisting as he did in his Gothenburg talk (in 1959, a year before his untimely death): "I do not really believe there are any concepts." On this issue too, Austin reveals a close affinity to Nietzsche who, in the words of A. Danto, "was more than a critic of concept and a word tormenting anarchist."

As a matter of fact, it turns out that Austin's resistance to 'concepts' had to do with an even deeper distrust of another sacred legacy of Platonism: universals. For he was acutely aware that most of the standard arguments for the existence of concepts seek to explain them in terms of universals. Austin was, however, fully convinced that the so-called universals were "calculated into existence ... not very long ago." He was not impressed by any of the transcendental arguments traditionally rallied in support of universals. For instance, he summarily dismissed the classical argument that claimed that universals are needed for the reason that otherwise we would not be able to call numerically different sense-data by the same name. Austin's counter-

argument consisted in maintaining that the putative proof viz., that a universal is "there" in each of those different *sensa*, actually serves to effectively undermine the chances of any independent enquiry into the as-yet-unexplained relationship between a universal and a particular, since the whole question is pre-emptively taken care of definitionally.

Now, there is another classical argument in favour of positing universals, to which Austin responds in a way strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche. First, the argument. A true statement is one that corresponds with reality. The statements made by scientists are examples of true statements. *Sensa*, by definition, do not correspond to the statements of the scientists. Hence there must be objects which are real but not sensible, corresponding to the statements of the scientists. Call them "universals".

Austin's reaction to this last argument is that it simply leads us nowhere. Because, contrary to what it seems to take for granted, we do not just stumble across true statements. To say that science provides us with true statements does not guarantee that we can readily recognize a true statement when we see one. For, what constitutes 'science' as opposed to say 'mythology' at any given historical moment is itself a matter of societal convention. That is to say, just as truth turns out to be the result of a certain kind of 'matching exercise' mediated and sustained all the way through by a set of conventions, so too is our general belief that a certain type of discourse (call it 'scientific') has privileged access to truth and is therefore best suited to

expressing it, itself the product of a societal convention. Neither Nietzsche nor Austin felt intimidated by the awe-inspiring prestige of Science among his contemporaries. Both took evident delight in calling the bluff of science's claims to absolute truth and knowledge. This is perhaps less evident in Austin's case, but his biographers have in general been unanimous about what they perceived as a thoroughly irreverend attitude on the part of the English philosopher vis-à-vis the self-proclaimed pretensions of science. As for Nietzsche, the following words by an early commentator gives a clear indication of the ire his posture frequently occasioned among the disbelieving readers:

Nietzsche despises science. He must have had sorry experiences with scientists who offered him the dry bones of scholarship as scientific truth. (18)

It is amazing to note that Nietzsche and Austin - two thinkers who, let us not forget, belonged to very different philosophical epochs and historical contexts - make use of exactly the same line of reasoning in their attempt to debunk the claims of scientific discourse to being the only medium for the formulation of higher order themes. Both reject the idea that science has at its disposal a metalanguage of the sort it has customarily been assumed to be - that is to say, a purified version of our everyday language, from which all those familiar infelicities such as vagueness and ambiguity have been methodically and painstakingly filtered out. Austin's argument in favour of the ordinary language is eloquently spelled out in the following oft-quoted remark:

... our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chair of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method. (19)

The point Austin is underscoring here is that our ordinary, everyday language should be seen as a living testimony for the centuries of active thinking, including philosophical and scientific thinking, that our forefathers engaged in with the same gusto and determination as we. In other words, the so-called 'ordinary' language, far from being a vehicle for pre-philosophical gibberish, already bears the indelible imprint of past philosophical and scientific thought. Therefore, it is pointless and perverse to expect that science or philosophy or whatever could aspire to a superior, qualitatively different, form of language ideally suited to expressing those lofty thoughts that are supposedly the monopoly of these "high-falutin'" activities. The quest for such a metalanguage is bound to end up as a wild goose chase, if only for the reason that it is based on the false assumption that there could be a qualitative difference between the ordinary language and its metalinguistic counterpart.

There lies hidden in language a philosophical mythology which breaks out every moment, however careful one might be. (20)

Thus Nietzsche, making what turns out to have been the same point Austin was to put forward more than half a century later, but with a pungence that shocked his contemporaries - as it was

indeed designed to. Nietzsche derives enormous pleasure - might we add, pleasure that borders on the sadistic - in mocking those amongst his fellow-philosophers who vaingloriously convince themselves that they are engaged in such a high-level intellectual activity that, in virtue of the goals they have set for themselves and the methods they have adopted in order to achieve them, they progressively rid themselves of the mythologies and superstitions that infest ordinary language. "How quixotic of you to conjure up such a thing!," Nietzsche seems to be telling those professional philosophers who think of themselves as a privileged class in this sense. "It is part of your philosophical mythology that makes you eagerly look for traces of mythology in the philosophies of the past that you contemptuously call folklores, while remaining blissfully unaware of the mythology that permeates your own supposedly myth-free philosophy." The best that a philosopher can aspire to accomplish is to knock down the old mythology and put up in its place a new one - and not, as his vanity makes him think, substitute a thoroughly unphilosophical mythology by a totally myth-free philosophy.

"Nietzsche's affinities to analytical philosophy . . .," writes Arthur Danto, "are nowhere more evident than in his pre-occupations with language. Common sense is after all expressed in ordinary language; in speaking the language we have learnt from infancy, we are implicitly prescribing how the world is believed
(21)
and and comprehended." But Nietzsche was also acutely aware of the fact that generations of philosophising in the past have

left so much imprint on our ordinary language that it often stood in the way of our looking at the problems afresh, by predisposing our minds in certain ways. It is in this sense that he was, right from the very outset, on the lookout for a new philosophy that would, in the words of Claude Lévesque , "give back to language all its striking force, all its power to cast a spell, its mysterious and indomitable density, its uncanny and irreducible strangeness." (22)

A radically new philosophy such as the one Nietzsche was looking for naturally called for a radically different language in which to expound it, as he came to recognize, even as he could not have helped being struck by the irony of having to veer round back to just where he had departed from. Nietzsche's dramatic and most controversial response to this challenge was his style, or rather, the multiplicity of his styles which alone, as he realized, was capable of translating the reconciliation of the irreconcilables that was the hallmark of the new philosophy's internal logic. As has been amply noted and commented on in the literature, Nietzsche increasingly resorted to the use of aphorisms - pithy and catchy phrases that contained an enormous potential in their sub-atomic entrails. As Deleuze has put it, "An aphorism formally conceived appears as a fragment; it is the form of pluralist thought." (23)

Austin resembles Nietzsche very closely in his passionate love of terse and epigrammatic forms of expression, and, very much after the manner of his German predecessor, never misses a single opportunity to fashion a smart turn of phrase. His dozen

or so essays, as well as the two longer texts How to Do Things
 (24) (25)
with Words and Sense and Sensibilia are strewn with scores of
 witty phrases of high lapidary craftsmanship. Consider, for
 instance, the catchy "I dreamt a line that would make a motto for
 a sober philosophy: Neither a be-all nor an end-all be." It is (26)
 Shakespeare through and through, in both syntax and morphology. (27)

But style and content are in general so interlocked that it
 is not always easy to tell where one ends and the other begins.
 Once again, the close resemblances between Nietzsche and Austin
 on this score are remarkable, although most Austin scholars have
 found it prudent not to pursue the point any further. As a matter
 of fact, the sheer insistence on the part of the Philosophical
 Establishment to see in completely different ways certain common
 features shared by Nietzsche and Austin, seems to have been in
 large measure responsible for the standard interpretations of the
 work of the two philosophers, ultimately paving the way for their
 portrayal as an 'outsider' and 'insider', respectively.

This is immediately obvious with regard to the one striking
 stylistic feature common to both Nietzsche and Austin that we
 have just alluded to: the penchant for the use of witty and
 catchy aphorisms. In Nietzsche's case, this is frequently inter-
 preted as clear evidence that he is more interested in verbal
 craftsmanship and rhetorical flourishes than in the soundness of
 his reasoning (whence the allegation that he is more of a poet
 than a philosopher). Here is how Kaufmann discusses this point:

If some Nazi writers cited him, nevertheless, it was at
 the price of incredible misquotation and exegetical
 acrobatics which defy comparison with all the familiar

devices that Nietzsche himself castigated in the name of the philological conscience. His works were rejected as a series of poses, parenthetical statements were quoted as meaning the opposite of what they plainly mean in context, and views he explicitly rejected were brazenly attributed to him.

The process was greatly aided by Nietzsche's sister .. - but also by his love of language. He could not resist a bas mot or a striking coinage, and he took delight in inventing better slogans and epigrams for hostile positions than his opponents could devise - and in breathing a new and unexpectedly different spirit into such phrases. Witness 'the will to power', 'the Overman', 'beyond good and evil', and dozens more. (28)

Vis-à-vis Austin, critics have generally taken a different stance. The very same epigrammatic style as one identifies in Nietzsche and much the same penchant for catchy, slogan-like turns of phrase are attributed to the rather sketchy character of his writings owing, as we are further told, to the fact that they were, for the most part, lecture notes that an untimely death prevented the author from revising and expanding on. "In 1955 he delivered, but by 1960 [the year of Austin's death] was still revising for possible publication the William James lectures at Harvard." - this is how Warnock tries to 'justify' Austin, uneasy with the nagging suspicion that somehow Austin's style fell short of the lofty aims he had set for himself. Says J.L. Cohen, seeking to defend Austin against the same charges, "If the late Prof. J.L. Austin had survived to publish the substance of his William James lectures himself, he would no doubt have made alterations in them. With his brilliant sharpness of intellect, he would probably have eliminated more flaws than most critics will ever see." (30) It is difficult not to be impressed by the similarity of

these comments with Arthur Danto's celebrated "Nietzsche's books (31) give the appearance of having been assembled rather than composed."

- although the altogether different inference made from this is typical of the double standard that the Establishment has found it expedient to assume on the whole issue.

It turns out that these divergent interpretations of what is at bottom the very same stylistic device, comes in handy in carrying out the Establishment's carefully thought-out strategy of assigning the two philosophers to altogether different camps - or, alternatively, of domesticating the one while marginalizing the other.

In Nietzsche's case, it is readily conceded that the short, catchy aphorisms have a telling effect and help drive home the message with laser-beam precision and forcefulness. But then no sooner is this concession made than it is followed by the observation that the very philosophical enterprise of Nietzsche is nothing but an exercise in pure verbiage, a dazzling display of verbal pyrotechnics. The very same critics would no doubt admit that Austin too is given - alas, a bit too frequently - to the use of witty and catchy phrases. But then, they would hasten to add, Austin is first and foremost a speaker and classroom teacher and not a compulsive loner like Nietzsche who took to writing as a means of escape (No doubt, Nietzsche's teaching career was but short-lived - although, like Austin too, he had a remarkable head-start at an unusually young age). To quote Warnock, "... Austin's style in writing is in fact never very far from that of the speaking voice." (32)

What the vast majority of these readers who correctly identify in Austin a strong tendency to resort to a direct, first-person conversational idiom, nevertheless fail to appreciate is the possibility that such a distinctive style may well be symptomatic of a refreshingly new approach to philosophy. Indeed it turns out that Austin's philosophical writings are imbued with reflections of a highly personal and autobiographical kind. A clear case in point is the book How to Do Things with Words, edited and published posthumously from the extensive lecture notes he had prepared for his Harvard lectures - of all his writings, perhaps the most widely known, especially to scholars working in areas other than philosophy proper.

The rhetorical structure of How to Do Things with Words has been missed by many an efficient reader. In point of fact, far too much time has been spent on trying to read it as a treatise, completely ignoring its internal, rhetorical movement, the very hallmark of its narrative design.

It is worth the while to dwell on this point a little longer in order to examine how the standardly accepted readings of Austin's widely-acclaimed masterpiece seek to arrest the rhetoridynamism of his narrative, for the reason that the tactic is crucial for the concerted attempt by the Philosophical Establishment to portray the English philosopher as belonging to the mainstream. For, Austin's alleged status as a full-fledged analytic philosopher critically hinges on the repression of the narrative flow in his writings and the smothering of its textual

free play and Dionysian abandon so as to yield a set of static, still-life, frames.

Nevertheless, as it turns out, every attempt to force on Austin an attitude of conceptual restraint and caution, and a consolidated philosophical outlook, soon runs into serious trouble, as the Establishment has painfully had to realize over the years. The professional philosopher today cannot help being taken aback by the extraordinary interest the Austinian text has sparked off among scholars from neighbouring disciplines - although, for reasons not too difficult to imagine, she is most likely not to want to go on record as assigning it any greater importance than that of a passing curiosity.

On the standardly available reading (call it the Official Reading), Austin's William James lectures constitute an attempt to sketch, to lay down the basics of, what has since then come to be known as the Theory of Speech Acts. Of course, it is immediately noted, one looks in vain into Austin's text for a theory in its fully articulated form. Rather, what we have there is a theory in its embryonic form, a theory, if you like, 'in the offing'. After all, says the Official Reading, Austin had been working on the theory since some ten or fifteen years before the Harvard lectures and was still at it at the time of his death.

(33)

Thus it is that John Searle can confidently speak of his own special version of the theory as something Austin did not live long enough to develop himself, having instead had to content himself leaving the task to be carried out after his death by some of his chosen disciples, among whom notably he - Searle -

himself. This version is given official stamp of approval when a standard text-book account of the subject says, "In general, Searle's theory of speech acts is just Austin's systematised, in part rigidified, with sallies into the general theory of meaning."⁽³⁴⁾

The net result of all this concerted interpretive endeavour is that Austin is co-opted as a thorough-going theoretician in the orthodox tradition of Analytic Philosophy - who did not make it all the way only because Destiny willed otherwise. No doubt, such a caricature of Austin is a far cry from Nietzsche, the arch debunker of Western philosophy who rejoiced in preaching a philosophy of pure negativity.

But to see Austin as desperately trying to perfect a rigorous theory of speech acts is also to miss certain vital aspects of his subtle artistry. As many perspicacious readers have also recognized, behind the veneer of a painstaking theory-building drive, there is also an equally strong, if not in fact stronger, desire to destabilize the very platforms he has so carefully constructed. This is what happens, for instance, with the celebrated distinction between the constative and the performative, between fact-stating and action-performing utterances - a distinction Austin expends an enormous amount of time and energy articulating and redefining. But then, no sooner has he given us the impression that he is reasonably happy with the results thus far obtained, than we begin to notice him at work again, trying, with what is best described as a certain 'impish' delight, to show why such presumed theoretical advances are at best illusory.

Many Austin readers who have been trained to think that the only way we can at all do philosophy is by persistently breaking concepts until we reach their ultimate, atomic constituents, are understandably disconcerted by what they rightly see as Austin's characteristic habit of 'weaving his way' in and out of temptingly reassuring distinctions, of 'flirting' with concepts that are nevertheless shown to be shadowy. What they have not been trained to look at and appreciate is the uncanny rhetorical movement of the Austinian text which is, contrary once again, to all that they have been led to believe, a part and parcel of his philosophical message.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been numerous attempts to establish how Austin 'gave up' on his distinctions far too easily. "Austin's despair," ponders Keith Graham, "was premature." Writing in the same vein, J.J. Katz devotes an entire section of his book to the self-appointed task he refers to as 'How to save Austin from Austin'.⁽³⁵⁾⁽³⁶⁾

What all this goes to prove is that Austin's philosophical modus operandi is something totally alien to the procedures familiar to analytic philosophers. The freewheeling, rhetorical movement of his text, that we mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, often tends to create the weird sensation that he wouldn't in the least be bothered about any final, definitive outcome of his meandering ruminations. But then, that is the whole point - recall the motto he coined for himself: Neither a be-all nor an end-all be. He is quite happy making and unmaking

distinctions, and in the process, tempting and teasing the ever hopeful reader who persists in her expectation that a neat system is about to emerge. Thus Max Black's facetious (as seems to have been the case) suggestion that an appropriate sub-title for the William James lectures would be 'In pursuit of a vanishing distinction' ⁽³⁷⁾ does capture the spirit of the Austinian enterprise.

A careful examination of Austin's rhetoric reveals that, far from working his way toward a positive thesis, he is all the time concerned to act out the failures and frustrations of anyone intent - like himself before he became wiser - on pinning down speech acts as a first step to theorizing about them. The quarry always escapes and surprisingly, the hunter has always known that the whole enterprise is destined to be a wild goose chase. Still, it is as though there were a pressing need to narrate the same story all over, again and again; for there simply is no other way to talk about it - and talk about it he must. Small wonder, therefore, that Austin used the same script on at least two other important occasions - in his paper 'Consta-
tif - Performatif' ⁽³⁸⁾, read at the Royaumont Conference and again in his talk 'Performative utterances' ⁽³⁹⁾ delivered on the BBC.

This unmistakable narrative strain in Austin's writings brings to mind Nietzsche's most favoured rhetorical style. Higgins points out that, for Nietzsche, a philosopher's writings are "the personal confessions of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir." ⁽⁴⁰⁾ As Nietzsche himself said in a letter to Lou Salomé, "Your idea of reducing philosophical systems to the status

of personal records of their authors is a veritable 'twin-brain' idea." (41)

If there is one thing that readers of both Nietzsche and Austin have been unanimous about in their assessment of the work of the two philosophers, it is the seductive charm that the texts in question exercise over them. G.J. Warnock recorded his impressions in a telling passage that appeared in the New Yorker, as part of an obituary note, shortly after Austin's death. In Warnock's words, "...[Austin] did succeed in haunting most of the philosophers in England, and to his colleagues it seemed his terrifying intelligence was never at rest. Many of them used to wake up in the night with a vision of the stringy, wiry Austin, standing over their pillow like a bird of prey ..." (42) Those, like Warnock, who knew Austin personally typically thought of him as a veritable 'Ancient Mariner' frantically sailing across the Sea of Philosophy.

As Erich Heller remarks in a highly insightful study of Nietzsche, the German philosopher once wrote up a 'fable', whose central figure turns out to be none other than its creator himself. ("... it is amazing that Nietzsche should not have recognized his [own] features" (43)). Here is how Nietzsche presents the enigmatic figure:

The Don Juan of the Mind; no philosopher or poet has yet discovered him. What he lacks is the love of the things he knows, what he possesses is esprit, the itch and delight in the chase and intrigue of knowledge - knowledge as far and high as the distant stars. Until in the end there is nothing left for him to chase except the knowledge which hurts most, just as a drunkard in the end drinks absinthe and methylated spirits. And in the very end, he craves for Hell, it is the only knowledge which can still seduce him ... (44)

It is no coincidence therefore that Shoshana Felman invokes the name of none other than Nietzsche, at the very outset of her by-now-already-a-classic The Literary Speech Act: Don Juan with J.L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages. (45)

With all these close resemblances between the two philosophers, why have analytic philosophers been by and large reluctant to pursue the issue any further or, at the very least, as much as, take note of it by even a passing mention? The answer to this question will necessarily have to take into account the power structure that underwrites much of what we refer to as the 'disciplinary integrity' of the different academic areas that constitute the organizational structure of modern universities. For, as Russell Jacoby has noted (along with countless others), it is the universities that have in modern times taken upon themselves the task of furthering common intellectual interests that were pursued in other epochs almost entirely as a private hobby or a pastime to be shared with a handful of one's friends. (46)

It stands to reason that it is in the interests of the powers that be - the guardians entrusted with the arduous mission of ensuring the survival of the guild - that a precious name like that of J.L. Austin is insulated against the possibility of getting 'tarnished' by the mere association with that of someone like Nietzsche, long considered an outcast and a constant threat to the very integrity of the enterprise of Analytic Philosophy.

But then, there is always the ever-persistent question: In whose name are these self-appointed guardians themselves speaking?

What happens to an academic discipline when these guardians fail in their effort to ward off the threats that ultimately spell the disintegration of the existing power structure ? It seems philosophy is quite unlike science in this respect. Modern chemistry was born out of the ashes of a discredited alchemy, and astronomy yielded its place to modern astronomy - star-gazing has lost its mystic awe and bewilderment, at least for the contemporary practitioners of the art. But in philosophy, it seems, there is no outside - as Bertrand Russell once noted and, indeed, Nietzsche before him had been forced to recognize. Perhaps what we need further, à la Derrida, is the recognition that all philosophy is but a text, and hence in need of constant reinterpretation. Indeed any analytic philosopher who can be made to see the inescapably textual nature of philosophy, can no longer express any qualms about the much-misunderstood Derridean cliché that there is nothing beyond the all pervasive text.

Some thirty years ago, Arthur Danto wrote in his penetrating study of Nietzsche:

Nietzsche cannot be regarded as having been an influence upon the analytic movement in philosophy, unless in some devious, sub-terranean way. Rather, it is for the movement to reclaim him as a predecessor. It is, however, not too late for him to become an influence. (emphasis added). (50)

All I have endeavoured to do in this paper is to make a preliminary move in that direction, and Danto's prophetic words seem to be ideally suited for wrapping up the present discussion.

NOTES

(1) This paper was prepared from the notes used for a talk at UC Berkeley. I wish to thank CAPES for a fellowship (2715-92-7) that supported me during my post-doctoral visit to Berkeley in 1993. The general trend of the reasoning I develop in this paper is one that I have been pursuing for a much longer time, thanks to a research grant from CNPq (306151/88-0).

(2) Published by the Mcmillan Co., New York. 1965.

(3) Cf. M.S. Silk and J.R. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy., Cambridge: CUP. 1981.

(4) The original version in German was published in

(5) Cf. Kathleen Higgins, Nietzsche's Zarathustra Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 1987.

(6) Cited in Higgins, op cit p. 15

(7) ibid

(8) First published in 1917

(9)

(10) Telos

(11) 'Truth' p.

(12) 'Truth' p

(13) The notes used for these lectures were edited and published posthumously in 1962 under the title How to Do Things with Words

(14) Cited in Mats Furberg, Saying and Meaning: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin's Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1971

(15) op cit p. 12

(16) 'Are there a priori concepts?' p. 2. in Philosophical Papers Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1961. Pp. 1 -9

(17) ibid

(18) Cf. Paul Carus, Nietzsche and Other Exponents of Individualism Chicago: The Opus Publishing Co. p. 55.

(19) 'A plea for excuses' 1956. in Philosophical Papers pp. 129 - 130.

- (20) Nietzsche on metalanguage'
- (21) op cit p. 83
- (22) 'Language to the limit' In Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism ed. by T. Derby et al. 1982. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- (23) Deleuze, 1977 p. 35
- (24) Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1962.
- (25) Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1962.
- (26)
- (27) Cf. Hamlet "Neither a lender nor a borrower be"; The Merchant of Venice "And such a want-wit sadness makes of me/ THAT I have much ado to know myself"
- (28) in Portable Nietzsche Edited and translated by Walter Kauffman. Penguin Books Ltd, 19 pp. 14-15
- (29) J.L.Austin London: Routledge. 1989. p. 105.
- (30) 'Do illocutionary forces exist ?' in K.T.Fann ed. 1969. Symposium on J.L. Austin p. 420
- (31) Arthur Danto, op cit p. 19
- (32) J.L.Austin p. 105.
- (33) 'Reiterating the differences' p
- (34) S.C. Levinson, Pragmatics Cambridge: CUP 1983 p 238
- (35) J.L.Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Sussex, The Harvester Press. 1977. p. 67
- (36) Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force. Hassocks Harvester Press 1977
- (37) Max Black. "Austin on performatives' p. 401. In K.T. Fann ed. op cit Pp. 401-411
- (38) In La Philosophie Analytique, Cahiers de Royaumont. 1962. Pp.271-304
- (39) In Philosophical Papers pp
- (40) Higgins, op cit p. 152
- (41) Cited in Higgins op cit p.4

(42) Cited in Mats Furberg, op cit p. 1

(43) The Importance of Nietzsche Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 15

(44) ibid

(45) Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY. 1980. Translated from French by C. Porter

(46) The Last Intellectuals NY: Basic Books. 1987.

(47) Bertrand Russell, 'Preface' to Words and Things: An Examination of and An Attack on Linguistic Philosophy by E.Gellner. London, R.K.P. Ltd.

(48) Derrida,

(49) the French original reads,

(50) Danto, op cit p.14

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ANEXO 4

FREGE'S RACISM AND DUMMETT'S
REMORSE: IS THERE
A MORAL TO THE STORY ?

"Squib" que serviu como "moot point"
num "Graduate Seminar" no
Departamento de Retorica, UC Berkeley

FREGE'S RACISM AND DUMMETT'S REMORSE:

IS THERE A MORAL TO THE STORY ?

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to track down some of the broader implications of Michael Dummett's discovery that Gottlob Frege, one of the founders of modern analytic philosophy, whose philosophical work he had studied for years and whom he had literally come to "revere ... as an absolutely rational man," was a virulent racist and an anti-semite. Dummett's remorse at his discovery is interrogated against the back-drop of his own major claim that there is an essential unity to Frege's thoughts. It is argued that such putative unity as Dummett claims for Frege's philosophy is the result of certain manoeuvres of strategic exclusion that have been the hall-mark of Western philosophy ever since its inception. For, it is these very manoeuvres that help sustain such inaugural dichotomies as philosophy vs. literature that are, in the final analysis, no different from, and indeed, provide a rational justification for the discriminatory dichotomies that invariably underlie racist ideologies.

FREGE'S RACISM AND DUMMETT'S
REMORSE; IS THERE A MORAL TO
THE STORY ?

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"There is some irony for me in the fact that the man about whose philosophical views I have devoted, over years, a great deal of time to thinking, was at least at the end of his life, a virulent racist, specifically an anti-semite." Thus Michael Dummett, altogether unexpectedly, in the very last paragraph of the Preface to the first edition⁽¹⁾ of his Frege; Philosophy of Language,⁽²⁾ by general acclaim, an authoritative work on the German philosopher and one of the founders of modern analytic philosophy.⁽³⁾ What we have here is, no doubt, a veritable scandal bomb, whose disastrous potentialities Dummett clearly recognized, indeed to the point of withholding the information till the very last minute, when his intellectual honesty would no longer permit him to go on doing so. And even when he did drop the bombshell, it is almost as if he secretly wished it would not explode, or even if it did, the resulting shrapnel would not get scattered too far. Anyhow, Dummett's words are a poignant and very moving confession. The irony of that confession becomes even more telling when considered against the fact that, earlier on in the same Preface, he has spent some time trying to excuse himself for the inordinate delay in sending the manuscript of his work to the publishers on the grounds that

he was busy doing politics, fighting what was to prove later on to have been a losing battle against the alarming growth of racism nearer home in his own native Great Britain. For Dummett there was, thus, some deep and disturbing incongruity about the fact that someone whom he "had revered ... as an absolutely rational man" could (as revealed beyond the shadow of a doubt by a fragment of a diary discovered amidst Frege's Nachlass), all of a sudden, turn out to have been, all along, "a man of extreme right-wing political opinions, bitterly opposed to the parliamentary system, democrats, liberals, Catholics, the French and, above all, Jews, who he thought ought to be deprived of political rights and, preferably, expelled from Germany." ⁽⁴⁾ How on earth - we hear Dummett asking silently - can a philosopher, indeed any sane person, advocate political views that are not justifiable in terms of the very same standards of rationality as the ones she herself considers unnegotiable in expounding her philosophical views? And, sure enough, we can also sense here Dummett's utter despair at the discovery that he had all along been literally "revering" someone whose political views were at loggerheads with the ones he himself had always cherished and, indeed, fought for. Thus from Dummett's point of view, it seems clear that it is only in the fitness of things that there be consistency not only between one's political and philosophical views, but also between the political views of one's own and those of all those people whom one elects to revere as one's intellectual idols.

In what follows, I shall avoid going into a discussion of why the Academic Establishment has found it prudent all these years to draw a curtain of silence on the whole issue. No doubt, such a discussion would be interesting in itself, especially in view of the fact that the post-war years have been rocked time and time again by scandals over such names as Nietzsche, Heidegger and, more recently, Paul de Man who lived to see the cupboard of his past being avidly ransacked for skeletons of all imaginable sorts.

What I wish to address is, instead, a thesis Dummett himself argues for in the body of his text, and ask what if any is its relevance to Frege's racism and his sympathy for a political ideology that was, not long after his death, to be championed by the dreaded Nazis, the discovery of which so disconcerted his English admirer and self-proclaimed exegete.

"More than that of most philosophical writers," says Dummett in a chapter entitled 'The evolution of Frege's thought',⁽⁵⁾ "Frege's work can be treated as a unity." He then goes on to contrast Frege with Bertrand Russell who, we are reminded, frequently changed his views, often drastically, and hence can be credited with no single, stable and monolithic philosophical outlook. Frege, on the other hand, insists Dummett, modified his views very little, in fact so little that such minor revisions as the ones he did introduce can be safely ignored so as to reveal a single, solidly consistent system of thought, spanning the entire length of his career as an intellectual.

Now, the ascription of unity to a body of thought, whether from a diachronic or synchronic perspective would, it seems, crucially depend on how we are to treat those "nitty-gritty details" that constantly threaten all talk of unity. Indeed, to the extent that the soundness of a theory is believed to stem from its essential unity, the internal consistency among its different parts, such methodological preliminaries as 'idealization' and 'standardization' have been sanctioned and sanctified by the scientific community precisely to ensure that such inconvenient 'details' are swept under the carpet. And, sure enough, Dummett makes a point of calling our attention to three basic principles enunciated by Frege himself in his Preface to Grundlgen der Arithmetik. Here are the principles in Dummett's words:

always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective,
to ask after the meaning of words only in the context of sentences, not in isolation; and
to keep in view the distinction between concept and object.⁽⁶⁾

In point of fact, it does not take us very long to discover that Frege - or rather, the Frege as so approvingly and enthusiastically interpreted by Dummett - is able to guarantee every semblance of unity to his thought, both synchronically and diachronically, only to the extent that we acquiesce in his characteristic strategy of positing dichotomies, invariably with a view to retaining one member of the pair, while throwing the

other overboard unceremoniously (a practice justified in the name of 'conceptual analysis', the summum bonum of analytic philosophy). The Fregean boat of a single, unified theory, to recall and rework Neurath's famous metaphor, stays afloat just in case we follow Dummett and accept as perfectly in order that he should jettison not only the psychological and the subjective, but also, as Dummett tells us in the very first chapter of his book, what Frege called 'tone' or 'illumination' (Beleuchtung) and 'colouring' (Färbung), as opposed to his more famous 'sense' (Sinn). The unity of Frege's thoughts rests, to change our metaphor, on our conceding him the right to separate the theoretically interesting wheat from the theory-threatening chaff.

But isn't what we have been saying true of every theory? How can anybody construct any theory whatsoever, unless she is given a free hand, if we may switch to yet another metaphor, to do some conceptual trimming and streamlining? Finally, why should we be singling out Frege in order to say the obvious about what everybody intent upon theory-building must perforce do?

The answer to all this is that we are not - at least for the time being - simply interested in Frege or even whether or not he was able to bring his political views to square with his philosophical convictions. We are trying to make sense of a certain, highly esteemed, authoritative interpretation of Frege's work that, on the one hand, explicitly claims that there is an essential unity to his thoughts while, on the other hand, also implicitly suggesting that his political views can by no means

be justified with reference to the same criteria of rationality as the ones in terms of which his philosophy may be appraised.

It seems, then, that, on the face of it, Dummett simply cannot be right on both these counts simultaneously. Either he must forego the claim of unity of Frege's thoughts, or stop feeling remorse about or sensing an irony in having revered someone whose political views were so scandalously outrageous. This is so because the claim of unity rests on the assumption that a person's political views can be regarded as being outside of the frame of reference when assessing her total intellectual profile; whereas the detection of irony at the discovery of a philosopher's highly objectionable political views involves the implicit credo that one's political views form a part and parcel of one's overall intellectual make-up and must be assessed in terms of the same standards of rationality as are brought to bear on one's other views, philosophical or whatever.

But the most intriguing aspect of it all is yet to be countenanced. For, upon closer inspection, it begins to become clear that the whole predicament faced by Dummett rests on a profound aporia. It is - contrary to the first impression - the one and the same gesture of strategic exclusion that we looked at earlier, that secures, on the one hand, both the unity of Frege's thought as energetically argued for by Dummett and Dummett's own thesis claiming such unity for Frege's thoughts, and, on the other hand, the irony at the discovery of the crass irrationality of the political views of a man otherwise believed to be the very paradigm of rationality. In order to appreciate

this better, let us recall that, to begin with, Frege achieves the much-vaunted unity of his thoughts, the neat intermeshing of the different elements that make up his conceptual schema, by systematically eliminating at every stage, the excess of meaning that threatens his enterprise. It is thanks to this manoeuvre that he is able to guarantee the 'purity' of each and every one of the concepts that will enter into the schema - 'sense', 'the logical', 'the objective' etc.. In his turn, Dummett too does exactly the same thing. He strategically excludes from the body of his book-length treatment of Frege's philosophy, even a passing mention of the political views of the man whom he has by now begun to "revere". Here is how he justifies the exclusion: "A preface is personal, the body of the book impersonal." ⁽⁷⁾ It is thanks to such a strategic exclusion that he is able to portray Frege as "an absolutely rational man." But then, here is where the plot finally begins to thicken. Could Dummett's disillusionment and despair at the discovery that Frege was, all along, an anti-semitic and an early advocate of what was to become the rallying cry of the Nazis, have to do with a sudden, horrifying realization on his part that it is one and the same guiding principle that is at work in his idol's political convictions as well as his philosophical views? For, as Dummett discovered to his horror, Frege wholeheartedly subscribed to a political ideology centred on ethnic and religious intolerance and hatred. And, as the events in Germany subsequent to Frege's death in 1925 were to show clearly, the integrity of that ideology - as embodied by the National Socialist Party - was

zealously safeguarded by the strategic exclusion of "... the ... democrats, liberals, Catholics, the French and, above all, Jews" who threatened the cherished 'purity' of the German race and with it, the unity of the ideology that so critically depended on that mythical purity.

In other words, could Dummett's disillusionment and despair be accounted for by appealing to the possibility that it occurred to him, maybe at a subconscious level, that Frege's central thesis was exactly the same in the two apparently unrelated spheres of politics and philosophy viz., ethnic cleansing in the former and conceptual cleansing in the latter? If so, the real irony of it all would seem to consist in the following: it turns out that Dummett is indeed absolutely right in claiming an essential unity to Frege's thoughts - but, alas, for reasons he would wish didn't hold good. As supreme irony would have it, Dummett is right in spite of himself! But then, at this stage, we had better leave it to Dummett to find a way out of his own dilemma.

However, no matter how we choose to draw the bottom line to our discussion so far, there is one final question of much wider significance that still cries out for an answer: Is there a moral to the whole episode of Frege's involvement with the burgeoning anti-semitic caucus in Germany at the turn of the current century and Dummett's remorse at the belated discovery of his idol's nefarious political views?

There seems to be a compelling case for staking the claim that Dummett's predicament is, as a matter of fact, endemic to the entire history of Western philosophy, right since Plato.

For, isn't the Western philosophy's inaugural gambit of defining itself in stark opposition to literature - leading to the attendant dichotomies such as logic vs. rhetoric, science vs. art, reason vs. emotion, argumentation vs. persuasion, the objective vs. the subjective, literal vs. metaphoric, and so on, and indeed, impersonal vs. personal and text vs. preface - nothing but an early attempt to secure the sort of 'purity' that alone can guarantee its cherished goal of unity of thought ? Finally, how can we possibly rest assured that a concept of rationality born, as we know, of an inaugural manoeuvre of strategic exclusion that isolated the Barbarians so as to focus on the Greeks, will not also ratify and provide a rational justification for further dichotomies such as Aryan vs. Jew, Jew vs. Gentile and all the rest of it ?

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NOTES

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(2) Published in 1973 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., London. p. xii.

(3) Cf. e. g. Hans D. Sluga, Gottlob Frege, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980. p.2: "Gottlob Frege can be considered the first analytic philosopher." About Dummett, Sluga, a former student of the English philosopher, writes, "No one has discussed Frege's thoughts at greater length", and further, "... he pursues Fregean problems with a great deal of acumen." (p.3)

(4) op. cit. p. xii.

(5) op. cit. p. 628.

(6) op. cit. p. 631.

(7) op. cit. ix.

ANEXO 5

'CHAMELEON-LINGUIST' AND
THE REVIVAL OF CASUISTRY:
AFTERTHOUGHTS ON A
CONTROVERSIAL SUGGESTION
BY FERNANDO TARALLO

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'CHAMALEON-LINGUIST' AND THE REVIVAL OF
CASUISTRY: AFTERTHOUGHTS ON A CONTROVERSIAL
SUGGESTION BY FERNANDO TARALLO

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ABSTRACT: Este trabalho procura rediscutir a polêmica questão levantada por Fernando Tarallo a respeito de como adequar uma teoria lingüística às especificidades inesperadas que os casos concretos - os chamados 'fatos reais' - tendem a apresentar. A sugestão de Tarallo de que é preciso, nesses casos, usar uma boa dose de senso prático e ser, digamos, um 'lingüista-camaleão', é revista à luz da pesquisa realizada por Jonsen e Toulmin (1988). Segundo esses autores, a redescoberta do 'casuismo' - livre das conotações negativas que a história de pensamento lhe conferiu - abre excelentes possibilidades de nos libertarmos do marasmo criado pelas teorias totalizantes com suas metas pretensamente universais que mal conseguem dar conta do recado quanto à obrigação de se adequar à experiência vivida. Ao mesmo tempo em que se procura na idéia lançada por Tarallo o germe de casuismo (ainda que de forma não tencionada, nem de longe), argumenta-se também que a tese de Jonsen e Toulmin vem ao encontro dos anseios contemporâneos tematizados pela corrente que chamamos de 'pós-modernidade'.

The passage of time often opens up for us new perspectives on a problem that were unavailable in the midst of the excitement of the moment at which it originally came up for discussion. Armed with hindsight and the wisdom that accrued in the intervening years, one is thus frequently in a position to review an old case and discern in it fresh elements that reach out far beyond their originally projected range of application.

In what follows, I shall review one such issue, brought up by Fernando Tarallo and argue that, perhaps unbeknownst to him, he ended up suggesting a bold - and, to judge by the state of the art

that characterizes contemporary linguistics, indeed thoroughly unconventional and revolutionary - approach to a dilemma that researchers involved in the so-called 'field-work' as opposed to 'arm-chair research' come up against, alas, all too frequently.

On one of the few occasions when he directly addressed a question of meta-theoretical import, Tarallo (1986) grappled with the familiar problem of the embarrassing slip between the theoretical cup and the practical lip. What is a practical-minded researcher supposed to do when she discovers that the categories and types posited *in vacuo* by an arm-chair theoretician she is broadly in agreement with, fail to fit the kind of objects she actually comes across in her routine field-work? Should she simply throw the theory overboard and call it a day or, set about trying to find on the market an alternative theory or, if none exists that meets her requirements, to come up with one herself? Those among us who are given to getting sentimentally swept off the feet by all this talk about the scientist's need to be honest at least to herself, are wont to say an almost instinctive and enthusiastic "yea" to the second alternative. But then to our sheer dismay, pat pops up the ugly question: What guarantee is there that the newly elected theory will not fare equally badly in the face of the next bundle of raw data that awaits the analyst's scrutiny?

Now, before we recall Tarallo's recommendation on this question, let us note that the problem he called our attention to is by no means confined to linguistics. It is endemic to all branches of human inquiry that aspire to overarching, totalizing generalizations, while, at the same time, staking on their behalf the claim of some real-life relevance. No doubt, one is relatively safe (or, at the very least, blissfully ignorant of what is going on) so long as one is operating at the Olympian heights of "pure" theory. But down on the valley below, it is a different story. To illustrate the case by taking linguistics as an example, as soon as one goes into any of those hyphenated sub-areas such as socio-linguistics, psycho-linguistics, neuro-linguistics and the like - and, of course, not to forget the unhyphenated 'no-man's land' called 'applied linguistics' -

one discovers one can no longer eschew the million-dollar question. And similarly in the case of applied mathematics, applied psychology, and applied what-have-you.

As a conscientious and through-going linguist concerned to treat raw data in a way rigorously faithful to the theory he had chosen to work with, Tarallo realized that he had to come to terms very early on in his lightning career with the quandary as to the persistent mis-match between the types posited by the theory and the tokens encountered in practice - or, as it would be more appropriate to say, the question as to which of the types provided by the theory he subscribed to were to be seen as the right candidates for the items encountered in real life to be tokens of. Of course, no theory ever comes with a guarantee that there will be a perfect fit; instead, in the normal run of things, the task is left to the more practical-minded among its new adherents. That is why all theories pose the same dilemma before anyone intent to test them on the anvil of real life experience.

Tarallo's solution consisted in saying that the practical-minded researcher should not shy from resorting to the use of common sense every now and then. It is only by permitting herself some elbow room and right to use discretionary judgment that she can ever hope to bring the full weight of the theory to bear on the data. Not to recognize this would be to ignore the fact that no theory is meant to dovetail into real life without some chipping and chiselling. Such 'minor readjustments' are necessary to meet the exigencies of concrete situations. With his characteristic flair for drawing on analogies from all walks of life, Tarallo broached his topic by calling attention to 'Zelig' the silver-screen character portrayed by Woody Allen, whose distinguishing personality trait was instantaneous adaptation to every novel environment in which he would find himself. Zelig became, thus, the prototype for Tarallo's 'chameleon-linguist' and personified the opposite extreme to immutability and unresponsiveness to environmental variation. He had no self-same identity or, if you like, he had far too many of them to be credited with any single one as being his real, inalienable

one. Zelig and the 'chameleon-linguist' were what could best be described as 'bundles of contingent features'.

I shall refrain from going into further ramifications of Tarallo's analogy, or details of the acrimonious debate his paper sparked off. I wish instead to focus on the very awkward hot-spot on which he put his bold finger. Although the particular interpretation I shall try to develop in the remainder of this paper will, for all I know, diverge significantly from what seems to me to have been Tarallo's own position at the time he raised the issue, the kind of considerations I shall make in what follows, will, I hope, contribute to underscoring the enormous importance as well as the timeliness of his calling attention to the existence of the problem.

The problem that Tarallo called our attention to has a very long history indeed. This begins to become patent as soon as one recognizes that it is at bottom simply a variant of the ancient problem of universals vs. particulars. Granted, for the sake of the argument that there are such Platonic entities as universals, how do we actually go about identifying them? Do they inhere, or in some other mysterious sense, inhabit every sense-datum we seem to come across routinely, so that every time we look at a particular sense-datum, we are also thereby looking at a universal? Or, do they, instead, exist (or, if you like, subsist) as a class apart, so that every time you look at a particular, you can rest assured you are looking at anything but a universal?

The opposition between theory and practice too ultimately rests on the distinction between universals and particulars. Consequently, the way we conceive of the relation between theory and practice - or, as Tarallo narrowed the question down to, how a theory conceived in abstract (universal) terms can be made to square with concrete (particular) entities in real life - will depend, in the final analysis, on how we relate universals to particulars.

It is interesting to note at this juncture that historically the question has more often been posed the other way round. How can one theorize at all, given the hopelessly erratic and unprincipled and random behaviour of things in the phenomenal world? Plato's smug

answer, as we know, was that one can theorize or, equivalently, begin to make sense of the phenomena (what else is a theory for?), just in case one concedes that the real world is that which constantly eludes us, which our deceptive senses prevent us from 'seeing'. Real knowledge (or, knowledge of the real world) can only arise as a result of our willingness to look beyond the 'veil of appearances'. For Plato, the really real world is, as all the paradox in the heavens would have it, the ideal world that we cannot really see, but only intuit (or, some put it, only see with our 'mind's eye').

It is a platitude (but, all the same worth repeating, lest we should forget it) that the entire tradition of Western philosophy has been under the spell of Plato's inaugural gimmick.

The Platonic world of ideal forms is no doubt a theoretician's dream (no pun intended). Free from the nuisance of unruly particulars, she can theorize to her heart's content. And, as we have already noted, so long as she does not care to look from the Olympian heights upon the valley below, she can go on dreaming undisturbed (some pun intended, if you insist).

But that is just what researchers working in hyphenated sub-areas of most academic disciplines simply cannot afford to do. Because, whether or not they like it, the valley is where they belong and where they must do their work.

So much for a quick historical perspective on the problem posed by Tarallo. What is now interesting to note is that Tarallo's practical suggestion that we use discretion and common sense when it comes to making the theory directly accountable for practice has had an equally long history of vociferous opposition and indeed persecution at the hands of die-hard universalists, unwilling to make any sort of compromise on the applicability of their theories.

Most surprising as it might indeed seem, the suggestion made by Tarallo is nothing but an invitation to casuistry - or, at least, that is certainly how it would have been branded had it been put forward, say, in the last century. For most of us today, 'casuistry' is a dreaded curse-word, along with 'sophistry', 'wizardry' and the like (The list may be prolonged by adding such latter-day terms as

'behaviourism'). Nevertheless, what is seldom realized in regard to these contemporary four-letter words of academic jargon is that most of them were once upon a time normal words and denoted normal and often highly respected practices. And in most cases, their present pejorative connotations bear the mark of years and years, sometimes centuries, of systematic reviling they were subjected to.

In a book-length treatment of the phenomenon of casuistry and its centuries-long history, Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin (1988) argue that, in ethics, casuistry is as old as universalistic moral reasoning and that the condemnation of casuistry is as old as at least Plato. But then the authors also show that all along history there have been long spells when casuistry was not only accepted as a valid form of reasoning but also held in high esteem. As it turns out, the tussle between casuistry and mainstream moral reasoning, as meticulously researched and recorded by Jonsen and Toulmin can throw a flood of light on the problem posed by Tarallo and his own proposed solution.

Just as Platonic ontology posited as the only real things such entities as are thoroughly unaffected by spatio-temporal specificities, and the corresponding epistemology of the Greek savant stipulated awareness of such entities as the only true knowledge as opposed to mere beliefs, the mainstream ethical reasoning emanating from the Platonic tradition incorporated the central idea of there being absolutely immutable moral laws, valid for all times, places, and cultures. Needless to say, such a universal, rigorously all-or-nothing, code of moral conduct is bound to raise more problems than it can solve, when asked to confront specific issues arising at historically given moments. This is so because the universal ethical principles were formulated in total disregard of the specificities of those historical moments (If only for the reason that, had they been so framed as to attend to all those specificities, they would no longer be universal in the required sense).

Examples are legion in the sphere of moral philosophy. Sweeping condemnation of abortion, for instance, raises the

question of its applicability to say, victims of rape, or expectant mothers who are known well in advance to be carrying hopelessly deformed off-springs owing to some natural or man-made disaster, and so on. The growing challenge to existing legal systems and religious orthodoxies all over the world amply demonstrates the contemporary relevance of the age-old dispute between Platonism and casuistry.

True to its guiding principles of the absolute inviolability of universal laws, the moral philosophy inspired on Platonic thought invariably condemned all talk of the specificity of a local problem, and insisted on ethics being a body of principles totally insensitive to the peculiar circumstances attending on individual cases.

Now, alternatives to Platonism are as old as Plato himself if not older. An early challenge came from his own disciple Aristotle who, in his Nicomachean Ethics, sought to base moral judgments on the three-fold starting premiss of (a) the absence of 'essences' from the world of human affairs, (b) the 'opportune character' of all timely choices and actions, and (c) the 'circumstantial' appreciation of the details of the particular case in question. (Cf. Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988: 67).

Now, lest there should be any misunderstanding on this matter, let us make it clear right away that, in its radical form, the tension between a universal law and the demand that the way we handle an actually occurring instance take into account circumstances not anticipated by that law is not one that can be dismissed casually (as seems to be the standard ploy) by saying that the application of the law simply involves, in addition to the law stated in universal terms, a handful of local rules of adaptation. To argue thus would be to claim that every conceivable particular moment is a universal moment with an additional marker of particularity (This is nothing but one of the several transcendental arguments for the existence of universals, stated in the reverse order.).

Casuistry poses a major challenge to the pretensions of universal laws in its fundamental claim that the very application or not of the universal law is a matter of the peculiar circumstances

attending on the particular moment, an argument that effectively undermines the claims of the universal law to be an inviolable rule, valid for all times. On the interpretation based on transcendental reasoning, the application of the universal law is guaranteed under all circumstances, the only uncertainty if any being simply a matter of what peculiarities of the particular case in hand should be brought to bear on the outcome of the unfailing application of the universal law.

For all its boldness and eagerness to break the gridlock of dogmatism, however, the Aristotelian alternative was but a rather timid challenge to Platonism, although in Nicomachean Ethics, he did take his opposition very close to a decisive break with the prevailing orthodoxy.

No doubt, it was Aristotle's great merit to have seen that the demands of justice by far exceed the stipulations of the universal law and the potential circumstances foreseen by it. Nomos or rule-governed law alone cannot guarantee justice; there is an additional need for epieikeia or 'equity' or a practical application of general rules - "the interpretation of a law in a case that the legislator did not foresee." (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988: 116). But, alas, the Stagyrte innovator was too much under the spell of his teacher to perceive that, in so formulating his case, he was actually giving in to Platonic metaphysics, even as he was trying to extricate himself from its clutches. This is so, because, instead of asking for a revision of Platonism at the grass roots level as seems to have been his intent, he in effect bolstered it up by pleading for some additional rules or rules of extension. Here is a quotation that proves the point:

A law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement...

This does not make [the general statement] a wrong law: the error is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the case, the stuff of practical conduct being essentially variable. (Aristotle, apud Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988: 68).

In other words, says Aristotle, it is the defective particular that is to blame, not the universal which is, by definition, perfect. To be sure, it is Plato who has the last laugh here.

As Jonsen and Toulmin (1988: 69 ff) argue, however, Aristotle did pave the way for the rise of casuistic reasoning by emphasizing the importance of the practical over the theoretical. But again, unfortunately, Aristotle was probably responsible for the rift between episteme and phronesis, between theory or intellectual grasp and practice or technical skill. Hardened defenders of a permanent epistemological gap between theory and practice seldom pause to think they are in fact giving in to the long legacy of a Platonic prejudice that glorified pure theory at the expense of its practical consequences. The situation remains unaltered, even when some of them oppose Platonism with a view to inverting the priorities because, as we shall see shortly, simply turning a hierarchy upside down does not resolve the problem if what we are concerned to rectify is the very question of differential valuation.

Anyhow, Platonism has reigned supreme in the Western world down through the centuries although, as Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) point out, there also have been fairly long spells, notably in the 15th and 16th centuries, when casuistry flourished in its historically most hospitable host environment viz., Ethics. Indeed, it might strike one today as quite surprising that even the Church found it perfectly normal that casuistic reasoning should be freely resorted to in tackling practical issues involving moral judgment. But, starting with the 17th century, attempts at stamping out all challenges to nomologistic reasoning were also on the increase. Many of these efforts were actually misdirected and as in the case of Blaise Pascal's vitriolic lampooning of the Jesuit moral teaching as involved in the on-going Jansenist-Jesuit controversy, were not infrequently, spurred on by a desire to settle private scores (Cf. Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988:235 - "The issue of laxist moral teaching had been on the periphery of the Jansenist-Jesuit debate for some years."). And, as irony would have it, many of these highly successful attempts such as Pascal's gained all their effectiveness

from the clever and opportune exploitation of what were at best secondary or tertiary issues at stake, in precisely those ways in which casuistry itself had all along been accused of freely indulging in. A detailed examination of this issue is far beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader will find highly illuminating material in the chapter entitled 'Casuistry confounded: Pascal's critique' of Jonsen and Toulmin (1988).

In our own century, some remarkable new developments have been in the making. In an important paper intitled 'Are there a priori concepts?', which is, for reasons we can only speculate about, nevertheless regarded as only marginal to his overall philosophical outlook (Cf. Warnock, 1989: 32), J.L. Austin (by the way, a life-long admirer of Nicomachean Ethics) categorically asserted that the so-called universals "were calculated into existence ... not long ago"(Austin, 1993:3), adding that sober reasoning would do much better without them.

But Austin was careful not simply to turn the tables and make it an excuse for the affirmation and glorification of the particular, the ephemeral and the opportune against the universal, the timeless, and the necessary. As he said himself elsewhere, it "is essential ... to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies" (Austin, 1962: 3). Austin perceived, that is to say, that the moment you call into question one member of a dichotomously opposed pair, the other member too is automatically rendered suspect. Therefore it is senseless to quarrel with universals, and go on talking of particulars as though these were perfectly in order. Questioning one of the two entities that result from a dichotomy is tantamount to questioning the whole dichotomy, destabilizing the very logic that sustains that dichotomy.

Wondering, as Tarallo did, how on earth a theory conceived in the abstract can guarantee immediate and ready application to concrete elements in the researcher's work-a-day experience would seem to lead, inevitably, to either of these conclusions: (a) a sense of complacency that somehow or the other the fatal encounter does take place, so why worry about exactly how it comes about (Most

of us who consider ourselves 'scientifically minded' are quite happy with this, leaving any further question to the 'philosophers of science' and the like) (b) the startling realization that which meets with practice is not what started off as the abstract theory, nor is what the theory in fact meets with what is claimed to be the raw, concrete experience. In other words, the theory and the corresponding data are so inextricably intertwined that it is pointless and, if you come to think of it, impossible to contemplate them in isolation. Just as there are no data-free theories, there are no theory-free data either. This is the fundamental insight behind the so-called incommensurability thesis advocated by Kuhn (1970;1976) and Quine (1961), among others.

The thesis of incommensurability has been shown to be riddled with problems of its own (Cf. Bernstein, 1992: 57-78). As Davidson has argued, if it is true at all, no sense can be made of it - so that there is an urgent need to restate it in some other terms. In his own words, "Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement." (Davidson, 1973: 129). Quine, like Aristotle before him, does not quite rid himself of the metaphysical paraphernalia that go together with the entities and distinctions he wants to throw overboard - so that, for all his revolutionary zeal, he remains wedded to the absolute distinction between theoretical statements and observational statements, a feature Davidson has ironically christened 'the third dogma'(Cf. Kraut, 1986).

Where do we go from here? At least one of the authors of the book we have examined at some length in this paper, viz., Stephen Toulmin, is a scholar groomed in the great Oxford tradition called 'Ordinary Language Philosophy' and, in particular, very much influenced by the philosophy of J.L.Austin (An earlier book of his, The Uses of Argument (Toulmin, 1958) relies heavily on the thought of Austin and others in order to propose a logic of everyday reasoning). As the concluding chapters of the book

demonstrate, he and his co-author are hopeful that the resurgence of casuistry will, if properly pursued, free us from the intellectual quagmire we find ourselves in. "Of course, our wish is to rehabilitate not the word casistry but rather the art to which it disparagingly refers."(Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988: 13). "When properly conceived (we claim), casuistry redresses the excessive emphasis placed on universal rules and invariant principles by moral philosophers and political preachers alike.: (id.ibid) And, as their statements elsewhere in the book make it clear, what is at stake is the overwhelming, awe-inspiring prestige that abstract theories conceived in ivory towers have enjoyed among both scientists and laymen.

Jonsen and Toulmin estimate that the winds of change started blowing some time during the 1960s. "The historical reasons for this change are complex and still partly obscure, but they had less to do with developments within philosophy than with the challenges to authority and expertise that were evident in many other areas of life at this time. " (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988: 304). "As in the days of Ciceronian and Christian casuistry, a feeling for the features of moral experience that led Aristotle to put ethics in the realm of praxis and phronesis, not theoria and episteme - the specificity of moral issues, the particularity of cases and circumstances, and the concreteness of the stakes for those individual human beings who are involved in them - has reentered the moral debate."(p.306).

When properly understood, then, casuistry is the art of making sense of our work-a-day life experiences, not in terms of totalizing laws provided by some grand theory, but by contemplating them locally and piecemeal. In so doing, it challenges our very concept of 'understanding'. According to the paradigm it outrightly rejects, understanding is a matter of making sure that no particular is left out, unattended to by a universal law - a practice technically known as 'scientific explanation'. Casuistry teaches us, on the other hand, that it is the quest, the craving for universal and all-encompassing laws that has made us incapable of appreciating the individuality of the particulars.

Thus characterized, casuistry is clearly a symptom of what has broadly been referred to as the 'postmodern consciousness'. Small wonder, therefore, that the recent surge of interest in postmodernity and its implications for all the multifarious branches of human inquiry has had its origins traced back by scholarly opinion (Cf. Wakefield, 1990; Best and Kellner: 1991; Cooke:1990) to the 1960s - the same momentous period in the recent history of the Western world in which Jonsen and Toulmin believe modern interest in casuistry began.

Postmodernity is by no means a novel phenomenon, despite the strong tendency to read the prefix 'post-' as a chronological marker (Cf. Heller and Fehér, 1988: 1). As a matter of fact, the distinctive attributes that characterize the postmodern attitude such as the distrust of totalizing drive and grand narratives and a concomitant preference for the local and the contingent (or, as it would be more appropriate to say, the universality of the local and the necessity of the contingent - reminiscent of Nietzsche's famous "profundity of the superficial"(Cf. Koelb, 1990)) have accompanied the mainstream philosophy with the same doggedness with which the shadow follows the object.

To round off our discussion, then, to Tarallo we owe the debt for having awakened us to the existence of the problem and the urgent need to face up to it, rather than pretend it didn't exist. No doubt, he would most probably have balked at the idea I have developed in this paper that his own solution to the problem was an invitation to casuistry, especially in view of the unsavoury connotations that have come to be attached to the term owing, as we have already seen, to centuries of reviling.

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NOTES:

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ANEXO 6

WHEN HUMOUR TURNS SOUR:
THE 'RUSHDIE EPISODE'
IN RETROSPECT

Trabalho a ser apresentado no XXVI SENAPULLI.

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WHEN HUMOUR TURNS SOUR: THE
'RUSHDIE EPISODE' IN RETROSPECT

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'O, my shoes are Japanese,' Gibreel sang, translating the old song into English in semi-conscious deference to the up-rushing host-nation, 'These trousers are English, if you please. On my head, red Russian hat; my heart is Indian for all that.'

Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses begins with a bang. In fact, quite literally so. The whimper comes, not so much at the end of the book - though, in stark contrast with the cataclysmic opening, the end of the novel may well be described as such. The real anti-climax comes at the end of a series of real-life events: the banning of the book by the Indian Government, the Bradford rally, the declaration of the fatwa by Iran's Ayatullah Khomeini, the outcry and condemnation of the death sentence by the Western media, Rushdie's unceremonious slipping into hiding, the Indian-born writer's pathetic attempt to retract everything and redefine himself as a pious and devout Muslim ... well, as of now, this drama is still dragging on. But there is one thing in all this that seems pretty much undisputable: fact and fiction are irrecoverably muddled up in the whole episode involving Salman Rushdie and his ill-fated magnum opus.⁽¹⁾

There is one important aspect of The Satanic Verses that seems not to have been, as far as I can see, adequately appreciated by all parties involved in the ensuing controversy. It is that the novel has all the trimmings of a popular Indian feature film, a marketing miracle routinely churned out by Bombay's gigantic and flourishing movie industry. The secret of an Indian

popular movie and its incredible success essentially consists in its capacity to cash in on every conceivable novelty in the air, while faithfully adhering to a formula that probably harks back to the days of alchemy of the cinematographic art - the silent movies. As someone like Baudrillard might discover to his heart's content, whatever originality there is in one Indian film as opposed to any other randomly chosen, is its unique and untiring reaffirmation of a distant originary original, whose very essence is thus demonstrated to be its capacity for being simulated again and again.⁽²⁾

Gibreel Farishta's somewhat surrealistic gesture of humming a popular Hindi film ditty - as he is hurtled down to the earth after the Air India Boeing jet in which he is travelling in the unlikely company of Saladin Chamcha explodes into flames in response to a bomb planted by terrorists, just minutes before its scheduled landing at London's Heathrow airport - is by no means just the fancy opening scene of a bizarre novel. Its rather simplistic sounding lyric captures the entire ethos of a nation at the cross-roads of history. The reference to the Japanese shoes signals the newly independent India's desperate need to invoke a non-Western nation as a role model in the wake of the traumatic colonial experience, whereas the red Russian hat points to the predicament of a young nation, inexperienced in the cloak-and-dagger diplomacies of the Cold War era, being forced to take sides for whatever reasons, not the least important of which being its arch enemy, Pakistan, rushing to join the SEATO.

The two other nations mentioned in that lyric, viz. England and India, constitute the pair of psychologically polar opposites that is at the centre of the cultural schizophrenia which is, in the final analysis, the very theme of Rushdie's novel. "Proper London, the capital of Vilayat,⁽³⁾" exclaims Gibreel, as it strikes him all of a sudden that he is heading for a violent, head-on collision with the mighty Other in relation to which alone he knows how to define himself.

It turns out that Gibreel's instinctive reaction is of a

piece with what one might call the cultural Gestalt that in general characterizes the personality of most post-colonial Indian citizens (among whom, no doubt, the present writer, aptly but provocatively referred to by Rushdie as 'the midnight's children) and also, surprisingly enough, many if not most post-imperial British citizens. Bharat and Vilayat - or, if you like, the post-colonial India and the post-imperial Britain - form, as it were, each other's emotional and sentimental resonance chambers.

Modern Britain, 'the weary Titan' as it has been described, no longer basking in its imperial glory, needs every now and then to recall and relive the great days of the Raj. The innumerable television serials, documentaries, and even full-length feature films on the theme bear unmistakable testimony to the deep-seated yearning for a by-gone past. In addition, one may also think of the hundreds of Indian restaurants that keep mushrooming all over Britain, where local men and women, especially those belonging to the older or middle age brackets, routinely find it an uncanny rejuvenating experience, a fascinating stroll down Memory Lane, to order waiters clad in fancy head-gear and the red kammarbund, rattling out the names of their favourite culinary curiosities from the Orient with no need for prior consultation of the blurbs in English on the menu. As for contemporary Indians, well, they need Britain not only as the ever-handly whipping boy for all the contradictions and divisions that plague their nation today, but also in order that they may every now and then reassert their own complex independent identity - by which most of what they mean is whatever is left over when they have stripped themselves of the memories of their colonial past. A most illustrative example of the traumatic experience that is this desperate search for a new identity is the famous episode, some two decades or so ago, during a massive rally called by the students of the Delhi University to protest against the continued use of English in post-colonial India: amidst the thousands

of demonstrators shouting angry slogans there was an enthusiastic participant holding a placard that said "Down with English" (yes, that is right, in the very same language that it purported to denounce !). Perhaps one will look in vain for a better example of the complex relation of 'love-and-hate' that has been the hall-mark of the ties between Great Britain and its former colonies in the half century or so following the Second World War.

I do not wish to belabour the point any further. But it would arguably be seem to be the case that a good deal of what goes on in the world of The Satanic Verses makes sense just in case you happen to share with its author, the trauma of being severed from one's roots, of being a migrant forever, a being without a clear identity that is the product of the post-colonial diaspora experienced by India and Pakistan. AI 420, the number that identifies the Air India jet whose explosion provides the bang with which Rushdie begins his narrative, may mean nothing to a reader not brought up in the particular ethos we have been talking about. But no insider to that ethos will fail to notice the unmistakable reference to an all-time box-office hit of India's film industry, 'Sri 420' - the story of a tramp whose unblemished moral life is extolled as by far making up for the material penury that Destiny had reserved for him.

Likewise, only someone who has had more than a nodding acquaintance with the socio-cultural milieu from which Rushdie collects the ingredients for his make-believe world of factive fictionality can be made to see the 'logic' of Gibreel Farishta (the surname of this protagonist means, in Hindi/Urdu, "angel", just as the first name names a celebrated member of the species) all of a sudden sprouting a halo after his 'safe landing' on English soil - there is yet another famous film song that he did not have time to hum during his free fall, but must certainly have been at the back of his mind all along; the song says "Farishtõn ki nagari me mãe, aa gaya hũ me mãe/ Unto the land of angels, have I just come." Small wonder that the first contact with the 'angelic' city of London has exactly the opposite effect on Saladin Chamcha (whose surname, by the way, means a 'sycophant'), who

metamorphoses into a satyr, half-man, half-goat, with horns, stinking breath, cloven feet, and a phallus of monstrous proportions.

But all this is completely irrelevant, if what we are looking for is an answer to the question why Rushdie's book irritated so many people and to such a degree as to make them wish him dead. Perhaps, before venturing any hypothesis, we should let Rushdie himself make out his case. In a note released to the Press (ironically entitled 'In Good Faith'⁽⁴⁾), Rushdie characterizes his own novel in the following words:

If The Satanic Verses is anything, it is a migrant's eye view of the world. It is written from the very experience of uprooting, disjuncture, and metamorphosis (slow or rapid, painful or pleasurable) that is the migrant condition, and from which I believe can be derived a metaphor for all humanity.

And he goes on to add:

The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combination of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. M \acute{e} lange, hotch-potch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world. It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to embrace it. The Satanic Verses is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining. It is a live-song to our mongrel selves.

Having thus underscored the universal appeal of his novel, Rushdie asks us to ponder the following general statement:

Throughout human history, the apostles of purity, those who have claimed to possess a total explanation, have wrought havoc among mere mixed-up human beings. Like many millions of people, I am a bastard child of history. Perhaps we all are, black and brown and white, leaking into one another, as a character of mine once said, like flavours when you cook.

The sheer forcefulness of Rushdie's rhetoric should not be allowed to deflect our attention from the remarkable argumentative feat he pulls off in the excerpts quoted above. In one swift stroke, he turns the tables on his accusers. Those who were (5) wholeheartedly denouncing him as part of a satanic conspiracy against Islam and even comparing him to none other than the paradigm case of the Evil Incarnate of recent human history, viz. Adolf Hitler, were in point of fact accusing him, Salman Rushdie, from a standpoint that was the very hallmark of Nazi ideology - purity, ethnic, cultural, religious, or whatever ! It is they who implicitly claim to have a total explanation, not Rushdie. It is they who have, in the name of that total explanation, sentenced Rushdie to death for the only reason that he did not meet their standards of purity and total commitment to a definitive interpretation.⁽⁶⁾

But then, whatever the rhetorical force and the logical merit of Rushdie's post-hoc justification, his case was beyond redemption, as indeed the sequence of events from then on has clearly shown. What went wrong for him ? How come that such logically unexceptionable disclaimers from Rushdie as that he could not, in all fairness, be charged with blasphemy because he had never been a true believer to begin with, failed to produce any effect whatsoever on his ever-growing ranks of accusers ?

The answer to the above query is most likely to be located in Rushdie's inimitable style and in particular his use of irony as the means to achieve his effects. "Irony ?," exclaims Malise Ruthven, the author of Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam,⁽⁷⁾ "Or something more uncanny ? Irony seems too feeble a term to apply to the fiction of The Satanic Verses. The novel seems to have overtaken its author, threatening his life and turning his existence into the kind of nightmarish farce experienced by characters created out of his imagination, characters whose dreams are looking out of the vessels of self-hood into the fictional narrative of their lives."

We have already noted that with The Satanic Verses one is at a complete loss when it comes to drawing a line between fact and fiction. What is equally important to stress is that Rushdie's own life is implicated in and inextricably interwoven with the eerie drama that unfolds in the novel. Thus when he says right at the outset of his work, in fact, in the very opening sentence, "To be born again first you have to die. Ho ji ! Ho ji ! To land upon the bosomy earth, first one needs to fly. Tat-taa ! Takathum ! How to smile again if first you won't cry !"⁽⁸⁾, his words turn out to be imbued with heavy dramatic irony, irony that is, that happens to be unwittingly targeted on its own locutionary source. And coincidence or not, all those real-life celebrities whom Rushdie had singled out in two of his earlier, equally controversial novels Midnight's Children and Shame - to wit, Indira Gandhi, her son Sanjay Gandhi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and General Zia ul Haqq - were to have their lives cut short brutally and abruptly.

Once the sluice-gates of his frantic and impish imagination are opened, irony overruns Rushdie's fictional world and, encountering no obstacles on the way, in no time invades and inundates his own life, private as well as public. The very same Margaret Thatcher at whose expense he had sharpened his satirical wit to his heart's content was later on to come to his rescue, championing his freedom to speak and ordering round-the-clock protection by the Scotland Yard. If that isn't irony enough, consider what was in store for the one who wrote " you bastards, come and get us, or, alternatively, o god, o god, they're going to send in the fucking commandos, the mother-fucking Americans, Yaar, and the sister-fucking British"⁽⁹⁾ - even George Bush, the then President of the United States, felt a pressing need to take some time off his busy schedule to consider the 'imminent threat' - albeit, coming from afar - to a prized item of the First Amendment (As recently as November 1993, Rushdie was still spotted making a lightning visit to the White House to meet with President Clinton, as part of the former's

all-out, last-ditch effort to force Iran to lift the death sentence on him).

If irony is an extremely effective weapon at the disposal of a writer, it is also, as it turns out, the most unwieldy one. As a matter of fact, one never knows when it is going to backfire. Rushdie's case is a prime example of irony than ran amok, of humour that turned sour all too soon. The man who took evident delight in sparing no one when it came to letting his mordant irony run loose should not, in the best spirit of sportsmanship, take offence at being reminded that his very name invites a pun that seems interwoven with the ingenious plot that is going to unravel in his own novel: "Rushdie rushed in where angels (including his own brain-child, Gibreel Farishta) feared to tread" !

Alarmed by the unexpected reaction to the publication of his book and appalled by the grim prospects ahead that were to ultimately force him into hiding, Rushdie tried out every available means in order to save his skin. The same man who had so confidently asserted on an earlier occasion, apropos of George Orwell, that all literature is bound to be political "because what is being disputed is nothing less than what is the case,"⁽¹⁰⁾ was to insist: "At the centre of the storm stands a novel, a work of fiction, one that aspires to the condition of literature."⁽¹¹⁾ But no sooner had he so characterized his polemical work than he was taken by a sense of self-reprobaton that forced him to go back on his earlier statement, saying "It felt impossible, amid such a hubbub, to insist on the fictionality of fiction," and quickly hastening to add, "Let me be clear; I am not trying to say the The Satanic verses is 'only a novel' and thus need not be taken seriously, even disputed with the utmost passion. I do not believe that words are trivial matters."

The crux of Rushdie's ultimate, excruciating, dilemma is: either his novel is a serious matter, in which case, the charge of vilifying one of world's most important religions does have some factual base and the death sentence meted out to him is not altogether unfounded, albeit arguably exaggeratedly severe; or,

it is a mere work of pointless and perverse fiction, a product of a restless mind, all boggled up, and Rushdie himself, "a (perhaps not so) beautiful, ineffectual angel, beating his wings in the void (or, if you like, a supremely fictive farishta)."

Understandably, neither horn is a comfortable resting place for anyone in the shoes of Salman Rushdie.

Be that as it may, it seems worth the while at this stage to ask whether and to what extent Rushdie's peculiar predicament lends itself to generalizations. It seems a case can be made that the series of mishaps that befell Rushdie is by no means accidental or gratuitous, but integral to the very enterprise of literature and, indeed, to all writing, and an inevitable risk that every writer - wielder of 'stylus' - who elects irony as the means to get her message across is destined to run.

On January 22, 1989, The Times Literary Supplement carried an interesting write-up by a certain Fadia A. Faquir, a Jordanian novelist writing in English, who had himself got into trouble over some of his writings on Islam and was living a life of self-imposed exile in Britain. "The conflict between literature and Islam," he wrote, "..... started when the Archangel Gabriel dictated to Muhammed the following verse of The Qur'an : 'As for poets, the erring follows them. Hast thou not seen how they stray in every valley ? And how they say that which is not'". The author then went on to argue that, to the extent The Qur'an was looked upon as having been presented as the final and supreme text, writing has ever since been held in disrespect and often despised as an act of subversion. "The main problem that faces the Muslim intellectual is that Muslim individuals never read the texts under debate but accept the value-judgment of their Imams and Ulamas." (12)

Indeed, Faquir's claim was borne out by the following startling observation by Syed Shahabuddin, the Indian M.P. who had earlier spearheaded the successful campaign leading to the ban on The Satanic Verses by the Indian Government. In a letter to The Times of India in 1988, Shahabuddin wrote: (13)

You [Salman Rushdie] are aggrieved that some of us have condemned you without a hearing and asked for the ban without reading your book. Yes, I have not read it, nor do I intend to. I do not have to wade through a filthy drain to know what filth is. My first inadvertent step would tell me what I have stepped into.

It seems then that Rushdie's was a thoroughly hopeless case from the very start. There was a definitive, unnegotiably final, interpretation always already available and ever ready to be foisted upon any dare-devil exegetical hit-and-run on the one "final and supreme text." And, as the words of the Indian M.P. make it amply clear, there was no way an author under such circumstances could escape the dire consequences of her imprudence, for the definitive interpretation that she is doomed to be saddled with is also - as befits all putative definitive interpretations - equated with authorial intention. Whereof the alleged justification for all the retaliatory action mobilized against Rushdie, both his novel and his person: the vilification did not take place by accident or oversight; there was clear intent to defame and defile the Sacred Faith.

Let us be absolutely clear on this: what the Rushdie episode presents before us is not a case of interpretation where the author's communicative intention was deliberately set aside, so as to make room for another his blood-thirsty detractors wanted to credit him with; instead, what we have is a case where the very need to look into the text for the author's communicative intention was altogether dispensed with, not because no such intention was believed to be there waiting to be unearthed, but because his detractors acted on the conviction that the intention in question was always, already available to them - in fact, even long before Rushdie even thought of putting his pen to paper.

In other words, what the Rushdie episode reveals is not a case where the conventional canons of interpretation were openly flouted; quite on the contrary, the whole episode

involving Rushdie and his ill-fated novel could simply not have taken the course it did, if the different personalities involved therein - including, to some extent, Rushdie himself as well as the countless zealots, many of whom laid their lives trying to defend their convictions - were not tacitly proceeding on the assumption that the conventional wisdom as to what interpretation is all about did hold good, after all.

In retrospect, it is fairly easy to see that that is just where Rushdie made his fatal miscalculation. True to the spirit of the post-modern condition which he believed had befallen the 'midnight's children' like himself, a condition marked by a sense of endless dispersion and un-belonging, Rushdie it seems had hoped in vain that his contemporary readers would have no problem coming to terms with a text whose constant ironic undertone alone would ensure unending interpretive flux.

What Rushdie had not reckoned with, then, was the complex issue of the 'politics of irony!' ⁽¹⁴⁾ In point of fact, one highly illuminating way of reviewing the whole Rushdie episode in retrospect is to see it as a prime example of the vengeance of Irony on those of its unsuspecting practitioners who, following in the footsteps of Thomas Mann ⁽¹⁵⁾, himself a self-proclaimed "non-political" man, go about their business as if there were an irreducible antagonism between irony and politics. This is doubly ironic in Rushdie's case. For, as his own insightful comment on Orwell makes it clear, Rushdie knew all too well that, ironical or otherwise, all novels have an inescapable political dimension to them. On the other hand, it is equally clear that Rushdie could only hope to escape the wrath of Khomeini by pleading for a "non-political" separation of irony and politics, which is precisely what he did when he appealed to the "fictionality of fiction". But then when all is said and done, one cannot resist asking if such an allegedly "non-political" separation of irony and politics isn't itself ironic, and perhaps even more strikingly, a move motivated by political expediency!

When the dust finally settles on the Rushdie episode, it may

(10) See Timothy Brennan, Salman Rushdie and the Third World: Myth of the Nation. London: Unwin. 1986. p. 64.

(11) In Good faith p. 4.

(12) See L. Appignanesi and S. Marland, The Rushdie File Syracuse University Press. 1990. Pp. 225 - 226.

(13) Quoted in M.A. Anees, The Kiss of Judas: The Affairs of a Brown Sahib. Kuala Lumpur: Quill Publishers. p. 24.

(14) On this question, see the excellent collection of papers The Politics of Irony: Essays in Self-Betrayal. edited by D.W. Conway and J.E. Seery. NY: St. Martin's Press. 1992.

(15) See 'Reflections of a Non-political man' 1917. Cited in the Introduction to The Politics of Irony

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Este Caderno pertence ao Processo nº
01 P-04627-84 - Vida Funcional do
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tamento de Linguística - IEL

MEMORIAL
E
CURRICULUM VITAE

ENTREGUES COMO DOCUMENTAÇÃO ANEXA
AO PEDIDO DE RECLASSIFICAÇÃO
DE PROF. MS-4 PARA PROF. MS-5

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MEMORIAL

A "CONDIÇÃO MIGRANTE"

Kanavillil Rajagopalan

Seguindo, ao que pude constatar, uma tendência bem definida "de costa a costa" nos Estados Unidos, a Universidade da Califórnia (onde tive a oportunidade de passar o ano de 1993 na qualidade de "Visiting Scholar and Research Associate") já há algum tempo vem estudando uma re-estruturação geral acadêmico-administrativa. Além do objetivo imediato de contenção de gastos e de desburocratização, o plano em via de implantação visa também um realinhamento das diversas unidades que compõem a Univesidade, de forma que possa refletir melhor as tendências atuais no mundo do saber acadêmico.

Para falar daquilo que nos interessa de imediato, está em debate uma proposta no sentido de fundir os departamentos de Lingüística e de Filosofia. A motivação é simples e obvia. De uns anos para cá, está se tornando cada vez mais evidente que os pesquisadores das duas áreas se vêem na necessidade de poder transitar livremente entre terrenos historicamente tidos como distintos. Acontece que, enquanto existirem barreiras institu-

cionais no caminho, o fluxo de intercâmbio está sempre sujeito a restrições de ordem pura e irritantemente burocrática.

Referí-me ao caso acima, por acreditar que ele se constitui, no mínimo, em uma pequena curiosidade - que porém pode não se apresentar como tal para muitos dos nossos alunos e colegas recém-formados nos dias de hoje, quando já não resta mais nenhuma dúvida quanto às estreitas ligações entre a Filosofia Analítica e a Lingüística Contemporânea. O fato entretanto se torna curioso diante da constatação de que, não mais que duas décadas atrás, um dos mais destacados lingüistas entre nós (cuja identidade, assim como as demais circunstâncias do episódio, prefiro não revelar, por motivos de ordem da ética profissional) foi obrigado a justificar, na qualidade de "réu" numa defesa de tese, por que havia recorrido ao trabalho de Sir Bertrand Russell para solucionar um problema no campo da Lingüística: "O que é que este tal de Russell tem a ver com a Lingüística, pelo amor de Deus?"

Já se foram os tempos em que uma simples menção ao significado de uma palavra era sumariamente taxada de sinal inconfundível da falta de preparo científico por parte do lingüista-aventureiro.

A guinada que deu a Lingüística quando os pesquisadores se livraram das injunções impostas pelo Behaviorismo que imperava e determinava os rumos das investigações até os meados da década de 50, teve como consequência o deslocamento da questão de significado para o centro das atenções.

O que eu quero ressaltar a respeito de toda essa mudança

é que está se comprovando algo que, já há algum tempo, venho sustentando a respeito da própria constituição da Linguística enquanto disciplina - e, de modo mais abrangente, toda e qualquer disciplina acadêmica: a idéia de que nada há na constituição dessas disciplinas que seja a prova de revisão. Isto é, uma disciplina acadêmica não é senão um conjunto de indagações que caracteriza e distingue uma comunidade de pesquisadores que, através da prática cotidiana, elege determinados procedimentos e prioridades de pesquisa, os quais tem sua validade necessariamente atrelada ao momento histórico específico em que se acha a disciplina em questão, quando procuramos compreender a sua constituição.

Embora pareça, à primeira vista, intuitivamente aceitável e sem maiores consequências, a postura acima rascunhada se choca frontalmente com a tese historicamente mais bem aceita pelos Filósofos da Ciência. O enfoque sociológico, isto é, aquele que atenta para os indivíduos que compõem uma comunidade científica, ao invés de ficar circunscrito as considerações de ordem exclusiva e fanaticamente onto-epistemológica, ainda encontra bastante resistência, entre os cientistas dos mais variados naipes. Pois, nem todos eles conseguem "digerir" a consequência imediata dessa nova postura que é a de que, numa disciplina acadêmica qualquer como a Linguística, não há nenhum postulado que não esteja aberto a uma revisão, isto é, todo e qualquer enunciado dito "básico" pode ser descartado (e, de fato, é isso que tem acontecido ao longo da história) ao sabor dos ares do momento, sem que a disci-

plina perca sua "identidade" (O que, no fundo, equivale a dizer que a única identidade de que se vale uma disciplina é como que fruto de um processo de reificação a partir do fluxo permanente que lhe é próprio).

Ocorre que interesses estritamente acadêmicos (isto é, até onde seja possível separá-los dos demais interesses: a própria origem da palavra "academia" nos alerta para a inutilidade da tentativa), acabam, de forma geral, esbarrando em considerações da ordem institucional. O caso em discussão na Universidade da Califórnia demonstra claramente que o que está em jogo, no fim das contas, é a própria sobrevivência de determinadas sub-áreas, tanto no lado da Filosofia, como no da Linguística (Leia-se, a situação profissional e empregatícia dos inúmeros professores e pesquisadores que se notabilizaram nessas áreas de concentração).

Segundo que me confidenciou o Chefe de um dos departamentos envolvidos, as negociações só não produziram resultados concretos até o momento, porque não se sabe ainda como justificar a inclusão no novo departamento que resultaria da fusão, de sub-áreas como a Filosofia Política ou a História da Filosofia que historicamente fizeram parte do Departamento de Filosofia e, do outro lado, pasmem!, a Fonética Articulatória e Acústica, que, até pouco tempo atrás eram vistas como as áreas-chaves e as portas de entrada para um estudo sério da Linguística. O argumento de que tais sub-áreas devem ser cedidas a outros departamentos como os de Ciência Política, História, Biologia, Física, e assim por diante, por razões compreensíveis, provoca cada vez mais temores entre aqueles que justamente naquelas áreas de

concentração depositaram suas fichas profissionais.

Ao longo da estadia que realizei na universidade norte-americana, acompanhei de perto como os próprios academicos estão lidando com a questão da reestruturação. Por um lado, como já vimos, os receios devidos a incerteza quanto às perspectivas empregatícias, como também ao temor, até certo ponto procedente, de que grandes interesses corporativistas e alheios aos compromissos históricos de uma univesidade de vanguarda, possam acabar ditando o rumo da proposta reestruturação.

Por outro lado, não resta duvida de que um crescente número de docentes e pesquisadores se revela convencido de que a organização das diferentes áreas e sub-áreas de saber dentro da universidade, não corresponde mais às atividades de pesquisa e intercâmbio que hoje se verificam. Prof. John Dupré, da Universidade de Stanford, filósofo que tem se notabilizado por causa de suas idéias ousadas no campo da epistemologia das ciências, vem pregando a tese de que o ponto alto da virada do milênio vai ser o inevitável reconhecimento da 'dispersão', da 'disseminação', no lugar da propalada 'convergência' dos interesses e da unificação das metas e prioridades (que, nas décadas de 30 e 40 gozaram de total hegemonia, inspirando até o lançamento da revista The Enciclopaedia of Unified Sciences).

Um outro nome, ao qual não posso deixar de me referir a esse respeito, é o de Arthur Fine, cujas controvertidas idéias sobre a problemática da explanação em ciências, tem obtido grande destaque nos últimos tempos no mundo acadêmico norte-americano. Cheguei a conhecê-lo pessoalmente, pois nos encontravamos toda

semana ao longo de um semestre, por ocasião de um "Graduate Seminar" sobre o tema "Scientific realism", a cargo do Professor Martin Jones do Departamento da Filosofia (Prática, aliás, muito comum entre professores das universidades norte-americanas, que um dia, quem sabe, espero ver implantada entre nós !). Dono de um currículo invejável (estudou em Harvard e MIT com Thomas Kuhn, e em Berkeley, com Paul Feyerabend e Donald Davidson, e já publicou vários livros), este senhor vem defendendo a tese de que o avanço nas ciências - até onde for possível caracterizar a história das ciências em termos de progressão linear - sempre se deu em função da ebulição pre-téorica e não, como tende a crer a leigo (como também alguns "experts"), em virtude de grandes descobertas e assim-chamados "break-throughs". Para o desespero de alguns colegas, Fine sustenta que, em verdade, a teorização é o anti-climax, a morte do saber, e portanto, deveria ser evitada a qualquer custo.

Por incrível que pareça (ou talvez, nem tanto, sobretudo se levarmos em conta o intercâmbio entre disciplinas que se verifica nos dias de hoje), as idéias de Fine encontram ressonância na obra de alguns pesquisadores que se acham trabalhando no Departamento de Estudos Literários. Com destaque entre estes está o Prof. Steven Knapp, da UC Berkeley, co-autor de um controvertido livro com o título chamativo "Against Theory". Naquilo que, no meu modo de entender, vem a constituir o rompimento definitivo com as barreiras que historicamente dividiram as disciplinas acadêmicas, e talvez mais interessantemente ainda, o endosso entusiasmado da "migração" constante por parte dos intelectuais contemporâneos

entre campos de saber até há pouco tidos como irreconciliáveis ou mesmo antagônicas, o recente livro de A.R. Jonsen e S.Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California Press), se preocupa com os perigos inerentes a tendência consagrada de construir teorias totalizantes a custo de não podermos apreciar mais as peculiaridades que marcam os casos particulares - por ironia, precisamente os "dados" que tais teorias se vangloriam poder abranger e explicar.

A estadia em Berkeley foi altamente produtiva para mim, porque possibilitou contato com diversos pesquisadores como os que acabo de mencionar, que vêm encarando a transdisciplinaridade como a única saída da morosidade das teorias totalizantes. Foi uma experiência encorajadora também, pois de certa forma, veio a reforçar algumas das convicções que nortearam as minhas pesquisas nos últimos anos.

Alguns dos artigos que escrevi recentemente demonstram claramente as convicções acima referidas. Entre eles está um artigo intitulado "'Chameleon-linguist' and the revival of casuistry: afterthoughts on a controversial suggestion by Fernando Tarallo" que escrevi para um número especial da Revista D.E.L.T.A. em homenagem ao saudoso colega Fernando Tarallo, volume que deverá sair do prelo a qualquer momento. Discuto a importância do raciocínio casuístico que, a despeito do desprezo que sofreu ao longo da história, ainda tem muito o que nos ensinar (O artigo tem como pano de fundo a obra de Jonsen e Toulmin, a qual me referi há pouco). Um outro trabalho que terminei no mês de dezembro de 1993 tem como título "When humour turns sour: The Rushdie episode in retrospect" e discute o caso do escritor

anglo-indiano Salman Rushdie, isto é, toda a confusão armada em torno de sua figura após a condenação da sua obra The Satanic Verses pelos Ayatollahs do Iran (Espero estar isento da obrigação de responder à pergunta: "O que é que um escritor-romancista tem a ver com a Linguística?"). Procuo mostrar nesse trabalho que o que no fundo subjaz à polêmica obra de Rushdie é nada mais, nada menos que o tema da dispersão e suas consequências em diversos níveis: cultural, intellectual, político, ético, e sobretudo, religioso. Procuo estabelecer ainda que o caso de Rushdie é prova contundente de que a ironia (alardeada como o tropo-mestre dos tempos pós-modernos) e a política são, de certa forma, irreduzivelmente antagônicas. A tragedia de Rushdie tem suas raízes no não-reconhecimento desse antagonismo.

De um lado, a Ironia; de outro, a Dimensão Política. O par dessas duas forças em conflito infundável está, a meu ver, na agenda de praticamente todos os intelectuais que estão vivendo a filosofia que podemos caracterizar de 'pós-metafísica' e 'pós-analítica'. Está também no centro dos grandes debates de hoje, seja no eixo franco-alemão (por. ex., Derrida vs. Gadamer), seja no eixo anglo-americano (por ex., Eagleton vs. Rorty).

A linha de pesquisa que venho perseguindo já há mais de uma década e meia, e que, desde 1988, conta com o patrocínio do CNPq, está caminhando justamente nessa direção. Em sua fase atual, eis as principais questões que estou procurando formular e responder: Tendo recuperado um Austin, cujo pensamento acerca dos Atos de Fala se revelam estar em clara dissonância em relação a todo o

trabalho de teorização e formalização que o sucedeu, haverá ou não um lugar para a questão de ideologia em sua filosofia ? Se a resposta for afirmativa, de que forma isso afetaria as demais preocupações do filósofo ? Como uma filosofia como a de Austin que no fundo aposta no decentramento e dispersão sem fim pode, ao mesmo, conviver com preocupações de ordem ideológica ?

É a partir do nosso presente que podemos tentar recuperar o nosso passado, a nossa história. E é o que gostaria de tentar fazer nos parágrafos seguintes. Uma ressalva, porém, deverá ajudar a desfazer, desde já, um possível mal-entendido. "Recuperar a história" (expressão gasta, sem dúvida) é um simples modo de dizer. Longe de "recuperar" qualquer coisa, nós de fato "criamos" a nossa história. Tanto é assim, a história é refeita a cada instante ao sabor dos ventos do momento. Não se procura com essa afirmação negar à história o poder determinante sobre o que nós somos no momento. Apenas se acrescenta a ressalva importante de que ela, a história, é ao mesmo tempo, determinada, por exemplo, pela percepção que temos, pela interpretação que fazemos, do presente. Eis, em síntese, o importante adendo que, no meu modo de entender, Nietzsche faz questão de acrescentar a Hegel.

E é a luz do presente, ou melhor, da minha percepção do momento presente, que, em seguida, gostaria de fazer um apanhado rápido da minha vida até aqui, como requer o "genre" que chamamos de 'memorial'

O escritor Salman Rushdie - pela nascença, um conterrâneo meu - em meio à intensa polêmica causada pela sua obra, chegou a

admitir que a questão central que sempre procurou trabalhar em sua trajetória intelectual (e, como revela sua biografia, a vida pessoal e íntima também) é a problemática suscitada por algo que chama de a "condição migrante" (migrant condition). Rushdie podera que tal condição tornou-se muito mais comum após o término da Segunda Grande Guerra, quando os países colonizadores europeus foram obrigados a libertar suas colônias na África e na Ásia, com o inevitável fluxo de milhares de pessoas das antigas colônias em direção a Europa que oferecia melhores condições e vida e de emprego. Num lance argumentativo que chega a ser simplesmente brilhante, o autor levanta a seguinte pergunta: será que, no fundo, não seríamos todos nós migrantes ?

Parece-me que a metáfora da "condição migrante" capta de forma adequada o espírito que até o momento tem norteado a minha carreira acadêmica, bem como a vida pessoal.

Nascido no Sul da Índia, numa cidade de porte médio chamada "Cochin", fui obrigado, desde cedo, a conviver com três línguas: Malayalam, Hindi, e Inglês. As primeiras duas eram as línguas maternas, respectivamente, da minha mãe e do meu pai; ao passo que, a terceira, o inglês, era a 'língua franca' na família, além de ser a língua oficial do país (uma ex-colônia da Grã-Bretanha) e, sobretudo, a língua na qual fui alfabetizado. Por incrível que pareça, do ponto de vista genético, há mais semelhanças entre as últimas duas do que entre as primeiras duas: o Hindi tem em comum com o inglês o fato de ser uma língua Indo-Europeia, ao passo que o Malayalam pertence à família dravídica. Os primeiros contatos com a diversidade linguística não param por aí. Na Índia, a

aprendizagem de várias línguas não é um simples hobby linguístico; trata-se de uma questão de sobrevivência e realização plena enquanto cidadão. Tive que aprender outras línguas como Tamil, Marathi, Gujerati, Urdu, e Punjabi pelo fato de cursar as diferentes etapas de instrução, de escola primária à universidade, em Estados diferentes da União (sendo que o princípio da demarcação de estados na Índia é linguístico; cada estado tem sua própria língua).

A "condição migrante" de que fala o escritor Rushdie descreve bem o trajeto que tive de percorrer até chegar onde me encontro hoje. Não só no sentido geográfico, isto é, em relação a constantes mudanças de domicílio, cobrindo diversas cidades e estados da Índia como Ootakamund, Trivandrum, Madras, Bombay, Jodhpur, Mysore, e Delhi (todos na Índia), além da cidade de Edimburgo na Escócia, antes de vir ao 'Brasil' (que, com tempo, passou a ser o 'Brasil'). A expressão "condição migrante" parece também descrever bem algumas das mudanças de rumo que ocorreram ao longo da minha carreira acadêmica: como mostrará uma consulta rápida ao 'Curriculum Vitae' em anexo - jornalismo, publicidade, literatura, linguística, e filosofia são alguns dos destaques de uma carreira que em inglês seria caracterizada como "chequered".

O que se destacou como marca registrada da minha carreira enquanto profissional acabou também influenciando de maneira decisiva o modo como penso hoje sobre as principais questões sendo debatidas na minha área de concentração enquanto professor e pesquisador: a Filosofia da Linguagem. Isso se torna bastante

claro quando analisarmos o caminho que vem percorrendo o meu projeto de pesquisa, financiado pelo CNPq (306151/88-0) desde 1988 (o mesmo ano em que fui promovido da categoria MS-3 para MS-4). Trata-se, na verdade, de uma linha de pesquisa que vinha perseguindo desde 1978, quando iniciei as pesquisas que resultaram na minha tese de doutorado em 1982. O tema daquela tese era a assim chamada Teoria dos Atos de Fala, teoria esta que, em sua atual forma, foi desenvolvida nos EUA, mais precisamente na UC-Berkeley, tendo como seu maior divulgador e defensor o Prof. John R. Searle (por sinal, o "sponsor" da minha visita àquela universidade). Na fase inicial da minha pesquisa, todo o esforço se dirigia à tarefa de formalizar a teoria - justamente na linha traçada por Searle como talvez a sua principal contribuição na área, posto que as primeiras reflexões a respeito portavam a assinatura do seu mestre J.L. Austin. Só depois de alguns anos (mais ou menos por volta de 1985) é que comecei a perceber que tal esforço de formalização não passava de um tremendo contrasentido, de vez que a Teoria dos Atos de Fala tem como fonte de inspiração o movimento chamado "a Filosofia da Linguagem Ordinária", movimento que se destacou na Inglaterra nas décadas de 40 e 50 em virtude da sua oposição ferrenha à tendência logicista que imperava no campo. O próprio Searle hoje em dia concede que houve um entusiasmo exagerado a favor de formalismo, chegando a caracterizar de "uma aventura infeliz" (comunicação pessoal) o seu próprio livro The Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (escrito em parceria com o lógico canadense Daniel Vanderveken). De qualquer forma, está aí como prova concreta dessa fase da minha pesquisa,

a minha tese de doutorado intitulada Negation and Denial: A Study in the Theory of Speech Acts. Foi no mesmo espírito que apresentei o trabalho "Sobre a função de 'F' na formula 'F(p)'" (VI Encontro Nacional de Linguística, PUC-RJ, Nov. 1981).

A partir do momento em que me convenci da insensatez de se procurar resolver os problemas da Teoria dos Atos de Fala por meio de uma formalização rigorosa de seu arcabouço bem como de seus conceitos básicos e pressupostos, começou a tomar um outro rumo o meu projeto de pesquisa. Surgiram duas perguntas distintas: (a) O que foi que induziu tantos estudiosos a optar por formalização como o método mais indicado para resolver os problemas pendentes da teoria? (b) Qual seria o caminho alternativo se abrissemos mão da tentativa formalista, e quais seriam suas implicações para o campo de estudo como um todo?

Como era de se esperar, as duas perguntas abriram dois caminhos distintos de indagação, dois 'sub-projetos' de pesquisa. De um lado, o caminho aberto pela primeira pergunta, ou seja, a que diz respeito as questões institucionais que promovem determinados tipos de pergunta em detrimento de outros, isto é, em última análise, tendo a ver com as áreas da Filosofia e da Sociologia das Ciências (envolvendo até a própria organização do saber dentro de uma universidade, tal qual o tema foi abordado no início deste memorial). A esse ramo da minha pesquisa pertencem trabalhos como "A Filosofia da Linguística: o que é e para que serve?" (39ª Reunião Anual da S.B.P.C. Brasília, 1987), "Evidências e Argumentos - Reflexões sobre a Construção de Teorias Linguísticas" (40ª Reunião da S.B.P.C., São Paulo, 1988), "A indissociabilidade do historiar da Linguística do próprio fazer

da Linguística" (D.E.L.T.A., Vol. 5. no. 2., 1989), "Ílocução, locução, e a forma linguística" (em um volume editado pela PUC-SP) e "A irredutibilidade do ato ilocucionário como fator inibidor das tentativas taxonômicas" (D.E.L.T.A., 1992)

Quanto ao outro, isto é, o segundo caminho aberto a partir da pergunta (b), a tendência tem sido a de distanciar-me cada vez mais da "Leitura Oficial" como venho chamando a interpretação do pensamento de J.L. Austin feita sob a influência de Searle. Vários autores serviram de base para tal distanciamento. Ao mesmo tempo, surgiu também um novo interesse em reler e reinterpretar os escritos do próprio Austin. O nome do filósofo francês Jacques Derrida tem o destaque maior no contexto dessa mudança de enfoque. Shoshana Felman, Barbara Johnson, e Sandy Petrey são alguns dos outros nomes importantes a esse respeito. Artigos como "Speech acts and literature: remarks on an often-overlooked aspect of the Searle/Derrida debate" (Cadernos Linguísticos, Unicamp, 1993), "O lugar da ideologia no pensamento de J.L. Austin" (Cadernos Linguísticos, Unicamp, 1992), "Austin: um exercício em desconstrução" (UNESP - Araraquara), e "Austin: um filósofo inglês com sotaque francês?" (Estudos Linguísticos, 1992) relatam a pesquisa desenvolvida nos últimos anos em resposta à segunda pergunta. O projeto que desenvolvi em UC Berkeley durante 1993 também se acha inserido nessa linha de pesquisa.

As duas linhas de pesquisa acima relatadas têm me conduzido a questões bem mais amplas, envolvendo não só a Filosofia da Linguagem mas também praticamente todas as áreas conexas - atribuindo a expressão "condição migrante" um significado ainda

maior. O 'vai e vem' entre as mais diversas áreas de conhecimento e o conseqüente apagamento das linhas de demarcação entre elas está se tornando cada vez mais evidente na minha conduta enquanto pesquisador.


Não é de estranhar, portanto, que a disciplina 'Tópicos de Semântica' que estou ministrando neste semestre no curso de Pós-graduação em Linguística (IEL, UNICAMP) reflète bem a transdisciplinaridade que caracteriza a minha pesquisa. Procurando rastrear o desenvolvimento de algumas das principais indagações da Filosofia da Linguagem nos últimos tempos, venho incentivando os meus alunos a ler e discutir autores que historicamente foram tratados como não pertencentes à área e portanto não relevantes.

Não pretendo me deter nos detalhes e nem multiplicar os exemplos mais do que o necessário. Parece-me evidente, a essa altura, que a vida e atividade intelectual estão mostrando uma só tendência: a da "condição migrante". Trata-se, talvez, de uma convergência, de um único momento não regido por acaso, numa trajetória de uma vida pessoal, e de uma carreira acadêmica, ambas governadas por uma série de acasos.

Para terminar este memorial, faço minhas as seguintes palavras de Salman Rushdie:

Throughout human history, the apostles of purity, those who have claimed to possess a total explanation, have wrought havoc among mere mixed-up human beings. Like many millions of people, I am a bastard child of history. Perhaps we all are, black, brown and white, leaking into one another, as a character of mine once said, like flavours when you cook.

Campinas,
14 de março de 1994


Prof. Dr. Kanavillil Rajagopalan

CURRICULUM VITAE

1. DADOS PESSOAIS

Nome: Kanavillil Rajagopalan
Número de matrícula Unicamp: 10.732
RNE: W 263311-W
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Estado civil: Casado

2. FORMAÇÃO ACADÊMICA

a) Graduação:

* B.A. em Literatura Inglesa

Instituição: University College, University of Kerala,
Trivandrum, India

Ano de conclusão: 1966

b) Pós-graduação:

* Diploma em Publicidade e Relações Públicas

Instituição: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombaim, Índia

Ano de conclusão: 1969

* M.A. em Literatura Inglesa

Instituição: Universidade de Delhi, India

Ano de conclusão: 1970

* M.A. em Linguística

Instituição: Universidade de Delhi, India



Ano de conclusão: 1973

* Diploma em Linguística Aplicada

Instituição: Universidade de Edimburgo, Escócia

Ano de conclusão: 1975

* Doutorado em Ciências Humanas - Linguística

Instituição: PUC-SP

Ano de conclusão: 1982

* Pós-doutorado em Filosofia da Linguagem

Instituição: Universidade da Califórnia em Berkeley, EUA

Ano de conclusão: 1994

3. EXPERIÊNCIA PROFISSIONAL

* Professor (RDIDP), UNICAMP (desde agosto de 1984)

* Professor Associado, PUC-SP. de agosto de 1977 até julho de 1988)

* Senior Lecturer, Shyam Lal College, Universidade de Delhi, Índia (de 1970 até 1976)

* Tutor, Wisdom Tutorial College, Ernakulam, Índia (de 1967 até 1968)

4. COLABORAÇÃO COM ENTIDADES E ORGANISMOS EXTERNOS

* Consultor 'ad hoc', FAPESP (desde 1984)

* Consultor 'ad hoc', CNPq (desde 1989)

* Consultor 'ad hoc' "especial", CEPE, PUC-SP

* Consultor 'ad hoc', FACEPE (Pernambuco) (desde 1991)

* Assessor Científico da Coordenadoria de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação, Universidade Est. de Londrina (desde 1991)

- * Membro do Conselho Editorial, Revista Semina, UEL (desde 1991)
- * Assessor 'ad hoc' da Editora da Unicamp (desde 1989)
- * Consultor 'ad hoc', FAEP, Unicamp (desde 1989)
- * Membro do Conselho Editorial, Revista Claritas, Depto. de Inglês, PUC-SP
- * Membro do Conselho Editorial, Revista D.E.L.T.A.

5. DISCIPLINADAS LECIONADAS NA UNICAMP

<u>Semestre</u>	<u>Ano</u>	<u>Disciplina</u>
2	1984	HL 517A - Lexicologia e Lexicografia
1	1985	LL 126 Pragmática
2	1985	LL 226 Tópicos de Semântica e Pragmática
1	1986	LL 226 Tópicos de Semântica e Pragmática
1	1986	LL 126 Prragmática
2	1986	LL 225 Tópicos de Semântica II
1	1987	LL 126 Pragmática
2	1987	LL 226 Tópicos de Semântica e Pragmática
2	1987	LL 020 Introdução a Semântica
1	1988	Ll 406 Leitura Ind. Orientada
2	1988	LL 226 Topicos de Semântica e Pragmática
2	1988	HL 624 Lexicologia e Lexicografia
2	1988	LL 126 Pragmática
1	1989	HL 092 Tópicos de Linguística III
1	1989	LL 020 Introdução a Semântica

<u>Semestre</u>	<u>Ano</u>	<u>Disciplina</u>
2	1989	LL226 Tópicos de semântica e Pragmática
2	1989	LL 012 Modelos de Análise Lingüística
2	1989	Ll 406 Leitura Individual Orientada
1	1990	LL 126 Pragmática
1	1990	LP 210 Tópicos em Lingua Materna
2	1990	HL 420 Gramática II
2	1990	LL020 Introdução a Semântica
1	1991	LL 012 Modelos de Análise Lingüística
1	1991	LL225 Tópicos de Semântica II
2	1991	LL 227 Seminário Avançado de Pragmática
1	1992	LL 126 Pragmática
2	1992	LL227 Seminário Avançado de Pragmática
2	1992	LL012 Modelos de Análise Lingüística
2	1992	HL 092 Tópicos de Lingüística III

6. TESES ORIENTADAS

Ja defendidas

<u>Candidato</u>	<u>Nível</u>
Maria Jose Coracini	doutorado
Paulo Ottoni	doutorado
Fabio Luiz Lopes da Silva	mestrado
Julia Maria C. de Almeida	mestrado

Em andamento

Maria Cristina Magro	doutorado
Marcelo Muniz Freire	mestrado

7. ATIVIDADES DE PESQUISA

- * Projeto de pesquisa intitulado "Austin: Para uma leitura alternativa", financiado pelo CNPq (306151/88-0)

8. ATIVIDADES ADMINISTRATIVAS NA UNIVERSIDADE

- * Membro do Conselho Departamental do DL/IEL/UNICAMP (1989 - 1990)
- * Suplente do Membro Complementario do Depto. de Linguística para a Congregação do IEL (1991 - 1992)

9. TRABALHOS PUBLICADOS

- * "Speech acts and literature: remarks on an often-overlooked aspect of the Searle/Derrida debate" Cadernos de Estudos Linguísticos 24 1993. Pp. 59 - 64.
- * "Discurso e história: Bakhtin vs. Austin quanto às possibilidades de uma articulação" Estudos Linguísticos XXII 1993. Pp. 376 - 383
- * "Significações e a crise na linguística" Filosofia v. 5. 1992. Pp. 61 - 70.
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12. PARTICIPAÇÃO EM BANCAS - TESES.

- * Fabio Luiz Lopes da Silva. Mestrado. Unicamp. 11/12/92. (Orientador).
- * Junia focas V. Machado. Doutorado. qualificação. Unicamp. 25/11/92.
- * Nicia Aam Bonatti. Mestrado. Qualificação. Unicamp. 15/10/92.
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- * Julia Maria C. de almeida. Mestrado. Qualificação. Unicamp. (Como orientador)
- * Maria Augusta de Bastos. Doutorado. Qualificação. Unicamp.
- * Marise Manoel. Mestrado. unicamp. 11/12/91.
- * Mario Laranjeira. Doutorado USP. 01/12/89.
- * Paulo Ottoni. Doutorado. Unicamp. 13/12/90. (Como orientador)
- * Rui Manuel Cruse. Doutorado. PUC-Sp. Suplente. 15/12/1989.
- * Lucia Helena Franca. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 27/11/89.
- * Cassia Regina sassolete. Mestrado. Unicamp. Qualificação. 03/04/90.
- * Maria Jose R.F. coracini. Doutorado. PUC-SP. 1988. (Como Orientador).
- * Sandra Maria Ferreira Castro. Mestrado. Unicamp. 1988.
- * Kazuko Maeda. Doutorado. PUC-SP. 1988.
- * Silvia simone Anspach. Doutorado. PUC-SP. 1987.
- * Eleni Jacques Martins. Doutorado. Unicamp. 1987.
- * Suzy Lagazzi. Mestrado. unicamp. 1987.
- * Rosana Paulillo. Mestrado. Unicamp. 1987.



- * Sumiko Ikeda. Doutorado. PUC-SP. 21/03/86.
- * Lyn Mario Menezes de Souza. Mestrado. Qualificacao. PUC-SP.
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- * Odenildo Teixeira Sena. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 06/12/85.
- * Ana Maria Carmagnani. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 05/07/85.
- * Paulo Zanotto. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 17/12/84.
- * Vicente Cerqueira Cruz. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 02/07/84.
- * Edna Cristina Gabriel. Mestrado. PUC-SP. 16/08/83.
- * Samira Samara. Doutorado. Qualificacao. PUC-SP.
19/12/83.
- * Irene Costa Alves. Mestrado. Qualificacao. PUC-SP.
03/08/83.
- * Selene Magda Correia. Mestrado. Qualificacao. PUC-SP.
07/05/84.

13. PARTICIPAÇÃO EM BANCAS - CONCURSOS

- * Prof. Dr. Julian Nazario. associado. Depto. de Inglês. PUC-SP
1992.
- * Profa. Dra. Silvia Simone Anspach. Associado. Depto. de Inglês.
PUC-SP. 1992.
- * Profa. Alice cunha de Freitas. assistente Mestre. Depto. de
Inglês. PUC-SP. 1991.
- * Profa. Maria Odila Moraes. Assistente mestre. Depto. de Arte.
PUC-SP. 1991.
- * Profa. Walkyria Mor. Assistente Mestre. Depto. de Inglês. PUC-
SP. 1991.

- * Profa. Ana Elisa Cysne. Assistente Mestre. Depto. de Inglês. PUC-SP. 1991.
- * Profa. Dra. Heloisa Collins. Associado. Depto. de Inglês. PUC-SP. 1991.
- * Profa. Maria Jose Coracini. Depto. de Francês. PUC-SP. 1991.
- * Profa. Margarete Elias. assistente Mestre. Depto. de Linguística. PUC-SP. 1990.
- * Profa. Flaminia M.M. Lodovici. Assistente mestre. depto. de Linguística. PUC-SP. 1990.
- * Maria Aparecida C.M. da Silva. assistente mestre, Depto. de Linguística. PUC-SP. 1990.
- * Rosana Paulillo Ferroni. Assistente mestre. Depto. de Linguística. PUC-SP. 1989.
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- * Profa. Laura Burman Assistente mestre. Depto. de Inglês, PUC-SP. 1988.
- * Lais F. Azavedo. Associado. Depto. de Portugues. PUC-SP. 1986.
- * Fernando Luiz tarallo. Associado. Depto. de Linguistica. PUC-SP. 1986.
- * Rosemary Arrojo. Assistente Doutor. Depto. de Ingles. PUC-SP. 1986.
- * Jose Carlos Paes de Almeida Filho. Assistente Doutor. Depto. de Ingles. PUC-SP. 1985.
- * Julian Nazario. Assistente Mestre. PUC-SP. 1983.
- * Maria Fachin. Assistente Mestre. Depto. de Ingles. PUC-SP. 1983.



* Profa. Leila Darin. Assistente Mestre. Depto. de Inglês. PUC-SP. 1984.

* Profa. Maria Francisca Lier. assistente Mestre. Depto. de Linguística. PUC-SP. 1988.

Campinas,

14 de marco de 1994


Prof. Dr. Kanavillil Rajagopalan



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INFORMAÇÃO

Ao SIARQ para manter em arquivo 1 exemplar do Memorial de Kanavillil Rajagopalan - IEL, a qual acompanhou o trâmite do proc. nº 01-P-4627/84 2 1 (Vida Funcional), em nome do interessado (a).

ARZ Gomes
ALDA REGINA GOMES
Seção de Ass. Femin.
Secretaria Geral
29/3/95